Equifax operates a massive database that contains the full employment history including weekly pay of 105 million US workers, which it receives from 2.5m employers and payroll processors #socialcredit
According to Equifax, it does not only have employment and income data but also 'talent' data. And it's not only sold to employers but to many parties from lenders to government agencies (to evaluate welfare applications, as interpreted by Business Insider).
"We are now receiving records every pay period from 2.5 million companies, up from ... 27,000 contributors a short two-plus years ago. Our lens is expanding beyond U.S. non-farm payroll to include the 40-50 million gig and self-employed workers and 20-30 million pensioners"
Equifax states that 'Workforce Solutions' is now its "strongest, fastest growing, highest margin and most valuable business. It now delivers over 40% of Equifax revenue, up from 25% a short three years ago and will likely grow to over 50% of Equifax in the coming years"
Apparently, Equifax already provides similar 'workforce solutions' products in Canada, Australia and India, and it launched a new "income and employment verification platform" in the UK.
Disturbing at many levels.
Why should an unaccountable+inescapable for-profit organization have control over lifelong employment data and subsequent decision-making?
Make no mistake, this is not just about 'privacy'. It fundamentally affects power asymmetries in life and work.
Making employment, pay and even talent data easily accessible *across* employers increases their leverage in many ways. Especially in low-paid work, it further contributes to disciplining workers throughout life, and it helps employers to better hire/fire/exploit people at scale.
Of course, Equifax also collects personal data in order to make decisions on people in other areas of life, for example credit data from 'buy now pay later' companies.
Equifax's "very unique data assets" include records on employment/education/incarceration, 'core' credit data, bank account balances/deposits/withdrawals, data on devices and digital behaviors (Kount), "access to 80 million unbanked, underbanked and credit rebuilding consumers".
Equifax is not just a credit reporting agency. It's a data broker and it helps others to make decisions about people in many areas of life. Each entry in the above list refers to yet another huge data processing system. I wrote more about one of them here:
I cannot believe that Kount, a fraud+risk surveillance company owned by Equifax, openly advocates the use of data processed for fraud prevention purposes for marketing profiling.
Totally irresponsible, destroys any trust in digital technology, would be totally illegal in the EU.
Sound *really* bad. Equifax/Kount don't just tell companies they should use data from their 'fraud team' for marketing purposes.
They also offer to enrich it with "fraud and risk data from Kount", i.e. with "thousands of data points from Kount's Identity Trust Global Network".
This "Identity Trust Global Network" is a mass surveillance system.
Kount claims it processes data on '32 billion annual interactions' from '50 leading payment processors, eCommerce platforms, and card networks' across 250 countries, including on payments, identity and location.
Die ProSiebenSat1-Datenfirma Kairion hat auf Basis von Daten über "Kaufabsichten" bei 50 dt. Online-Apotheken "bereits über zwei Millionen Nutzerprofile erstellt" 🧐
Auch wenn die Profilattribute, die am Ende für Werbetargeting verkauft werden, nur halb sensibel sein mögen (wobei: "Werdende Eltern"), sind die dafür verarbeiteten personenbezogenen Daten über "konkrete Kaufabsichten" von Medikamenten bei Online-Apotheken wohl höchst sensibel.
Habs mir bei disapo.de angeschaut, einer dt. Online-Apotheke mit € 90 Mio Umsatz und NL-Registrierung, kürzlich von Douglas übernommen.
Kairion/Adex erhalten Daten zu besuchten Produktkategorien zB "Depressive Verstimmung", "Diabetes" oder "Potenz & Stimulation".
Oracle verkauft nicht nur Unternehmenssoftware, sondern ist auch Tracking- und Datenhandelskonzern.
Nach einer US-Klage gegen Oracle's Datensammelei hat die Schweizer Datenschutzbehörde eine Untersuchung eingeleitet, @adfichter hat weiter recherchiert: dnip.ch/2022/10/11/der…
@adfichter "Es wird nun abgeklärt, inwieweit Schweizer Webseitenbetreiber und App-Anbieter durch die Einbindung der Tracking-Technologien [von Oracle] die Datenschutzgrundsätze gemäss dem Schweizer Datenschutzgesetz verletzen"
Ich hab mir gestern angeschaut, was bei einem einzigen Besuch von spiegel.de im Hintergrund passiert:
Zum Beispiel 2710 Datenübertragungen an 129 Hosts von Drittparteien, an Google, FB und unzählige Adtech- und Datenhandelsfirmen. Das ist völlig kaputt. Thread:
Der von österreichischen und deutschen Medien seit einigen Jahren gepushte DSGVO-Hack "einwilligen oder zahlen" ist keine Lösung. Im Gegenteil, er unterminiert die DSGVO.
Erstens halte ich die Datenverarbeitung bei "Einwilligung" kaum für rechtskonform (siehe Thread).
Zweitens, weil dann bald jede Website, App und alles andere von Reisebuchungen bis Finanzdienstleistungen bis "smarte" Geräte ein Pseudo-Angebot á la "bezahl ein paar Euro oder gib deine Rechte auf" einführen und damit kommerzieller Datenmissbrauch für die Mehrheit zur Norm wird.
"As only a tiny minority would pay this fee across a large number of digital services, data exploitation would become the default for most Europeans"
On the consent-or-pay GDPR hack invented by Austrian and German news websites, including comments by me: gizmodo.com/cookie-paywall…
Btw. Even if the consent-or-pay model was desirable and lawful, I doubt that spiegel.de has a lawful basis (or even oversight) about how at least 73 third-party hosts operated by big tech and shady to super-shady adtech/data firms process personal data on readers.
…the above table shows third-party hosts that received data during a single visit to spiegel.de as just observed in my browser. In many cases, these third parties stored personal identifiers in the browser, received them, sent them to each other ('ID syncing') etc.