(📢) Our post embargo thread on the recommendations made in the #IICSAfinalreport, including the expected #IICSAbigticket recommendation for the introduction of well-designed #MandatoryReporting of child sexual abuse by those working in #RegulatedActivities starts shortly.
1/ #MR of #CSA exists in most jurisdictions in the rest of the world. Empirical evidence and data demonstrate it's a vital component of significantly improved safeguarding in complex institutional settings. So why do Eng + Wal not have it?
2/ The short answer is that the safeguarding framework, as created by the Dept of Education, is dominated by 'neglect' in the family. It is then panel beaten into a framework that is misapplied to complex institutional settings which have entirely different demands. 
3/ Making any of it work is the same as attempting to nail jelly to a wall. A large part of the failure of safeguarding in schools, sport, healthcare, faith and so many other institutional settings stems from this poor framework.
4/ And yet it seems @inquiryCSA has not researched the essential question. "To what extent does the framework inhibit or facilitate the reporting of child sexual abuse?" Without addressing this question, the shortcomings are unlikely to have been fully addressed by #IICSA.
5/ With that preface, we are moments away from the start of our thread.
6/ The main #iicsabigticket item is #mandatoryreporting. And IICSA has recommended it, in Recommendation 13. Unfortunately the scope is wholly inadequate - it is "mandatory in name only" reporting.
7/ The inquiry only recommends a criminal sanction on failure to report witnessed abuse or a disclosure from a child or perpetrator. Failure to report other grounds for suspicion will not attract a criminal sanction. (Part F.4 para 92) #iicsabigticket
8/ Because child sex abuse is a private act, there will be few opportunities to witness it. The Chair said in her press statement today that on average it takes 26 years for a victim to disclose their abuse, so prompt disclosures from children are going to be few.
9/ Also, few perpetrators voluntarily admit their abuse. So a mandatory reporting law limited to these cases is very little use. Given the evidence that the inquiry has heard, it is impossible to understand how they have reached this position.
10/ Unfortunately it gets worse. The duty to report applies to "any person working in regulated activities", those in a position of trust, and police.
11/ This is obviously inappropriate. The only people who should be mandated reporters are those actually in a position of trust working with children in institutional settings. Dinner ladies are not in this category, but appear to be caught by the recommendation's wording.
12/ When the Home Office published a public consultation into mandatory reporting some years ago, headlines appeared that dinner ladies were being threatened with jail for failing to report.
13/ The panel knows this and must expect the same headlines again opposing mandatory reporting. It is almost as if they are trying to stimulate opposition to their own recommendation.
14/ The inquiry states that reporting of suspicions based on evidence other than disclosure or witnessed abuse "must be encouraged", but in saying this it is willing the end without willing the means.
15/ In the absence of a legal sanction, the question left unaddressed is how the inquiry expects to change the behaviour of those who suspect abuse, know that they should report it, know how to report it, but choose not to report it.
16/ It is not as if this is a hypothetical concern. This exact situation was presented to the inquiry repeatedly in evidence in the public hearings, but the panel has completely failed to grasp the consequences.
17/ The inquiry recommends that there should be no religious exemption to the duty to report disclosures. Disclosures by perpetrators or victims during confession are covered by the duty and the criminal sanction.
18/ The inquiry proposes setting up new Child Protection Authorities for England and Wales. These will be centres of information on good safeguarding practice, and will provide advice and recommendations to government in relation to child protection policy.
19/ They will also have some power to inspect institutions, either those not currently subject to any inspection regime or to supplement existing inspectorates.
20/ This will be discretionary, the CPA will choose what settings to inspect, "limited in the first instance to those areas most in need of independent scrutiny".
21/ The inquiry is of the view that "It would not be desirable or reasonable for the State to inspect every small or informal gathering of children."
22/ The power to inspect "should be used sparingly as the CPAs should be encouraging and supporting good practice."
23/ However, the existing failing inspectorates such as OFSTED and ISI will not be relieved of their safeguarding inspection duties and the CPAs will have no enforcement powers in the event that they discover inadequate practice.
24/ The inquiry report suggests that "the public exposure of failings in any report is envisaged to be sufficient to bring about the necessary changes".
25/ This needs to be looked at in the context for instance of Ampleforth College. It failed an emergency OFSTED inspection in Nov 2020 for inadequate safeguarding. It has since failed three more inspections, also on safeguarding.
26/ If mere bad publicity from a failed inspection was enough to get an institution to change its ways, then Ampleforth would have reformed and improved its safeguarding long ago. But at the time of writing it is still rated "Inadequate".
27/ So we are faced again the difficult question of how, absent a criminal sanction or other effective enforcement mechanism, we can change the behaviour of those who persistently fail to protect children effectively. And the inquiry seems to have no answer.
28/ The inquiry has looked at the workings of the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS), It recommends greater use of the barred list, that anyone engaging a person to work or volunteer with children can check whether that person is on the barred list.
29/ The inquiry also recommends the scope of DBS be extended to enable enhanced DBS certificates with barred list checks to be issued for those working with children overseas.
30/ This would cover those working or volunteering overseas with UK-based organisations where the recruitment decision is made outside UK, and cover England and Wales residents working or volunteering with children overseas in what in UK would be a regulated activity
31/ The inquiry has also looked at compliance with the statutory duty to make DBS referrals. It recommends that regulators and inspectorates include DBS compliance in their assessments of institutions
32/ But there are no specific proposals to improve enforcement for instance by defining DBS or any other body as a prosecuting authority for failure to make DBS referrals.
33/ While in principle it is mandatory to make a DBS referral, there is no effective enforcement mechanism. There have (as far as we're aware) been no prosecutions in England & Wales for failure to make DBS referrals. The report doesn't seem to address this.
34/ There doesn't appear to be anything in the report on the subject of establishing an accredited training system for safeguarding trainers. At present anyone can set up as a safeguarding trainer and spout all sorts of rubbish.
35/ The quality of LADOs (Local Authority Designated Officers) varies greatly across the country but we haven't seen any recommendations to address it. We'll keep looking to see if we've missed something.
36/ One of the issues hampering efforts to improve safeguarding practice or even assess the scale of abuse is lack of adequate data. The inquiry has recognised that and recommended improvements in data collection
37/ Agencies should produce consistent and compatible data about child sexual abuse including characteristics of victims and perpetrators, factors that make victims vulnerable, and the settings & contexts where abuse occurs
35/ These are our initial conclusions based on a first readthrough. More will follow once we've been able to look in more detail.
Overall, the recommendation for mandatory reporting is of almost no value at all. It's a counterfeit. When Prof Ben Mathews spoke to the inquiry's 2nd mandatory reporting seminar in April 2019 he made it clear that there's no point is implementing something known to be suboptimal
The inquiry looks as if (for political reasons) it has tried to implement half of a mandatory reporting proposal. But in this context a half-measure is no better then nothing at all. But that's what we've been given.
And there's no guarantee even that much will be implemented by government. Historically only about 45% of public inquiry recommendations are ever implemented by government in part or in full.
Assembling a thread of this detail at such speed following the release of the noon embargo requires subject literacy and an ability to rapidly structure argument. We'd like to thank our colleague @JonathanWest_ for this tremendous thread that delivered the facts with clarity.
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