Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵
Preventing Spurs from breaking from their deep block meant the visitors were locked into their own half. Rashford’s runs on the blindside of Dier were threatening, especially when receiving from Fernandes. Casemiro and the United defenders were superb at breaking up play... 🧐🧵
Fernandes’ positioning between the lines, and his ability to turn and face forward on his first touch, and deftly connect into Rashford running in behind, provided United with a significant threat throughout the second half... 🧐🧵
Conte set Tottenham up in a 3-5-2, with Bissouma coming into the side. Bentancur was therefore given more attacking freedom, and pushed forward through the right inside channel with penetrative runs off the ball... 🧐🧵
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Manchester City’s 4-3-3 started on the front foot as Arsenal initially attempted to press into the host’s half, in a 4-4-2 shape. Arsenal went player-oriented in the wide areas, with Declan Rice and Thomas Partey tracking Bernardo Silva and Ilkay Gündogan’s forward runs. However, Silva’s wide runs to City’s right-side created space for Savinho to drive inside, penetrating against the aggressive jumping of Arsenal’s left-back, Calafiori. This helped disrupt and stretch Arsenal’s back line in the early stages, including when Haaland was slid in-behind to calmly open the scoring... 🧐🧵
It wasn’t long before Arsenal formed a low block, while City responded with a 3-1-5-1 shape. Josko Gvardiol moved into a left-side number eight role from full-back, with Gündogan as the central option underneath Haaland. Rodri – soon to be replaced by Kovacic – acted as the single pivot. Still, it was City’s right side that proved most potent, with Silva’s wider positioning supporting Savinho’s direct movements and dribbles against Calafiori... 🧐🧵
Stemming from tweaks to the 4-4-2 formation, and initially most popular in Spain, the 4-2-3-1 grew in popularity from the 2000s onwards. It has since been used with success by many prominent coaches, including Pep Guardiola, Arne Slot and Erik ten Hag... 4️⃣2️⃣3️⃣1️⃣🧵
Central protection...
The 4-2-3-1 requires defensive midfielders who can duel, tackle and intercept in individual battles. These midfielders must be alert enough to land on any second balls. They must have good acceleration and deceleration to help with this... 4️⃣2️⃣3️⃣1️⃣🧵
Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Barcelona were set up in a 4-3-3, against a Madrid 4-4-2 defensive block. Torres moved inside to support centre-forward Aubameyang. De Jong and Pedri widened to support through the inside channels, with Busquets left as the single pivot ahead of the two centre-backs... 🧐🧵
Busquets dropped into defence to draw one of Madrid’s central midfielders up, and Pedri drifted wider to drag the other out. This often left De Jong as the free man to receive in the inside channel when Barcelona’s back line could access him... 🧐🧵