1. We learn a lot about “What Drives Phil Lowe?” from the RBA’s approach to the Review. Other than agreeing to cooperate, the Bank has not dedicated specific resources to prepare for and respond to the Review.
2.In fact, my understanding is that it is even worse as the RBA has not replaced staff that are serving on the Secretariat to the Review.
3. For anyone familiar with other central bank reviews, this is remarkable. As one example, a small part of the Federal Reserve’s intellectual effort on their recent review can be found here.
4. Should we understand that the Bank thinks the Treasurer will recommend continuance of the status quo; or that the Bank plans to refuse to implement recommendations, testing how much political capital the Treasurer is prepared to burn bringing the Bank to heal.
5. Regardless, the RBA apparently isn’t of the view that the public would be well served by internal reflection on the objectives, frameworks and institutional processes and procedures that determine monetary policy. This alone tells us a lot about the mindset of Bank leadership.
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1. Central banks are inherently political institutions. They build public consensus for their policy framework and decisions; they shape the values and the benchmarks by which they want the public to evaluate them; and they shape their legislative/regulatory environment.
2. The RBA’s recent introspection must be judged within this frame. The Bank’s unusual willingness to concede error and provide “critical” internal evaluation of pandemic programs does not reflect a now penitent institution, seeking to make amends and lasting reform.
3. Rather the Bank seeks to manage the politics of the RBA Review, attempting to forestall criticism, changes to its mandate, and, critically, changes to the way in which we hold the institution to account.