1. If I made a submission to the RBA Review, which I won’t, it would start with the following observation: the objectives and to a lesser extent the framework are second order issues when compared to culture and institutional design. 2. While the Review should be forward looking, we should require a high threshold of evidence and expected benefits to make radical changes now. Much of the concern about policy has arguably been about the failure to achieve objectives, not the objectives themselves.

1. We learn a lot about “What Drives Phil Lowe?” from the RBA’s approach to the Review. Other than agreeing to cooperate, the Bank has not dedicated specific resources to prepare for and respond to the Review.

https://twitter.com/SatPaper/status/1583597751665061888

2.In fact, my understanding is that it is even worse as the RBA has not replaced staff that are serving on the Secretariat to the Review.

1. Central banks are inherently political institutions. They build public consensus for their policy framework and decisions; they shape the values and the benchmarks by which they want the public to evaluate them; and they shape their legislative/regulatory environment. 2. The RBA’s recent introspection must be judged within this frame. The Bank’s unusual willingness to concede error and provide “critical” internal evaluation of pandemic programs does not reflect a now penitent institution, seeking to make amends and lasting reform.