There isn’t much substance in the reporting, because governments either don’t provide the substance or they skew what they want people to know based on their messaging.1/ washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
Having been on these kinds of contentious calls with foreign counterparts (with less at stake) sometimes it’s just feeling each other out.
The pentagon describing the call with the term “professional” tells me there was little to no significant breakthroughs. 2/
Sec Austin likely provided some pointed but nuanced communication that gave Shoigu pause. And Shoigu was likely testing Austin…and lying.
Remember, Shoigu is corrupt, a crook, a grifter, & is the guy most responsible for how poorly the Russian army is performing. 3/
Austin was my boss in Iraq. I watched him have tough conversations partisans & corrupt officials like Maliki, and hold firm. He keeps his cards close & he provides the right messages with no potential for misinterpreting what he’s saying. 4/
Add to that, he’s an official with exceedingly strong values. He holds to his beliefs, and he doesn’t suffer fools. He’s articulate, forceful and his integrity is beyond reproach.
He knows what right looks like. 5/
Given GEN Milley hasn’t connected with GEN Gerasimov (that we know of) in many months & Blinken doesn’t trust Lavrov & Biden has made his thoughts known about Putin (& shouldn’t be talking to him like some EU leaders have), it’s good that @secdef is reached out. 6/
But however forceful SEC Austin was, it will likely make little difference when Shoigu reports to Putin, as he alone is the decider who doesn’t seem open to influence.
This is simply an attempt to avoid further miscalculations & dumb moves on Russia’s part.
Hope it works. 7/
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Facts about the G2:
-It has a published range of 2500 km (about 1500 miles). That's suspect.
-It weighs about 200 kg (≈ 450 lbs)
-The payload (explosives) are estimated to be ≈ 50-60kg (130 lbs of explosives, smaller than the lightest 250 lb bombs delivered by aircraft). 3/
Mick describes the actions of Generals Valeriy Zaluzhnyy & Andrii Kovalchuk, and Col-Gen Oleksandr Syrskiy and how those will go down in Ukraine's military history (similar to Eisenhower, Bradley & Montgomery on D-Day).
Aggressive, adaptive, innovative...a new breed. 2/
In April, @politico did a great piece on Zaluzhnyy, saying he is part of a "new generation of Ukrainian officers who cut their teeth in the grinding eight-year war in Donbas and...deployed to training ranges across Europe to drill with NATO forces." 3/
Planners analyze & assess:
-enemy launch platforms (land, sea, air)
-potential "tracks" (the anticipated route the enemy missile will take)
-what they enemy wants to hit
-the critical thing being defended (e.g., airfield, port, infrastructure, specific building, forces). 9/
Here's the point:
It's impossible to line a bunch of ADA systems long the 2500-mile Ukrainian border & expect them to stop missiles launched from RU subs in the Azov, or dropped from RU bombers circling 1500 miles away, or land-based RU missile batteries in RU. 10/
What makes it even harder:
RU is not aiming at "critical infrastructure" or "military targets," (which, in an area like Ukraine would require literally hundreds of ADA systems), RU is striking random civilian targets - to include playgrounds! - all over the country. 11/
After the strike on the Kerch Bridge, it was expected Putin would respond.
He did so by launching 84+ missiles & dozens of drones against Ukrainian civilian targets (an initial assessment) and making more threatening speeches.
A 🧵on that & thoughts on air defense. 1/
As I said in a weekend tweet, the operational strike on the Kerch Bridge resulted in strategic implications.
-Militarily, it affects RU's belief they have a secure line of communication for logistics in a safe area.
-It also negatively affects RU ability to move forces. 2/
RU is now constrained in using the bridge for transport & resupply, and now must use either ship transport to Berydansk or the M4 road from Rostov.
Informationally the RU's - & RU's in Crimea - know about the strike. They can't understand how this "defended" asset was hit. 3/
Wanna know what it's like to be a battlefield commander & have a bridge blow up in your area of operations?
Having had that experience, under different circumstances, it is not a good day in Moscow.
A "war story" 🧵 that will provide some insight into the Kerch attack. 1/
In 2007, I assumed command of the storied @1stArmoredDiv. We would deploy to N. Iraq as "Task Force Iron," and become Multinational Division North, conducting operations in the 7 northern provinces.
Before going, we spent some time training...to include "staff training." 2/
The Division conducted 'battle drills' exercises with our staff at the simulation center at Grafenwoehr, a state of the art facility in S. Germany. During a two week period we practiced everything we thought we might see in combat under the watchful eye of trainers. 3/