1. If I made a submission to the RBA Review, which I won’t, it would start with the following observation: the objectives and to a lesser extent the framework are second order issues when compared to culture and institutional design.
2. While the Review should be forward looking, we should require a high threshold of evidence and expected benefits to make radical changes now. Much of the concern about policy has arguably been about the failure to achieve objectives, not the objectives themselves.
3. To the extent we think the RBA has failed to achieve their mandates stems from problems of institutional design and culture in my view. Sorting this out would largely resolve issues relating to the objectives and framework.
4. That is not to say improvements can’t be made. A priority should be to sharpen the understanding of the objectives in the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy. Two basic concerns here.
5. First, recourse to the third `welfare’ mandate needs to be tightly circumscribed to prohibit advancing unmeasurable and therefore unaccountable goals being pursued in its name. This is not an argument against financial stability concerns; just that they be measurable.
6. Second, persistent low neutral interest rate environments justify a more aggressive focus on the full employment mandate. We should tolerate more inflation variation to guarantee full employment if the ZLB on nominal rates is a recurrent problem.
7. We should of course provide institutional flexibility about the interpretation of price stability and full employment. If later we adduce clear evidence in support of the superiority of price level or nominal income targeting, we should be able to make changes.
8. When talking about objectives, a far more pressing concern is to provide clarity about the objectives of fiscal and macro-prudential policy. For example, theory and evidence makes clear inflation targets cannot be met under certain choices of debt management policy.
9. As Treasury seeks to entrench medium and long-term principles for fiscal sustainability, they should be cognizant of their implications for fiscal backing of the public debt, and therefore inflation policy.
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1. We learn a lot about “What Drives Phil Lowe?” from the RBA’s approach to the Review. Other than agreeing to cooperate, the Bank has not dedicated specific resources to prepare for and respond to the Review.
2.In fact, my understanding is that it is even worse as the RBA has not replaced staff that are serving on the Secretariat to the Review.
3. For anyone familiar with other central bank reviews, this is remarkable. As one example, a small part of the Federal Reserve’s intellectual effort on their recent review can be found here.
1. Central banks are inherently political institutions. They build public consensus for their policy framework and decisions; they shape the values and the benchmarks by which they want the public to evaluate them; and they shape their legislative/regulatory environment.
2. The RBA’s recent introspection must be judged within this frame. The Bank’s unusual willingness to concede error and provide “critical” internal evaluation of pandemic programs does not reflect a now penitent institution, seeking to make amends and lasting reform.
3. Rather the Bank seeks to manage the politics of the RBA Review, attempting to forestall criticism, changes to its mandate, and, critically, changes to the way in which we hold the institution to account.