The @StateDept has sanctioned 3 Syrian military officers for their role in the August 21, 2013 sarin attack on Ghouta which killed over 1,000 men, women, and children:
Brig Gen Adnan Aboud Hilweh
Maj Gen Ghassan Ahmed Ghannam
Maj Gen Jawdat Saleebi Mawas state.gov/designation-of…
Maj Gen Ghannan was commander of the
155th Missile Brigade and associated with Maher
al-Assad. He was sanctioned by the EU in 2016. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…
Brig Gen Adnan Aboud Hilweh was a senior officer in the 155th Missile Brigade. He was sanctioned by the EU in 2016 for "his responsibility for the deployment and use of missile and chemical weapons in civilian areas in 2013." eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…
Maj Gen Jawdat Salbi Mawas in the Syrian Artillery and Missile Directorate was sanctioned by the EU in 2016 for "the use of missiles and chemical weapons by Brigades under his command in highly populated civilian areas in 2013 in Ghouta." eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…
Interestingly, Maj Gen Tahir Hamid Khalil, who was head of the Syrian Artillery and Missiles Directorate in 2013 and was also sanctioned by the EU in 2016 (eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/…) was not sanctioned by US along with his colleagues.
These officers are only part of the vast Syrian chemical weapon complex that used sarin and chlorine indiscriminately against civilians for 8 years. More details on the Syrian chain of command for chemical warfare can be found in this @snhr report: snhr.org/wp-content/pdf…
Proud to support efforts by @OSFJustice to bring these CW perpetrators and war criminals to justice. Criminal investigations into Syrian use of chemical weapons now open in France, Germany, and Sweden. justiceinitiative.org/newsroom/eight… #NoImpunity
For more on international efforts to hold the Syrian regime accountable, read about the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons warontherocks.com/2018/03/noimpu…
And the accountability work of the #UNSC Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the @OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT): tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
This appears to be the first time that Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act has been used to target Syrian CW perpetrators state.gov/wp-content/upl…
No sanctions against these officers yet applied by @USTreasury under EO 13382 (for WMD proliferation) or EO 13572 (for human rights abuses) or EO 13582.
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Russia has taken its disinformation campaign to the @OPCW. In response, Ukraine has formally requested assistance from States Parties for protection against chemical weapons. Should be on agenda for tomorrow's NATO summit.
Ukraine has not yet submitted request for CW protection assistance from @OPCW as allowed under Article X para 8 of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Ukraine may invoke Article X para. 8 if Russia continues making threats and attacking industrial sites like the March 21 attack on Sumy which released ammonia theguardian.com/world/2022/mar…
Syria continuing to stonewall @OPCW. Last meeting with DAT was in Feb '21--20 issues still unresolved. Since Syrian rights and privileged suspended in April, they have refused to schedule next meeting with DAT.
@OPCW .@OPCW planned on sending DAT in May but Syria never responded. Then OPCW proposed September but Syria requested delay until October after UNGA. Then Syria denied visa for 1 member of DAT, even though that member had deployed to Syria multiple times in the past.
"The Secretariat further referred to the applicable legal framework which does not entitle the Syrian Arab Republic to select experts on behalf of the Secretariat, and confirmed that, in light of the above, it would
not deploy the DAT" to Syria.
Syria is seriously escalating its obstruction of @OPCW as newest progress report on elimination of Syrian CW reveals. opcw.org/sites/default/…
3 very worrisome developments....
1. Syria has destroyed the two chlorine cylinders from the April 7 attack on Douma. This is clearly destruction of evidence. Syria prevented @OPCW from bringing the cylinders to The Hague last year for analysis and then destroyed them in secret. Not suspicious at all!
2. Syria has reported that one of its declared former chemical weapon production facilities has been subject to some kind of attack. This is one of the facility's that Syria claims never produced and/or weaponized CW even though @OPCW has forensic evidence to the contrary.
The day after Syria declared in breach of #CWC and its rights and privileges under the treaty were suspended, @OPCW identified a new problem with Syria's CW declaration. For those of you following along at home, this is the 20th outstanding issue with Syria's declaration.
In its 91st monthly progress report on elimination of Syrian CW, @OPCW reports that it has evidence that Syrian CW site produced CW despite Syrian denials. Not only that, samples of CW agent were found in several large containers. Kicker: the agent itself was undeclared.
Note that @OPCW did not say it found degradation products or by-products of production--they found actual CW agent. Samples were taken in September 2020 but no indication of when the production itself took place. Another important question is the identity of the undeclared agent
A couple of observations.
The only immediate effect is that Syria is not allowed to vote or hold any positions at @OPCW
This is a slap on the wrist given how blatant and brazen Syria's violations of the #CWC have been. However, the decision is a milestone in accountability.
Members of the @OPCW can and should do more. If Syria remains in non-compliance with the #CWC by the next Conf of States Parties, the Conf should refer the case to UNSC. Yes, I know Russia will use its veto to protect Syria--but (at least) 3 good reasons to do so.
Last week, the @OPCW IIT issued detailed report on Syrian govt responsibility for chlorine attack on Saraqib in February 2018: opcw.org/iit/second-rep…
Last April, @OPCW IIT issued first report which found Syrian air force responsible for 1 chlorine and 2 sarin attacks on Ltamenah in March 2017: opcw.org/iit/first-repo…