I'm really troubled by what we're seeing from municipal, provincial, and federal intelligence on the Convoy and #POECommission. A short thread on some of the issues as I see them:
There's a great deal of variation in the quality of reports, but many fail some basic tenets of intelligence reporting:
a) Neutral language
b) Well-articulated sources
c) Nuance and uncertainty
d) Free of logical fallacies
e) "in lane" reporting
There's clearly plenty of bias in some of these reports, and it's a massive concern that these were finalized with this present. This is both a failure of analysis and of effective supervision. Intelligence supervisors should be pushing back against this.
In many cases, the sources of information aren't cited or referenced in any way. Sweeping statements are common, but what they're based on is anyone's guess.
There's a lack of nuance in many of these assessments, and in many cases, events are presented as equally certain. There doesn't seem to be any common scale or language for reporting uncertainty. How is an intelligence consumer supposed to make sense of this?
Logical fallacies have been present in several that I've seen, including the epic appeal to authority of Rex Murphy. I'd laugh if this wasn't such a serious matter.
And finally, lots of assessments outside of a lane. I believe that OPP and OPS probably had the best reporting on on-the-ground activities. But were they in a position to assess foreign influence? Probably not. (Again: not clear what they're basing assessments on here).
In short: this is not inspiring confidence. There appears to be a lack of professionalism in the intelligence function in many of these organizations (and I mean that as a lack of training & standards). And the federal level isn't immune either.
This is something that needs serious addressing, and this function needs to be taken seriously in police forces (and federal agencies -- it's a bit better there, but by no means perfect).
I'm reviewing more of these documents and I want to clarify: there are some that are very good and very professional, with excellent expressions of uncertainty and judgments. But these are not the norm.
While I think there's a strong public interest in knowing the names of people named in classified intelligence for colluding with foreign governments, this editorial misses a few key points, which I'll expand on below (and why I think it's a bad idea to name them). 🧵
1. Intelligence is not evidence. I seem to need to keep explaining this, but there's a lot of daylight between how intelligence is collected and how evidence is collected.
There are often motivated sources, circular reporting issues, intelligence from foreign agencies that can't be disclosed, etc. Intelligence is about probability, not certainty.
As always, I encourage you to read the full report. But here are some things that really stood out to me.
Full disclosure: I used to work at GAC (not in GSRP), and I consumed MANY of their products while I was in different roles in Canada's security & intelligence community.
I've also done some contract work for GAC since leaving government (again, not GSRP), and that's a matter of public record.
So here are my thoughts. (I'll use paragraph numbers to indicate where I'm getting info from in case you want to follow along at home)
Dark skies are gathering over Canada's public service: the threat of layoffs, budget freezes & cuts, and cutting vacant positions. This will make mobility harder, both lateral and upwards.
Here's an approach I call "detached engagement" and how to implement it at work.
I spent a few years of my career in the DRAP years - deficit reduction action plan. For those who don't remember, it was a time where managers kept saying "do more with less".
Friends, we did not do more with less.
As one of my good friends put it, we did less with less.
But DRAP also meant that many folks were stuck where they were. Worse, if you had a good job (like me), bad or ineffective executives were more stationary than usual.
Cameron Ortis was convicted on all six counts of violations of the security of information act yesterday. This is a huge win for Canada, and particularly the RCMP and the prosecution service.
They demonstrated they can investigate and successfully prosecute leaks. There are currently one or more people in Canada leaking intelligence to media. They did not sleep well last night.
Ortis's defence argued that he was running an off-the-books op, which he alone authorized, in order to target criminal syndicates and professional money laundering networks in Canada.
I'm still reflecting on the first foreign interference report, and I have one lingering question: what is the body of evidence that the report is based on?
It remains entirely unclear to me if our FI investigations are well-resourced, getting good intelligence, and building a robust picture. Or if we're dealing with snippets of intelligence. Let me give you a concrete example:
The $250k alleged to have been given to 11 political candidates. The Johnston report says that there is no evidence that the money ever got to the candidates.
I'm re-reading the first Foreign Interference Report today, and was struck by this passage, and that old adage to never attribute something to malicious intent that can be explained by incompetence....
Also, the play-by-play of the media allegations (and debunking of the theories / conspiracies around them) is pretty excellent.
Also, the fact that a (or more than one) leaker was leaking DRAFT documents is really telling. A real attempt to shape a particular narrative, in my view. (A partisan one, as I've long asserted.)