Tom Shugart Profile picture
Oct 27, 2022 19 tweets 7 min read Read on X
Having taken a closer look at these awesome photos, a few thoughts on some of the details...
First, some great detailed shots of some of the gun towers built on each corner of all of the "Big 3™️" island bases. Here's one from Fiery Cross Reef. You can see clearly what looks like a transplanted naval gun turret, and an anti-missile CIWS.
Here's a shot of another gun+CIWS combo on Fiery Cross...
...based on those side and rear views of the CIWS, I'd say it's likely a Type 730 or 1130 CIWS, just like on the PLA Navy's combatants.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4…
You may notice the island's CIWS mount doesn't have radars on top of it like on ships. I think they've moved the fire control radar higher up on the gun tower, where it wouldn't be subject to blast from the gun turret right behind it. Here's a set from Cuarteron Reef.
As for the gun turrets, my best guess is that they're something like the dual-purpose 76mm PJ26 mount, as carried on Type 054A frigates. Here's a comparison:
Back on Fiery Cross, we have this garage with super-tall doors. There are similar garages on each of the Big 3 (one has 2). In each case the tall doors face out to sea, and there are shorter openings on the land-facing side.
Over on Mischief Reef, you can see another one these sea-facing tall-door buildings, as well as the retractable-roof buildings that are also on each island.
My guess is that the sea-facing garages are for angled cruise missile launchers (for anti-ship YJ-12 or CJ-10 land-attack missiles)(left), while the retractable roof buildings are for vertical-launch SAMs (like HQ-9, right):
Some more good detail from the great photos: while it often looks on imagery like these islands are empty, as you can't really see people doing things, here we can see a car driving around Fiery Cross and someone walking down a street. It's not crowds, but it's also not nothing.
Here we have a great shot of a KJ-500 AEW aircraft on the ramp at Fiery Cross. Given the gray color scheme with subdued markings, I'm guessing it's PLAAF instead of PLANAF? (IIRC they're blue-gray)
As mentioned elsewhere, we also have this likely Y-8/Y-9 inside a hangar at Mischief Reef. Thought not 100% proof, this might be an indicator that patrol aircraft are now at least semi-permanently stationed there, instead of just on temporary mission-oriented detachments.
On the topic of aircraft, you can see in several photos that the Chinese have blocked the runway on Subi reef by placing what looks like luggage wagons in multiple spots. As a pilot, I can tell you this is an unsafe act, hostile to anyone else flying in the area.
You see, when you close a runway, if possible you're supposed to mark it as closed so that pilot know that it's not safe to land there. This is an international standard per ICAO, who recommends that runways be marked for temporary closure.
The reason this is important is that if you're a pilot in command of an aircraft in true distress, you're likely to look for the nearest available runway and take it. If you're busy dealing with an emergency, you might notice a big X on the runway...
...but you may not notice a luggage cart *deliberately* left on the runway 1/3 of the way down until it's too late & everyone dies. Now, ICAO says the X may be omitted if the reason is short duration & ATC can notify folks. But IMO that's for exigencies, not something like this.
I mean, what if the aircraft taking these pictures had an inflight emergency & really needed to use the runway, which was fouled *on purpose*? IMO this once again puts the lie to the idea these islands were built for the navigational safety of all. They're military bases, period.
One thing I forgot (I don't want to go all the way back & move every tweet down 1), assuming the Type 730/1130 CIWS on the corner of each island has its advertised 2500m effective range vs missiles, here's what the interlocking coverage looks like for Subi Reef, for example. 🖖
Here are some more details to flesh out some of what I provided above: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/c…

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More from @tshugart3

Feb 13
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts: Image
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos).
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ ChinaImage
Read 40 tweets
Feb 12
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with ChinaImage
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.
Read 37 tweets
Feb 1
One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.

What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).

They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Read 7 tweets
Jan 20
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.

What follows is an update, based on high-res imagery I've acquired:
navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".

I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024: Image
Next, let's zoom in, starting with #1 above.

Since I know of no designation for this type of vessel, I'm going to make one up: the T-LPT (i.e., civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform—transfer). And I'll call this one the Type 1.

It measures ~135m by 35m, w/ a ~140m ramp. Image
Read 22 tweets
Jan 7
I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific.
Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.
The scale of those numbers inspired an @TheEconomist article on this issue: economist.com/interactive/gr…
Read 13 tweets
Dec 20, 2024
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.

Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷‍♂️ Image
Read 4 tweets

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