First, some great detailed shots of some of the gun towers built on each corner of all of the "Big 3™️" island bases. Here's one from Fiery Cross Reef. You can see clearly what looks like a transplanted naval gun turret, and an anti-missile CIWS.
Here's a shot of another gun+CIWS combo on Fiery Cross...
...based on those side and rear views of the CIWS, I'd say it's likely a Type 730 or 1130 CIWS, just like on the PLA Navy's combatants.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4…
You may notice the island's CIWS mount doesn't have radars on top of it like on ships. I think they've moved the fire control radar higher up on the gun tower, where it wouldn't be subject to blast from the gun turret right behind it. Here's a set from Cuarteron Reef.
As for the gun turrets, my best guess is that they're something like the dual-purpose 76mm PJ26 mount, as carried on Type 054A frigates. Here's a comparison:
Back on Fiery Cross, we have this garage with super-tall doors. There are similar garages on each of the Big 3 (one has 2). In each case the tall doors face out to sea, and there are shorter openings on the land-facing side.
Over on Mischief Reef, you can see another one these sea-facing tall-door buildings, as well as the retractable-roof buildings that are also on each island.
My guess is that the sea-facing garages are for angled cruise missile launchers (for anti-ship YJ-12 or CJ-10 land-attack missiles)(left), while the retractable roof buildings are for vertical-launch SAMs (like HQ-9, right):
Some more good detail from the great photos: while it often looks on imagery like these islands are empty, as you can't really see people doing things, here we can see a car driving around Fiery Cross and someone walking down a street. It's not crowds, but it's also not nothing.
Here we have a great shot of a KJ-500 AEW aircraft on the ramp at Fiery Cross. Given the gray color scheme with subdued markings, I'm guessing it's PLAAF instead of PLANAF? (IIRC they're blue-gray)
As mentioned elsewhere, we also have this likely Y-8/Y-9 inside a hangar at Mischief Reef. Thought not 100% proof, this might be an indicator that patrol aircraft are now at least semi-permanently stationed there, instead of just on temporary mission-oriented detachments.
On the topic of aircraft, you can see in several photos that the Chinese have blocked the runway on Subi reef by placing what looks like luggage wagons in multiple spots. As a pilot, I can tell you this is an unsafe act, hostile to anyone else flying in the area.
You see, when you close a runway, if possible you're supposed to mark it as closed so that pilot know that it's not safe to land there. This is an international standard per ICAO, who recommends that runways be marked for temporary closure.
The reason this is important is that if you're a pilot in command of an aircraft in true distress, you're likely to look for the nearest available runway and take it. If you're busy dealing with an emergency, you might notice a big X on the runway...
...but you may not notice a luggage cart *deliberately* left on the runway 1/3 of the way down until it's too late & everyone dies. Now, ICAO says the X may be omitted if the reason is short duration & ATC can notify folks. But IMO that's for exigencies, not something like this.
I mean, what if the aircraft taking these pictures had an inflight emergency & really needed to use the runway, which was fouled *on purpose*? IMO this once again puts the lie to the idea these islands were built for the navigational safety of all. They're military bases, period.
One thing I forgot (I don't want to go all the way back & move every tweet down 1), assuming the Type 730/1130 CIWS on the corner of each island has its advertised 2500m effective range vs missiles, here's what the interlocking coverage looks like for Subi Reef, for example. 🖖
In the "you can't make this stuff up" category, in this 16 Apr image of COMEC's Longxue shipyard in Guangzhou you can see 5 of China's new Shuiqiao-class "invasion barges", whose only apparent purpose is to invade Taiwan, as well as...
...based on AIS data, what also appears to be a container ship under construction for a TAIWANESE Company, Evergreen Lines.
(and a couple of Zubr-class assault hovercraft, PLA Navy auxiliaries, and more.)
A few interesting tidbits from INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo's recent testimony. First, he puts China's warship production at a ratio of "6-to-1.8" to ours, or about 3.3 to 1.
This exceeds any of my estimates, which usually run a bit over 2-to-1 in hull count, and about 1.5-1 in tonnage.
Makes me wonder if there are PLAN ships I missed, or perhaps he's counting only surface combatants? Not sure.
On the topic of SLCM-N, he gives a full-throated endorsement. Of note, this is not the STRATCOM commander, but the theater commander that might actually need to use something like this (or have it to deter the other side's use of something similar).
Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/
@ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways.
@ChinaMaritime Next, we found patents for these or similar barges in filings from several years ago. In other words, this project has been in the works for a while now - not a reaction to the 2022 Pelosi visit, or the DPP's election win, etc. (not that I ever thought it was).
In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).
As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction.
After seeing the departure of these vessels, I went back & observed AIS data to see if the vessels were using AIS.
What I saw was indications of tugs getting these ships underway, but no AIS from the ships themselves, unlike other commercial vessels. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos). rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ China
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with China
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.