First, some great detailed shots of some of the gun towers built on each corner of all of the "Big 3™️" island bases. Here's one from Fiery Cross Reef. You can see clearly what looks like a transplanted naval gun turret, and an anti-missile CIWS.
Here's a shot of another gun+CIWS combo on Fiery Cross...
...based on those side and rear views of the CIWS, I'd say it's likely a Type 730 or 1130 CIWS, just like on the PLA Navy's combatants.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4…
You may notice the island's CIWS mount doesn't have radars on top of it like on ships. I think they've moved the fire control radar higher up on the gun tower, where it wouldn't be subject to blast from the gun turret right behind it. Here's a set from Cuarteron Reef.
As for the gun turrets, my best guess is that they're something like the dual-purpose 76mm PJ26 mount, as carried on Type 054A frigates. Here's a comparison:
Back on Fiery Cross, we have this garage with super-tall doors. There are similar garages on each of the Big 3 (one has 2). In each case the tall doors face out to sea, and there are shorter openings on the land-facing side.
Over on Mischief Reef, you can see another one these sea-facing tall-door buildings, as well as the retractable-roof buildings that are also on each island.
My guess is that the sea-facing garages are for angled cruise missile launchers (for anti-ship YJ-12 or CJ-10 land-attack missiles)(left), while the retractable roof buildings are for vertical-launch SAMs (like HQ-9, right):
Some more good detail from the great photos: while it often looks on imagery like these islands are empty, as you can't really see people doing things, here we can see a car driving around Fiery Cross and someone walking down a street. It's not crowds, but it's also not nothing.
Here we have a great shot of a KJ-500 AEW aircraft on the ramp at Fiery Cross. Given the gray color scheme with subdued markings, I'm guessing it's PLAAF instead of PLANAF? (IIRC they're blue-gray)
As mentioned elsewhere, we also have this likely Y-8/Y-9 inside a hangar at Mischief Reef. Thought not 100% proof, this might be an indicator that patrol aircraft are now at least semi-permanently stationed there, instead of just on temporary mission-oriented detachments.
On the topic of aircraft, you can see in several photos that the Chinese have blocked the runway on Subi reef by placing what looks like luggage wagons in multiple spots. As a pilot, I can tell you this is an unsafe act, hostile to anyone else flying in the area.
You see, when you close a runway, if possible you're supposed to mark it as closed so that pilot know that it's not safe to land there. This is an international standard per ICAO, who recommends that runways be marked for temporary closure.
The reason this is important is that if you're a pilot in command of an aircraft in true distress, you're likely to look for the nearest available runway and take it. If you're busy dealing with an emergency, you might notice a big X on the runway...
...but you may not notice a luggage cart *deliberately* left on the runway 1/3 of the way down until it's too late & everyone dies. Now, ICAO says the X may be omitted if the reason is short duration & ATC can notify folks. But IMO that's for exigencies, not something like this.
I mean, what if the aircraft taking these pictures had an inflight emergency & really needed to use the runway, which was fouled *on purpose*? IMO this once again puts the lie to the idea these islands were built for the navigational safety of all. They're military bases, period.
One thing I forgot (I don't want to go all the way back & move every tweet down 1), assuming the Type 730/1130 CIWS on the corner of each island has its advertised 2500m effective range vs missiles, here's what the interlocking coverage looks like for Subi Reef, for example. 🖖
I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.
This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.
...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.
Regarding China's early warning capability, we get a lot more specificity than I've seen before: that China now has IR warning satellites that can detect and warn of an incoming ICBM within minutes.
Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.
Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.
The new report is fairly different: for one thing, it clocks in at 100 pages to the previous report's 182.
From the top, the preface differs: the 2024 report's reads mostly like an intel product, where there's more proclamation of administration policy in the new one.
PRC SEALIFT UPDATE: based on a review of satellite imagery & AIS data from recent landing exercises, it appears China is practicing using dual-use civil-military landing craft for direct beach assault.
Of note, while info is sparse, these ships appear to exist in large numbers.
To the details: for a few years now, we've seen what've been known as "deck cargo ships" being used in PLA military transport exercises.
This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.
...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.
First, autonomy: he explicitly calls for these diesel boats as cruise missile platforms (SSGs), making a point to separate them from the multi-mission capabilities of U.S. SSNs.
No need for ISR, ASW, or torpedo capability. Ok, great—this sounds like a perfect job for an XXLUUV.
She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan.
She says the situation is not pre-ordained, and that the best way to avoid a war is to restrain US military posture in the region and tell Taiwan they may be on their own.
(I'd say she's half-right: it didn't have to be this way; but I'd place the blame elsewhere.)