European Union imports of Russian natural gas in 2022 will be down to around 60 bcm. The last time they were so low was in 1984. Here are some insights on where we go from here, using our latest @IEA#WEO2022 projections
What happens next with Russian gas is obviously uncertain, but as @tim_gould_ said at the WEO launch yesterday, we assume that there’s no way back for the EU-Russia gas relationship. That relationship was built up over many decades on the basis of trust. And that trust has gone.
In STEPS, we project a continued reduction in the EU's reliance on Russian gas. By 2030, imports are 90% lower. In APS, they are 0 before 2030. This is not easy; to avoid destructive demand reductions or price volatility, a huge scale up in clean energy (and LNG imports) needed
Wind and solar capacity has to increase by 600 GW by 2030. This is the major driver for a reduction in gas use in the power sector. Building retrofits accelerate and heat pumps need to be in one‐third of the EU building stock. A big dollop of hydrogen and biomethane also needed.
Europe also has to source more LNG and pipeline gas. The dilemma is whether to rely on the spot market or contract long-term supplies from either existing or new projects. Either way, anywhere from 70-170 bcm of gas needs to be bought in – even with rapidly declining gas demand.
That's a tough sell for EU gas buyers, who have huge near-term needs for more LNG but way less visibility on future demand. One way to resolve this is to shorten payback periods for new projects to 10 years (instead of 20), but this would raise the long-run cost of LNG by 20%.
Greater investment in clean energy to transition from gas is required, but this provides a big boost to energy security and ends up saving a lot of money. Cumulatively to 2050, the EU banks a $350 billion net saving compared to the STEPS, because of lower natural gas import costs
A lot of caveats come with this assessment - in practice, Russian gas can go to zero from next year. But the EU is already now pulling together the building blocks for a more resilient clean energy future.
And the loser over the long-term will be Russia. $1 trillion of lost income this decade, and no easy options to get its European gas to other consumers: in our projections, softening gas demand in China means the case for another large-scale gas pipeline is questionable, at best.
It was, as ever, a privilege to be part of the formidable #WEO team pulling together the long-term picture. Lots more gas-related stuff to unpick here (with awesome infographics!) iea.org/reports/world-…
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Is natural gas demand about to peak? This year’s @IEA World Energy Outlook helps shed light on this important question. A quick thread:
Ultimately, if you believe in gas as a transition fuel, you have to accept that it’s not a volume play: you don’t need a lot of gas to back up renewables if they grow at the level implied by today’s policy settings.
A case in point is Europe. The continent is rapidly adding renewables, pushing gas into a standby role in most power systems. See below its contribution over the course of a year, today and in 2035. Still important, but less volume required.
Our new @IEA report finds that that clean energy transitions are cheaper than the path we are currently on. How could this be? Surely sticking with fossil fuels is cheaper than buying fancy new kit like EVs and heat pumps…right? Nope. Let’s get into it.
Exhibit A is that clean energy technology costs have come down massively over the past several years (even if there was a period of post-pandemic cost inflation).
In fact, on a lifetime cost basis, clean energy is already the cheapest option for millions of consumers around the world. There are of course still areas where costs are higher (like hydrogen or industrial decarb). But the main ingredients for a transition are cost effective:
Can the oil and gas industry play a constructive role in transitions? This is one of the burning questions for the climate. Today, the @IEA released a massive new report on the subject. Let’s dive in for a quick one, shall we?
If you’re an oil and gas company, how do you play a part in transitions, especially now that a peak in fossil fuels is visible before 2030? How do you plan for a scenario reaching net zero where, for every dollar invested in fossil fuels, 10 dollars gets invested in clean energy?
Essentially, you have 2 choices: the first is to disappear. This means winding down operations, not investing in new fields, returning cash to shareholders, and cutting scope 1+2 emissions on your way out. Not selling your assets to a company with low ESG standards would be ideal
Lots of reactions to the #IEA World Energy Outlook 2023 finding that fossil fuels reach a peak based on today’s policy settings (the ‘STEPS’ scenario). Worth digging in a bit as to what a peak actually means (and doesn’t). Thread.
If you want to dismiss the idea of a peak in fossil fuels, you’d point to the strong historical relationship between GDP and fossil fuels. But this relationship is already changing and, in all our scenarios, it is transformed by the emergence of a clean energy economy.
The energy system is a slow ship to turn. But we are at an inflection point. Early indicators of a peak are visible by tracking flows, not stocks. For example, sales of ICE cars peaked in 2017. The high point for gas and coal power plant capacity additions was in 2002 and 2012.
Not many people realise that 15% of energy-related GHG emissions come from the process of getting oil and gas out of the ground and transported to consumers. If those emissions were a country, they would be the second largest emitter, after China. How do we reduce them?🧵
Today, the @IEA released a report about these ‘scope 1+2’ emissions, drawing together a body of work many years in the making. The headline message: these emissions can and should drop by more than half by 2030, and it’s one of the cheapest ways of cleaning up the energy system.
We looked at every oil and gas field in the world and calculated its emissions intensity – how much CO2 and methane comes with getting each barrel or cubic metre to consumers. There is a huge range between the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ performing supply chains, mostly due to methane.
EU natural gas demand fell by 55 bcm in 2022, the largest reduction in its history (equivalent to gas use in >40 million homes). There’s been a lot of debate what the main drivers were, and so today the @IEA released a commentary exploring how all this happened. Quick thread.
There was quite a lot of variation between sectors and countries. Germany cut the most gas in absolute terms, but in percentage terms it was the Baltic and Nordic countries.
Many think the EU lucked out with weather. And yes, the EU was lucky in some respects, but not in others. A mild winter cut gas use in buildings by over 10% compared to 2021. But drought conditions lowered hydro power generation, meaning 12 bcm of gas needed to fill the gap.