I've been evaluating the actions of both sides based on something the Army calls "Warfighting Functions."
Warfighting functions are defined in an Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0. It's a group of tasks & systems commanders use as a guide to successfully accomplish missions. 2/
The Warfighting Functions provide an intellectual organization for thinking about actions of different groups in combat.
A framework of how to "see" the battlefield to determine how things "fit."
This chart comes from the manual. It's a bit "power-point-ish," but it's great. 3/
There are 5 items around the ring (movement & maneuver, sustainment, fires, protection, intelligence).
These are things performed by teams that MUST be coordinated.
No "free-floating electrons!"
In the center: Command & Control, Leadership, Mission Command, Information. 4/
When Commanding the Operations Group at the Army's National Training Center in California, evaluating unit performance by using this seemingly simple (but VERY COMPLEX) chart was my job.
It would take weeks to explain the details. Trust me, it works. It's what soldiers do. 5/
This chart helped me analyzed the RU & UKR armies during the last 7 months.
Which brings us back to having (Ukraine) or not having (Russia) a professional sergeants corps.
NCOs (like Lieutenants, Captains, Colonels, Generals & Presidents) are a critical piece of 1 thing in the "center ring:"
Leadership. 7/
Leadership in combat is gathering information, understanding command & control, knowing what to do when no one is ordering you to do it (mission command).
That's required for generals, colonels, lieutenants.
It's also required in a professional NCO Corps. 8/
Going back to tweet #1 of this 🧵...what's all this have to do with winter?
Yes, Ukrainian winters are tough.
Many people are saying: "Ukraine has to gain ground before the winter sets in!"
My response? "Why do you think that?" 9/
This @washingtonpost article from early Oct indicates both sides will suffer equal effects from the Ukrainian winter.
I disagree.
The effects of weather is experienced by soldiers on both sides, but UKR NCOs will make a difference.
Fieldcraft and professional savvy will make the difference.
UKRs NCOs are better trained & savvier than their RU conscript counterpart, and...
-They have home field advantage
-They'll care for their soldiers.
-They'll maintain equipment.
All things RU "NCOs" don't have/do. 11/
1. Home field advantage.
Rasputitsa (RU) & bezdorizhzhia (UKR) are important words.
They describe the conditions when cross-country travel becomes difficult due to rain, snow, mud.
Last Feb, RU fell victim to this & UKR took advantage.
UKR won't fall victim. 12/
This may be part of why UKR's offensive operations in Kherson & Donetz have slowed & why RU is feverishly reinforcing their defenses.
It's been a wet fall; temps have dropped in both those places to 30-40 degree range now. There is mud.
Things have slowed. 13/
2. UKR NCOs will care for their soldiers
-They care for their teams, they won't lose soldiers to hypothermia, trench foot, & frostbite.
-They'll emphasize hygiene, hydration, calories, winter cloths...all critical
-They will "embrace the suck." 14/
There isn’t much substance in the reporting, because governments either don’t provide the substance or they skew what they want people to know based on their messaging.1/ washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
Having been on these kinds of contentious calls with foreign counterparts (with less at stake) sometimes it’s just feeling each other out.
The pentagon describing the call with the term “professional” tells me there was little to no significant breakthroughs. 2/
Sec Austin likely provided some pointed but nuanced communication that gave Shoigu pause. And Shoigu was likely testing Austin…and lying.
Remember, Shoigu is corrupt, a crook, a grifter, & is the guy most responsible for how poorly the Russian army is performing. 3/
Facts about the G2:
-It has a published range of 2500 km (about 1500 miles). That's suspect.
-It weighs about 200 kg (≈ 450 lbs)
-The payload (explosives) are estimated to be ≈ 50-60kg (130 lbs of explosives, smaller than the lightest 250 lb bombs delivered by aircraft). 3/
Mick describes the actions of Generals Valeriy Zaluzhnyy & Andrii Kovalchuk, and Col-Gen Oleksandr Syrskiy and how those will go down in Ukraine's military history (similar to Eisenhower, Bradley & Montgomery on D-Day).
Aggressive, adaptive, innovative...a new breed. 2/
In April, @politico did a great piece on Zaluzhnyy, saying he is part of a "new generation of Ukrainian officers who cut their teeth in the grinding eight-year war in Donbas and...deployed to training ranges across Europe to drill with NATO forces." 3/
Planners analyze & assess:
-enemy launch platforms (land, sea, air)
-potential "tracks" (the anticipated route the enemy missile will take)
-what they enemy wants to hit
-the critical thing being defended (e.g., airfield, port, infrastructure, specific building, forces). 9/
Here's the point:
It's impossible to line a bunch of ADA systems long the 2500-mile Ukrainian border & expect them to stop missiles launched from RU subs in the Azov, or dropped from RU bombers circling 1500 miles away, or land-based RU missile batteries in RU. 10/
What makes it even harder:
RU is not aiming at "critical infrastructure" or "military targets," (which, in an area like Ukraine would require literally hundreds of ADA systems), RU is striking random civilian targets - to include playgrounds! - all over the country. 11/
After the strike on the Kerch Bridge, it was expected Putin would respond.
He did so by launching 84+ missiles & dozens of drones against Ukrainian civilian targets (an initial assessment) and making more threatening speeches.
A 🧵on that & thoughts on air defense. 1/
As I said in a weekend tweet, the operational strike on the Kerch Bridge resulted in strategic implications.
-Militarily, it affects RU's belief they have a secure line of communication for logistics in a safe area.
-It also negatively affects RU ability to move forces. 2/
RU is now constrained in using the bridge for transport & resupply, and now must use either ship transport to Berydansk or the M4 road from Rostov.
Informationally the RU's - & RU's in Crimea - know about the strike. They can't understand how this "defended" asset was hit. 3/