1/ Flash: The Norwegian PM, Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence held a press-conference today, announcing that from tomorrow, the Norwegian Armed Forces formally increases readiness iaw national defence plans.
3/
We Norwegians are a bit tight lipped about Armed Forces operational activities. Readiness/alert levels aren't public either, and today's participants declined to comment on where this increase puts us.
4/ Looking to the Cold War for parallels, one must take into account that our Armed Forces was much bigger back then, parts of it maintaining a much higher day-to-day readiness than we have had for the past decades.
IMO, there may not be any good historical examples to look at.
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Regjeringens forslag er bedre enn jeg fryktet, fokus på å tette hull i eksisterende struktur og styrking av driftsbudsjettet er bra, men jeg vil påstå det fremdeles er et fredstids-budsjett som er lagt frem.
2/7 2.3.2
"Sjølv om vi ikkje ventar ei eskalering av krigen i Ukraina til nordområda, kan vi ikkje utelukka at den auka spenninga kan føra til misforståingar og enkelthendingar, også i desse områda."
Denne antakelsen er sentral i budsjettet. Jeg vil kalle den naiv og farlig.
3/7 Nord Stream sabotasjen, som har medført at vi har styrket sikkerheten rundt olje og gass installasjoner med Forsvarets ressurser, viser at faren for horisontal eskalering, først med ukonvensjonelle og sammensatte virkemidler, er reell.
1/6 Some thoughts on possible Russian nuclear signaling, and how to isolate what matters from bluster, propaganda and really the bad journalism out there
First: Listen to what the US and NATO says about Russian nuclear posture. As late as today, the US have said still no changes
2/6 I consider testing of new systems such as Poseidon and SARMAT as routine, even if Russian propaganda says something else.
These are long running programs, not yet in operational service, so there will be tests. Such tests does NOT involve live nuclear warheads.
3/6 Examples of what should be treated as nuclear signaling:
Increased SSBN patrols
Mobile ICBM exercises
Larger LRA exercises
Strategic exercises (Grom) involving test firing of ICBMs and SLBMs in operational service.
Russia did conduct Grom just prior to the invasion