Since Saturday, we’ve been focused on addressing the surge in hateful conduct on Twitter. We’ve made measurable progress, removing more than 1500 accounts and reducing impressions on this content to nearly zero. Here’s the latest on our work, and what’s next.
Our primary success measure for content moderation is impressions: how many times harmful content is seen by our users. The changes we’ve made have almost entirely eliminated impressions on this content in search and elsewhere across Twitter.
Impressions on this content typically are extremely low, platform-wide. We’re primarily dealing with a focused, short-term trolling campaign. The 1500 accounts we removed don’t correspond with 1500 people; many are repeat bad actors.
Impressions don’t tell the whole story. These issues aren’t new, and the people targeted by hateful conduct aren’t numbers or data points. We’re going to continue investing in policy and technology to make things better.
Many of you have said you’ve reported hateful conduct and received notices saying it’s not a violation. Here’s why, and what we’re doing to fix it:
To try to understand the context behind potentially harmful Tweets, we treat first-person and bystander reports differently.
First person: This hateful interaction is happening to or targeting me.
Bystander: This is happening to someone else.
Why? Because bystanders don’t always have full context, we have a higher bar for bystander reports in order to find a violation. As a result, many reports of Tweets that in fact do violate our policies end up marked as non-violative on first review.
We’re changing how we enforce these policies, but not the policies themselves, to address the gaps here.
You’ll hear more from me and our teams in the days to come as we make progress. Talk is cheap; expect the data that proves we’re making meaningful improvements.
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Let’s talk for a minute about slurs, hateful conduct, and trolling campaigns.
Bottom line up front: Twitter’s policies haven’t changed. Hateful conduct has no place here. And we’re taking steps to put a stop to an organized effort to make people think we have.
Our Rules prohibit Hateful Conduct. This includes targeting people with dehumanizing content and slurs.
This DOESN’T mean we have a list of words that are always banned. Context matters. For example, our policies are written to protect reclaimed speech. help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-p…
Over the last 48 hours, we’ve seen a small number of accounts post a ton of Tweets that include slurs and other derogatory terms. To give you a sense of scale: More than 50,000 Tweets repeatedly using a particular slur came from just 300 accounts.
Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, our aim has been to remediate abuse at scale and be transparent about our work to protect the conversation happening on Twitter. Today, we’re sharing two key updates about government affiliated accounts. blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/c…
Beginning today, we will require the removal of Tweets posted by government or state-affiliated media accounts which share media that depict prisoners of war in the context of the war in Ukraine. help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-p….
We’re doing so in line with international humanitarian law, and in consultation with international human rights groups. To protect essential reporting on the war, some exceptions apply under this guidance where there is a compelling public interest or newsworthy POW content.
We’re adding labels to accounts and Tweets sharing links of state-affiliated media outlets in Belarus after detailed reporting about their role in the war in Ukraine. This builds on our years-long work to add context to state media outlets and limit their reach on Twitter. 🧵
Last week, we launched labels on Tweets sharing links to Russian state-affiliated news media.
Early data suggests that our interventions here are working: We've seen a 30% drop in impressions on Tweets labeled under this expanded policy.
Why label Belarusian outlets now? Expert voices have highlighted Belarus’ involvement in the war in Ukraine. Coupled with what we’re seeing on the service around engagement with state-affiliated media, we see transparency about these outlets as key.
Have been sitting with the Apple announcement for a couple of days to try to avoid tweeting a regrettable hot take. This thread from @alexstamos just about captures it for me — as well as @gruber’s writeup: daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_…
More than anything, announcing these 3 fundamentally distinct features together feels like a (rare) colossal PR misstep by Apple. Grouping together anti-CSE tech (broadly good) with parental controls (somewhere between meh and dangerous) muddies the waters unproductively.
Apple in 2021 has a trust deficit with the security and privacy community — with good reason (nytimes.com/2021/05/17/tec…). The choices they’ve made about how to do business in China enable the slippery-slope arguments we’ve seen here.
We've seen no evidence to support the claim that "nearly half of the accounts Tweeting about #COVID19 are likely bots.” 🧵 with a few thoughts on the subject... npr.org/sections/coron…
First, we should get our terms straight: "Bot" means a lot of different things to a lot of different people — and doesn't necessarily refer to coordinated, manipulative, or inauthentic behavior.
There are lots of different ways of using Twitter. Some people Tweet a lot; some never Tweet at all, or only Tweet sporadically. There's no right or wrong way to use Twitter — and many "bot" studies wind up dismissing a lot of real activity as inauthentic.
Earlier this month, we removed more than 2,800 inauthentic accounts originating in Iran. These are the accounts that FireEye, a private security firm, reported on today. We were not provided with this report or its findings.
As we conduct investigations into the wider networks and actors involved in information operations, we typically avoid making any declarative public statements until we can be sure that we have reached the end of our analyses.
These accounts employed a range of false personas to target conversations about political and social issues in Iran and globally. Some engaged directly through public replies with politicians, journalists, and others.