Good morning Twitter. I am back. Courtesy of the Russian Navy's commitment to test if and how naval warfare evolves. Yes, a thread about the 'naval drone' attack conducted at the WE by seemingly Ukrainian forces against the Black Sea Fleet. Spoiler alert: NOT. A. REVOLUTION.
First things first -as usual. Very grateful to @jkuehn50 for pinging me with @cdrsalamander latest - which as you'd expect - is spot on on the topic: cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/the-aspects-… -Allow me though to offer some additional thoughts on why this matters strategically more than tactically.
The media coverage as it's been the case for most of the 'naval war/maritime front' has mostly highlighted its inability to report on operational theatres that are not dry. Two notable examples. First, the technologist take of the David vs Goliath: nytimes.com/2022/10/31/us/…
The Guardian here does a better job in focusing on the ability to strike at distance, and folds the event into a wider shift to 'Ukrainian forces are getting more tech savvy and well equipped'. theguardian.com/world/2022/oct… - This is not irrelevant, but somewhat misses the mark.
Why? because none of what we have seen - literally through footage circulated implies a particularly advanced/sophisticated know-how to get that type of attack going. In fact, images of the 'drone' suggest this is relatively smart off-shelf low-tech theguardian.com/world/video/20… 
So, what is the take away then?
A. Transforming tactical ingenuity into operational success. This is for 3 reasons - here I'm building on @cdrsalamander points:
1. UKR forces played to their strengths - leveraging limited tech advantages to produce mission-focused capability;
A. Transforming tactical ingenuity into operational success. This is for 3 reasons - here I'm building on @cdrsalamander points:
1. UKR forces played to their strengths - leveraging limited tech advantages to produce mission-focused capability;
2. UKR forces exploited Russian weaknesses - the BSF has been complacent/ineffective/mostly operating in an unimaginative way seemingly exploiting its advantage in superiority of capabilities alone;
3. UKR sought to strike at the place where their could max advantage: base area.
3. UKR sought to strike at the place where their could max advantage: base area.
None of the above invites considerations about a technical revolution in naval warfare. The UKR played very smartly and struck very effectively with a remotely piloted exploding kayak, and the BSF did much of the work by offering ideal conditions for the strike to be a success.
B. Leveraging the oldest trick in the naval warfare book. Beyond the technical aspect, the event is - from the perspective of naval warfare - the opposite of a novelty. It is the 2022 edition of something that's been around for a very long time. Here is a chronology:
B1. The Fire ship. The first remotely piloted ship to wreck havoc in fleet was.. the fire ship. The original version wasn't remotely piloted by a young person with a control. It was piloted by the tides. Now if you ask me that is clever. rmg.co.uk/collections/ob…
B2. The Siluro a Lenta Corsa. Personally, this is where you have a genuine evolution of the fire ship concept. The famous attack on the naval base in Alexandria in WWII set the template for the evolution of this type of tactic: not tides, but individuals manning the bomb.
I like these two links to offer an overview: marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/…, and this here for refs to Alexandria: marina.difesa.it/media-cultura/…
Since WWII, we've had numerous examples of 'fire ships', piloted by individuals - some trying to have the last phases remote, other much less. See the case of USS Cole, with lessons discussed hereby: govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CH…
What does this all point towards? Again 3 main considerations:
1. The maritime theatre of the UKR war remains largely misunderstood. So, far it has only proved that tech can renew what one knew already: war at sea is asymmetric and tech alone doesn't suffice to retain superiority
1. The maritime theatre of the UKR war remains largely misunderstood. So, far it has only proved that tech can renew what one knew already: war at sea is asymmetric and tech alone doesn't suffice to retain superiority
2. A weaker side, operating in a way that maximises the exploitation of the limits of a superior opponent, will retain higher chances of limited operational success.
3. As in the Moskva case, UKR success is as important as Russian failures in reducing vulnerabilities.
3. As in the Moskva case, UKR success is as important as Russian failures in reducing vulnerabilities.
There are some two additional observations about this incident:
1. The Symbolism of damaging the Admiral Makarov. If confirmed, it's all but dramatically ironic that the ship is named after one of the competent and aggressive commanders of the Russo-Jpn War. Something BSF is not
1. The Symbolism of damaging the Admiral Makarov. If confirmed, it's all but dramatically ironic that the ship is named after one of the competent and aggressive commanders of the Russo-Jpn War. Something BSF is not
2. The incertitude of the strategic value of limited operational success. Given what we know about RY pulling out of the grain shipping agreement - something that might have happened anyway - raises the question of the wider success of this operation.
Sure enough. No place seems to be safe for the BSF right now. This was a considerable blow and one that conveys the wide momentum for UKR forces. But its wider strategic impact might very well be pushing RU to think long and hard how to exploit the only theatre it still can.
in the Black Sea, RU has an opportunity to disrupt the shipping of grain and with it, shake international support - or at least it can try to do so. At sea, this success might very well mean that a new phase is about to begin. The ball is in the Russian court. Thanks for reading!
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