Thread by @Inkvisiit

2.11. Bakhmut - Siversk Front situation overview and rough estimate of troop positions. I'll start by reviewing the events and developments on the front since the beginning of the full-scale invasion: 1/

At the beginning of the invasion, both sides were able to rely on their extensive fortress chains built over the course of past eight years. Especially between Horlivka-Popasna-Hirske, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) had built several successive chains of fortifications 2/

the penetration of which was mainly tasked to the 2nd Army Corps of the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR), while the rest of the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) carried out their Ukraine-wide invasion. 3/

Before the full-scale invasion, the armies of the “People's Republics” (1st and 2nd Army Corps) were known to be practically a seamless part of the Russian armed forces, and their equipment and composition corresponded practically 1:1 to their Russian counterparts 4/

with some exceptions and “local modifications”. There were, of course, considerable reservations regarding the quality of the equipment and personnel, but in retrospect, the quality of the personnel was perhaps even slightly better in some units. 5/

The LPR 2. Army Corps (2AC) consisted, at least on paper, of three motor rifle brigades (2. 4. 7. MRB), an artillery brigade, a separate tank battalion ("August/Pantzir") and the 6. motorized regiment (exact composition unclear). 6/

In addition, the brigades were also supplemented with lighter territorial defence battalions and other miscellaneous units. At the beginning of the invasion, none of the 2AC units were probably fully manned, but probably quite close to their TOE in equipment. 7/

However, the initial penetrations of the AFU's fortress chains were very limited, and at the beginning of the war the 2AC units were mostly only able to tie down some AFU units to defend their fortified lines, while the situation on other fronts developed much faster. 8/

This tying up of AFU units probably cost the LDPR forces a great deal in blood and equipment. However, they were able to replenish their ranks significantly better than the regular RuAF forces, since the LDPR population was immediately subjected to full mobilization. 9/

This significantly better ability to absorb continuous heavy losses is, in my opinion, a significantly underestimated factor in the course of the war so far. Even though the performance of the so-called LDPR conscript/militia units has been very poor in many places 10/

the regular units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps have seemingly performed their tasks more persistently and doggedly. For example, most of the trench storming battle videos I have come across are usually the work of LDPR, with relatively proficient assault units. 11/

In my opinion, the LDPR units seem to aggressively seek close combat using small strike teams of few platoons or squads, thus, if well supported, being able to overrun individual AFU fortified positions, although often at a high cost. 12/

However, the ability of LDPR units to carry out larger, organized and operationally significant manoeuvres is likely to be very limited, if not non-existent. Lack of modern communications equipment seems to be one of the many reasons for this. 13/

In the summer, after the focus of the war shifted from the defensive battles around Kiev to artillery and attrition war phase in Donbas, the units of the 2nd Army Corps were finally able to break through the AFU fortifications in the Popasna sector. 14/

This was largely achieved through the efforts of RuAF's best remaining combat-capable units (Naval Infantry, VDV), but LDPR troops also played a significant role in achieving the breakthrough. At the same time, the poorly developing situation for the AFU 15/

in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area, forced the AFU to withdraw to the Bilohorivka-Berestove-Soledar-Pokrovske line. At this point, the RuAF's assault capability began to be largely exhausted. Russia had still not carried out mobilization, 16/

and the limited volunteers were not sufficient to cover the ever-increasing manpower shortage in the RuAF units. By the end of the summer, focus of the fighting shifted towards to the Horlivka-Svitlodarsk-Klynove-Pokrovske-Soledar sector, increasingly being fought 17/

with the forces of LDRP troops and Wagner mercenaries. However, the RuAF was still able to put pressure on the AFU lines with its massive artillery superiority, which endless demand for ammunition could be met by relying on the critical railway infrastructure 18/

and the prepositioned artillery munitions stocks in Donbas republics. Even the operational deep strike capability brought by the HIMARS systems has not been able to completely eliminate the logistical advantage brought by the core region of the LDPR to the RuAF artillery. 19/

At the turn of August-September AFU launched its own strategic counterattacks, first in the direction of Kherson and then in Kharkiv, drawing the last significant RuAF units from the Donbas front to reinforce the threatened directions. 20/

The LDPR and Wagner forces were nevertheless able to push the AFU’s defences slowly, expensively, but steadily in the Bakhmut region. First in the area of the Svitlodarsk power station, then pushing into the suburbs of Bakhmut from the direction of Pokrovske 21/

and finally reaching the road T-0513 south of Bakhmut. Today, the Bakhmut front is practically 20-30 km away from the pre-invasion fortified lines. More than 251 days of intense continuous struggle = 20-30 km of "achieved" result. 22/

Which equates an average of about 120m per day.. but the effects and results of the battles on the Bakhmut front cannot be fully evaluated and measured solely in the form of conquered or unconquered ground. 23/

AFU has been able to repel RuAF's attempts to achieve a wider and more dangerous breakthroughs in this area of the front. The threat of a encirclement of the frontline forces at the Izyum-Kramatorsk-Horlivka level existed. RuAF clearly tried to do this by almost any means, 24/

but AFU's tenacious defence along the lines of Bakhmut and Izyum prevented, and then the counterattacks around Kharkiv and Lyman finally eliminated this threat. But the AFU would certainly have liked to hold on to the strategically important Lysychansk-Severodonetsk region. 25/

It is on this front that the fighting has also been particularly costly and severe in AFU losses as well. Could this have been avoided in any way? Unlikely. As long as Russia has the ability to massively concentrate its artillery on one sector of the front, 26/

result is a lot of losses for Ukraine. This can hardly be avoided completely, at least in the current state of AFU training, equipment, and unit performance, which forces the AFU to defend largely statically. 27/

There are also strategic considerations in favour of steadfast but static defence. The defence of the Bakhmut front seems to require about six AFU reinforced brigades at the moment. If the pressure of the RuAF artillery and continuous attacks were to subside, 28/

AFU could probably detach two or even three whole brigades to fighting in other, more decisive sectors. For example, penetrating the Northern Luhansk front would be significantly easier with a similar additional force. 29/

RuAF's merciless sacrifice of LDPR troops and Wagner mercenaries/convicts on this scale is probably still unjustified, but the final, real effects and costs of these attrition battles on the AFU forces will probably be known only after the war. 30/

Finally, let's go through with a more detailed assessment the frontline situation in terms of units and force ratios. I note once again that the information presented on the maps is rough, indicative and relies unfortunately lot on individual second-hand sources. 31/

In the northern part of the front, in the Siversk-Lysychansk-Berestove area, the AFU's defense apparently consist of the main parts of the 54th Bde, reinforced by parts of the NG 27th Bde. In the Siversk-Bilohorivka-Verkhnokamyanske region, AFU tried during the past month 32/

push towards Lysychansk and probably reach especially the Pryvilla-Shypylivka-Novodruzhensk triangle south of Kreminna, from where the Kreminna-Svatove line could possibly have been threatened via Rubizhne. 33/

This sector apparently underwent a rotation in the last few weeks, which may indicate that the AFU pushes failed with possibly quite heavy losses. The RuAF responded to the attacks by bringing additional troops to the area and also carried out a troop rotation, 34/

apparently bringing the remaining main elements of the 201st Division (Base) into the area, as well as the two understrength BTGs of the 74th MRB. In addition, a detached BTG of the 4th MRB (2AC) was brought back to this front from the Svatove-Kremminna line. 35/

With the weight of the troops concentrated there, the RuAF was able to push the forward units of the AFU away from the eastern highlands of Bilohorivka and has also carried out attacks from the direction of the Verkhnokamyanka refinery towards Siversk and Bilohorivka. 36/

AFU's advance in this sector seems to have ended, at least for the time being. To the south of the refinery, the main body of the 4th MRB seems to continue their attacks in the direction of Spirne, where apparently the forward units of the AFU's 10th Mtn Bde are defending. 37/

4. MRB's efforts seem to be small attacks of about 1-2 platoon assault teams, which AFU has mostly been able to repel. Both sides are likely engaged in mainly small local tactical battles or skirmishes for forward outpost positions. 38/

In general, the front has been quite stable along the road T1302, with the AFU's defensive positions probably being well prepared and tactically advantageously positioned at this stage (behind the ridges in the so-called "reverse slope" positions). 39/

The fighting strength of the AFU's 10th and 54th Brigades is an open question, but with the front being relatively stable, I would believe that they are mostly close to the target strength, at least in terms of manpower. 40/

RuAF is able to check the advance of AFU for the time being, but according to my estimate, the threat of a RuAF breakthrough in the direction of Siversk does not practically exist either. 41/

There have been months of continuous and fierce fighting in the direction of Soledar, as the RuAF forces tried to breakthrough to the NE of Bakhmut, to the level of road T0513. At present the main elements of the 2nd and 7th MRB (2AC) appear to be arrayed towards Soledar. 42/

The 93rd Brigade, one of the best in the AFU, seems to bear the main responsibility for the defence of Soledar direction. The brigade has most likely suffered heavy losses in places but is probably able to rotate its battalions to mitigate the impact of casualties. 43/

It is difficult to say which of the AFU brigades is responsible for defending Bakhmut itself, but I have drawn the 53rd Brigade in the pictures, which apparently operates at least in the immediate vicinity of Bakhmut. In addition, the city has a special forces detachment, 44/

units of the International Legion and probably parts of the 109th Territorial Defence Brigade. Attacks coming from the direction of Klynove-Pokrovske-Vesele Dolyna are apparently from the 6th Motorized Regiment (2AC) and at least one Wagner assault battalion. 45/

The separate "Diezel" tank battalion (1AC) is probably supporting these attacks. The attackers who entered the suburbs of Bakhmut have apparently been pushed back in some places, but fighting is still taking place in the immediate vicinity of Bakhmut. 46/

South of Bakhmut, the 3rd MRB (1AC) and apparently one or two Wagner Assault Battalions are constantly trying to get further from the level of road T0513 to the south and southwest of Bakhmut. The attacks are aimed at Kurdyamivka, Klishchiivka and Opytne. 47/

The irrigation canal running between Ivanivske-Kurdyamivka (S. Donets - Donetsk), which I have highlighted in the picture in yellow (it stands out poorly), is probably the objective of these attacks, from where the attacks would continue northwards west of Bakhmut. 48/

The defence of the southern side of Bakhmut is apparently carried out by the 62nd mechanized and 109th territorial defence brigades, reinforced with detached BTG from 30th brigade. 49/

The fighting in the directions of Soledar and south of Bakhmut are unlikely to lead to significant RuAF breakthroughs, but the battles are likely to continue as slow, bloody, local assault and artillery battles, the price of which is likely heavy for both sides, 50/

but which do not pose significant operational threats to the overall defence of the AFU in this sector. In a war of attrition like this, the defender has to accept bitter, sometimes complete losses of entire individual platoons or companies. 51/

Which must be weighed against the fact that on a larger, strategic scale, Ukraine is bleeding white Russia and especially the LDPR, as well as producing and accumulating in other frontline sectors the conditions for achieving final victory. 52/

However, one should not be too lulled into the immutability of the frontline situation in this sector either, as both AFU and RuAF are capable, if sufficient reserves can be concentrated in the area, to change the situation quickly. 53/

For example, the 5th Brigade of the DPR's 1st Army Corps is, according to my calculations, still probably in reserve and almost at full strength, in which case its sudden deployment to the battles in the Bakhmut area could at least momentarily change the balance of power. 54/

I shall end this thread here and thank you for your time spent reading it. 55/55

This thread was originally published in Finnish, and I have translated it partially with translator tools to speed up the process and hopefully picked up on some of the worst errors in the process. Original thread can be found here:

https://twitter.com/Inkvisiit/status/1587848715351609346