Acording to our map the russian territorial gains in December were 451 km2 in Ukraine and approx. 60 km2 in Kursk. This was considerably less than in November (750 in Ukraine) although I would wait until the end of January to judge if the rate of advance is actually slowing 1/ or if the November was just particularly bad month for Ukraine and the general trend keeps slowly creeping up towards 500-550 km2 a month figure. Weather conditions are also likely playing a part in slowing down the pace of Russian advance. 2/

ATACMS, like most precision weapons, have the most effect and impact when used en masse in geographically limited area and within a narrow time window as is possible, combined with decisive combined arms operation. I.e. Their use should be concentrated in time and space. 1/

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1872723237165252915

Ukraine chose to use its limited stockpile of Storm Shadow and later ATACMS to strike high value (in material and propaganda) targets of opportunity, spread out wide over geography and time, which diluted their overall impact and effect. 2/

Toisin kuin Keskisuomalaisen tämän päivän uutisessa todettiin, Venäjä on kiihdyttänyt operaatioitaan Ukrainassa Kurskin offensiivin jälkeen vallaten Ukrainalta maa-alueita nopeammin kuin kertaakaan vuoden 2022 kesän jälkeen. 1/

https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1842511860433641606

Tässä datassa ei toki huomioida Ukrainan vaaltaamia alueita Kurskissa, jotka saavuttivat arviomme mukaan noin 1000 neliökilometrin maksimin offensiivin ensimmäisen viikon aikana. Ukrainan hallitsema alue Kurskissa on sittemin kutistunut noin 750 neliökilometriin. 2/

Made some rudimentary calculations on how the Russian 2024 summer offensive compares to the Ukrainian 2023 summer offensive in terms of territorial change of Russian controlled area on our map. 1/

It’s quite clear that the Russian pace of advance this spring and summer has been grindingly steady with few notable intensifications thrown in the mix. As for the Ukrainian summer offensive, its clear that almost all meaningful progress in terms of territory captured 2/

05JUL24. Nearly two months have passed since Russia began its Kharkiv offensive. In terms of captured land, Russian gains have been limited and bought with very high cost. During the past month or so, most of the heaviest fighting has been in Vovchansk. 1/ In Vochansks a costly urban battle has taken place with both sides actively seeking to control this natural tactical and operational bottleneck. The now completely ruined town has become crowded with both sides committing considerable number of units into the battle. 2/

16MAY24 ORBAT and analysis thread on Kharkiv Front. RuAF began offensive operations in northern Kharkiv oblast UKR-RUS border regions on 10MAY24. During the past six days RuAF has advanced between 9 to 5 km in three distinct directions along the border. 1/ This operation is conducted by recently created NORTH (SEVER) operational-strategic grouping (OSG) based on the re-established Leningrad Military District. Offensive operations in Kharkiv area are conducted by two army corps. 2/

27APR24 Avdiivka sector ORBAT and operational thread. Over the past week RuAF has achieved series of local successes on Avdiivka sector. These began with sudden and unexpected penetration into village of Ocheretyne on 22APR24. 1/20 Exact reasons for this sudden success aren’t entirely clear, but likely involve a botched rotation of troops, misallocation of resources and problems with coordinating forces drawn from multiple different brigades on ad hoc basis, 2/

Two years of Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is an overview thread on the situation at the front and deployment of UkrAF and RuAF forces as of 24th FEB 2024. Attached is high resolution image of our Order of Battle tracking map. Zoom in for more detail. 1/ Ukrainian forces along the frontline are organized in three “Operational-Strategic Group of Forces” (OGS): Odessa (O), Tavriya (T) and Khortytsia (K). 2/

A short thread on Kupiansk sector and the disposition of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA). Between 19-28JAN24 Russian forces from the 1GTA managed to capture the villages of Krokhmal'ne and Tabaivka. 1/ The offensive seems to have been local and opportunistic in nature, with several UkrAF 103rd TDF Bde positions being overrun by assaulting elements from RuAF 47th Guards Tank Division (47GTD) 2/

It has been tough couple of weeks. General situation on the frontline seems to be deteriorating around Avdiivka and northern Luhansk. Velyka Novosilka sector been activating and Novomykhailivka not faring particularly well either. 1/ And then there is the mobilization deadlock and manpower&munitions crisis coupled with the military-political command crisis in Kyiv. Latter seems to be resolving now, at least publicly, but there may be unforseen consequences and shocks throughout the UKR armed forces. 2/

We have decided to release a series of full satellite images used to construct this thread, since at this point they are nearly five months old (13MAR23) and could be useful for geolocation as well as providing some transparency on the methods used in the original analysis. 1/

https://twitter.com/Inkvisiit/status/1655584386601951238

The series in question is particularly relevant at this moment, since this area has seen some of the fiercest fighting over the past few months as Ukrainian forces have been trying to bypass the Russian held village of Robotyne from the east. 2/

Back on May 8th I posted the thread on the Russian defences around Kopani – Robotyne - Tokmak axis. Quite frankly I did not quite expect the way it captured attention of the people and the amount of discussion it generated. 1/

https://twitter.com/Inkvisiit/status/1655584386601951238

I know that I also promised a tactical operational analysis on later date. A promise which I did not keep for two reasons: I was burned out and I was also beginning to increasingly spot certain subtle sings that, contrary to my earlier expectations Ukraine was in fact going to 2/

1/ Thread: Analysis of Russian defensive network and field fortifications on Kopani-Robotyne-Tokmak sector of the Zaporizhzhia front. This analysis was done using Sentinel Hub EO imagery and commercially available very high-resolution satellite imagery by Airbus DS Pléiades Neo. 2/ Russian defenses have been constructed along dominant heights and ridgelines. Defenses have been established at depth of 25-30km from Russian forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) all the way to the city of Tokmak.

30.1.2023 Ketju: Ajatuksia Ukrainan sodan tämänhetkisestä tilanteesta ja kuluneesta sotavuodesta. Tämä ketju toiminee todennäköisesti alustuksena sarjalle pohdintoja erilaisista sotaan liittyvistä aiheista, ilmiöistä ja tapahtumista. 1/ Aloitan aluksi pahoittelemalla viimeaikojen hiljaisuuttani twitter-rintamalla. Erinäiset opintoihini liittyvät velvoitteet rajoittavat käytettävissäni olevaa aikaa ja ennen kaikkea henkisiä resursseja sekä rajallista keskittymiskykyäni. 2/

THREAD: Northern Luhansk Front 19 DEC 2022 - Frontline situation overview and analysis of estimated Russian Order of Battle (ORBAT). 1/ First some disclaimers: Sources, notes and possible biases are presented in the pictures, but in general be aware that the drawn maps and the analysis leans heavily on secondary sources who often do not disclose their primary sources. 2/

Nyt kun näitä huhuja Dnipron ylitse menneistä AFU:n operaatioista on sakeana ilmassa, kannattaa muistaa ettei Venäläisten tavoitteena todennäköisesti edes ole luoda yhtenäistä ja tiivistä puolustusta vaikeasti ylitettävän ja logistisesti haastavan maastoesteen tasalle. 1/ Vaan on todennäköisempää, että pyrkimyksenä on toteuttaa jonkin asteista "liikkuvaa puolustusta" minkä doktriinin mukaisissa puitteissa kokonaisen prikaatin vastuualue voi paisua 50 tai jopa 60km levyisiksi ja syvyisiksi turvallisuusvyöhykkeiksi 2/

2.11. Bakhmut - Siversk Front situation overview and rough estimate of troop positions. I'll start by reviewing the events and developments on the front since the beginning of the full-scale invasion: 1/ At the beginning of the invasion, both sides were able to rely on their extensive fortress chains built over the course of past eight years. Especially between Horlivka-Popasna-Hirske, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) had built several successive chains of fortifications 2/

2.11. Bakhmut – Siversk Rintaman tilannekatsaus ja joukkojen ryhmityksen karkea arvio. Aloitan ensiksi kertaamalla karkeasti rintaman tapahtumat ja kehitykset täysimittaisen invaasion alusta: 1/ Invaasion /sodan aktiivisen vaiheen alussa, kumpikin osapuoli kykeni tukeutumaan kahdeksan vuoden aikana rakennettuihin ekstensiivisiin linnoitusketjuihinsa. Erityisesti Horlivka-Popasna-Hirske välillä Ukrainan asevoimat (AFU) oli rakentanut useita peräkkäisiä linnoitusketjuja 2/

19.10. Tilannekatsaus Pohjois-Luhanskin rintaman tilanteesta. Rintama on ollut verrattain aktiivinen kuluneiden parin viikon aikana Ukrainan asevoimien (AFU) pyrkiessä laajentamaan asemiaan Kupyanskin itäpuolella ja 1/ Venäjän asevoimien (RuAF) pyrkiessä vastaavasti rajoittamaan AFU:n toimia alueella. RuAF:n vastahyökkäykset Kupyanskin itäpuolella epäonnistuivat ja näyttäisi siltä, että AFU on onnistuneesti pakottanut RuAF:n puolustuskannalle tien P07 suunnassa. 2/

Ukrainan asevoimien (AFU) vastahyökkäys Pohjois-Luhanskin rintamalla jatkuu. Lymanin kaatuminen lienee tässä vaiheessa vain ajan kysymys. AFU aloitti hyökkäykset Lymanin suunnalla käytännössä välittömästi Harkovan oblastin offensiivin saavutettua Oskil joen 8.-9.9. 1/ Harkovan offensiivin myötä Venäjän asevoimat (RuAF) joutuivat evakuoimaan kiireellisesti Izyumin alueelta 1. Kaartin panssariarmeijan (1. GTA) ja 20. Kaartin armeijan (2. GCAA) pääosat saarrostusuhan alta. 2/

Siitä mitä olen tilannetta ja siihen liittyviä kommentteja sekä analyysejä seurannut Oskil joen / pohjoisen Luhanskin rintamasta, niin arvioisin Venäjän asevoimien (RuAF) todennäköisesti yrittävän alueella seuraavaa: 1/ - RuAF käynee tällä hetkellä viivytystaistelua Oskil joen varrella ja Lymanin suunnalla. Tällä se pyrkinee ostamaan aikaa saadakseen Izyumin alueelta vetäytyneet joukot takaisin jonkinlaiseen taistelukykyyn ja ryhmitykseen, sekä vahvistuksille mahdollisuuden saapua paikalle 2/