I promised a thread on the success of Religious Zionism in this year's Israeli elections. One-sentence summary: the mainstream narrative is oversimplified. RZ is no longer properly described as a sectorial party; it has measurable support in all segments of Jewish society. /1
The mainstream take is something like this: 2021 Yamina voters didn't forgive Bennett's betrayal and overwhelmingly voted for RZ, for lack of a better option. The numbers superficially back this claim: RZ and Yamina together got 11.3%; RZ now gets 10.83%. /2
Extract the (supposedly) small number of Yamina voters who couldn't stomach Ben Gvir, add a few Likud voters and former non-voters, and you get to this number. I think there's reason to think that this narrative isn't quite right, though; I'll use electoral maps to show why. /3
In most places where Yamina was especially strong last year, RZ's share of the vote this year is significantly lower than the combined RZ+Yamina vote was then. Here is, for example, Givat Shmuel. Yamina won this city with 24% last year; RZ got 15. This year, RZ got 23.95%. /4
The same pattern holds in softcore settlements where in 2021, Yamina was stronger than RZ. Take Efrat: in 2021 Yamina+RZ got 69% combined (43+26). This year: RZ at 48.05% only. At least half of Yamina voters in Efrat couldn't get themselves to vote for Smotrich and Ben Gvir. /5
Elkana is another settlement where Yamina was popular. In 2021, Yamina got 38% here, while RZ got 37. But this year, RZ got only 52.7%. Here, too, more than half of 2021 Yamina voters moved to parties other than RZ. /6
Okay, last example in the softcore settlement genre: Alon Shvut. 2021: Yamina 40%, RZ 34%. 2022: RZ 47.68%. Here, the massive majority of Yamina voters declined to vote for RZ. /7
I can't go through all settlements, but I conjecture that RZ massively *underperformed* in the settlements compared to its potential to get the Yamina vote. RZ is much less of a settlers' party this year than it was last year. Probably also less of a religious Zionist party. /8
So where's the support coming from? Journalists speak of the "periphery", but I'm convinced that RZ's rise is impossible to explain without internalizing the national trauma that anti-Jewish rioting caused last May. So I'll now look at cities that were affected by the rioting. /9
The first example is Lod, the epicenter of the riots. Lod was a warzone last May. RZ got 15.5% here, 2% more than the combined RZ/Yamina vote. For reasons I explained before, I think we should assume that a lot more than 2% of the new voters aren't former Yamina voters. /10
Next, Ramleh; another impoverished mixed city that saw some pretty nasty rioting. RZ in 2022: 12.68%. Last year, RZ and Yamina got 7.8% together here. Like in many mixed cities, many of the Ramleh votes for RZ were spasms of rage over the anti-Jewish violence there. /11
Be'er Sheva and its broader area has also seen rioting last May. Last year RZ and Yamina together here: 11%. This year RZ alone: 15.67%. /12
Be'er Sheva and its broader area has also seen rioting last May. Last year RZ and Yamina together here: 11%. This year RZ alone: 15.67%. /12
Acre (Akko), which has seen particularly brutal attacks on Jews last May. 8.2% for RZ and Yamina combined last year; 9.97% this year just for RZ alone. Some Akko residents aren't convinced by the motto that "Jews and Arabs refuse to be enemies". /13
Last example: Tiberias, another scene of Arab rioting last May. RZ got 12.83% this year; only 11 last year for RZ+Yamina combined. Perhaps less impressive than the others, but again, keep in mind that a lot of Yamina voters did not switch to RZ. /14
Now, all of these are socioeconomically disadvantaged cities that, although without a major religious Zionist population, were nonetheless already pretty right-leaning (mostly Likud strongholds). However, this is not the end of the story. RZ also got 4.5 in Tel Aviv. /14
TLV has some poorer Likud-leaning Southern districts, but this is not the whole story. RZ also got 3.6% in Florentin - not a lot, but enough for 4-5 seats into the Knesset. This is one of the most left-wing districts in Israel; Labor and Meretz combined got 44% here last year./15
Slightly less left-wing but still very solidly left-wing Neve Tzedek also would have voted RZ into the Knesset, with 4.53% (around 6 seats). Granted, in many wealthy Northern Tel Aviv districts RZ wouldn't have made it into the Knesset. /16
It's hard not to think that the physical proximity to Yafo, another area where rioting occurred last May, had something to do with the distribution of the RZ vote in heavily left-leaning areas of Tel Aviv. /17
And the situation in Tel Aviv is also the big picture in virtually all well-to-do, middle-class, secular cities in the Gush Dan. RZ underperformed here, but it would have still entered the Knesset (3.25% or more) in Givatayim, Ramat HaSharon, Herzliya, and Hod HaSharon. /18
Religious Zionism garnered 4.18% in Saviyon. In Saviyon!! This is Israel's richest city, where millionaires live in heavily guarded villas with large swimming pools. Smotrich and Ben Gvir are more of a thing in Saviyon now than Merav Michaeli's Labor is in Israel. /19
So the story is that RZ didn't just gobble up the Yamina vote. It did some of that; it also reached out to disenchanted youth in the periphery; but it also attracted measurable support from unlikely demographics, in towns where religious Zionists are almost nowhere to be seen./20
I'm convinced that we can't explain such a reach for an ostensibly sectoral religious party without the riots during Guardian of the Walls. Many Israelis, from very different backgrounds, perceived the riots as a major blackpill about Jewish-Arab coexistence. /21
I'm very unhappy about the strong showing of RZ; I reject Ben Gvir's worldview and politics. I wrote this thread because I want to help both center-left Israelis and Western Israel watchers to understand why Ben Gvir has such appeal well beyond his natura core constituency. /22
You can shout "fascist" and enjoy the warm, fuzzy feeling of righteous moral outrage. But anger won't help you understand social phenomena. Ben Gvir offers bad solutions to very real problems. Those who want to defeat him need to understand why so many find him appealing. /23-end
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One of my more niche opinions is that the Israel should invest into the formation of a positive Israeli Arab identity that is decoupled from Palestinianism, at the very least makes peace with Zionism and which can serve as a blueprint for full integration and communal dignity. /1
The sense one gets is that the Israeli right opposes the Palestinization of Israeli Arabs, the far-left cheers it, and the moderate left (but also much of the moderate right) pretends that it isn't real or is restricted to a "radical minority". /2
This isn't good enough: Israel's Arab minority should be reminded at every turn that there is a route to complete, sincere and *warm* social acceptance, and that this route is paved through at the very least the passive acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state. /3
@LZionist This wasn’t really your question, but just to add my own two cents: I consider the entire contemporary discourse on anti-zionism and antisemitism totally flawed. It’s based on the assumption, on both sides, that antisemitism is this ultimate evil, and that when a thing implies…
@LZionist …antisemitism it’s ultimately evil, while if it doesn’t, it’s fine, or at least fine enough to deserve a table in polite conversations. I think this is completely wrong. For one, I have to confess that I don’t particularly care about antisemitism as such. It’s hardly ever on…
@LZionist ...my mind. Some antisemites are potential murderers, only waiting for the right opportunity. Many others are ignoramuses who never met a Jew in their life, reflectively accepted a few stupid prejudices about Jews, and who never act on their prejudicial beliefs - and quite...
Short thread on "First Israel" vs. "Second Israel" discourse. Very roughly: paradigm "First Israel" is secular, Ashkenazi, center-left, and middle to upper-middle class; although one can belong to this tribe without being all of these things. /1
"Second Israel" is traditional or religious, Mizrahi, right-wing, and lower-middle to working-class, although again, one can be "Second Israel" without being all of these things. /2
One recurring theme in this discourse is the need for "reconciliation" between the two Israels. Reconciliation sounds nice, but it's unclear what it amounts to. There's reconciliation between two parties when instead of one defeating the other, they reach a kind of compromise. /3