1./ Common fallacies in IR thought, or: how to avoid geopolitical gibberish.

Some thought patterns became so prevalent in geopolitics commentary that they bled into ordinary discourse. Yet these ideas are manifestly and obviously absurd, and they should seem absurd to anyone who wasn’t indoctrinated with geopolitics gibberish. In this thread, I’ll list a few common fallacies. 2./ The homeopathic fallacy (“the weaker, the stronger”; credit to @aryehazan): the more of your enemies you kill, and the more you destroy their fighting abilities, the stronger they become. This only applies to *them*, mind you; if *your* people die and your infrastructure is destroyed, you just get weaker. Homeopathy works only on third-world countries and terrorists, not on Israel and the West.

I agree with this post of Tamritz, but I'd like to elaborate on it. The war between US/Israel and Iran has a dynamic very similar to the dynamic of the war between Israel and Hamas between 2023 and 2025. I will go over this dynamic and will then also stick out my neck and make a cautious prediction about what I think we can expect over the coming weeks / months. (Long thread; maybe get a coffee before continuing.)

Tl;dr: my prediction is that Trump will either succeed at securing Hormuz by force, or we are facing a prolonged war in which Iran eventually agrees to a nuclear deal that is closer to Trump's original red lines than to Iran's. Most likely is some combination of the two. (I'm assuming there won't be regime change.) Below I'll explain why. /1

https://x.com/HeTows/status/2033958173615272365

Hormuz is Iran's version of the hostages. In the Gaza War, Hamas had something very precious for Israel: the hostages. The hostages were Hamas's only card, so Hamas felt it couldn't let go of them without substantial guarantees that the war wouldn't be renewed. Hamas demanded a "capitulation deal" from Israel, which would have included full withdrawal with Hamas in power on the entire Gaza Strip. A majority of the Israeli public (including a substantial minority of Bibi's voters) felt that the hostages were a top priority and were willing to pay any price for them.

Hormuz is similar. It's Iran's only serious card, so Iran feels it can't let go of it without a guarantees that the war wouldn't be renewed and a favorable nuclear deal. The closure of Hormuz is felt in the oil price, and it will be even more felt by the American public as time goes on. Americans are currently divided over the war, but the MAGA base is largely behind it. As the oil price will start shooting up, more and more of them will sour on the war and prioritize cheap oil over ending the war on the US's terms. /2

There is no need to annex the West Banks. Annexation would serve two legitimate goals, and both can be achieved by other means: to make a future withdrawal harder, to arrange the legal environment (property law, land ownership, taxes etc.) of settlers. /1

https://twitter.com/amitsegal/status/1981315873542697056

The first goal can be achieved by the passing a law that conditions any further withdrawal from the West Bank I’m getting the support of at least 80 MKs we majority in a public referendum - the same conditions as giving up sovereign Israeli territory. /2

I wanted to wait at least until the living hostages are really, truly back in Israel, scribbling down my thoughts about about the two-year long Gaza War. Thread. /1 The Gaza War ended in the same way as the war's other fronts, with Hezbollah and with Iran: with a victory, although not "total victory". The war wasn't "total" victory in the colloquial sense. Hamas still exists and the Gazan population still defiantly supports its ideology. /2

Ironically, Trump, who is often described as cynical and a man with no principles, is one of the last true peaceniks in the US. The progressives obviously don't believe in peace, they just want to punish Israel. /1 The more centrist Democrats who demand a two-state solution, I don't think they really believe this will solve the I/P conflict either. Some of them are principled liberals and they think the Palestinians have the "right" to a state no matter what they will do with it. /2

In an interesting and surprising way, the groups in Israel who behave most consistently on the Israeli normalcy vs. Jewish exceptionalism dilemma, the most consistent ones are on the fringes of the right with little representation in its elite: soft Bibists and galuti Haredim. /1 On most cultural matters, as well in matters of war and peace, the Israeli center-left tends to advocate for "Israeli normalcy": Israel should be a normal state just like any Western liberal democracy, with state and synagogue more or less separated, with humanistic principles /2

As I promised: a few thoughts about the Twelve-Day War (I hope this name becomes standard), which seems to have ended.

Short summary: Israel won. This isn't "total victory", whatever that means. But it's also not a "mere tactical" victory (a highly overused expression). /1 The last few hours left a bitter taste in the mouth of many Israelis, because Trump restrained Israel right after Iran managed to murder a few more civilians in the last moment. But in the grand scheme of things, this restraining doesn't matter much. /2

A lot of military analysts (also in Israel) are now warning against getting dragged into a "war of attrition" with Iran. I'll stick out my neck and say that I'm actually in favor of a war of attrition. In this thread I'll briefly explain why. /1 This war hurts Iran far more than it hurts Israel. More importantly, in Israel the trend is positive, while in Iran negative. In the thread below I predict thated Iran would ask for a ceasefire in a month. But if they're dumb enough not to, even better. /2

https://x.com/HeTows/status/1936363757921337447

I don't know what the explanation of the "Israeli demographic miracle" is, but I know this: its only truly miraculous component is one of the seemingly least impressive ones. Namely, secular Jewish TFR, which isn't sky-high but merely hovers around replacement level. Thread. /1 Israel's high fertility (a TFR close to 3, completely unique in the developed world) is often discussed in vague, general terms, linking the phenomenon to religion, nationalism, and "siege mentality". It's often ignored that Israel is an archipalego of several different tribes./2

One of the emptiest, most meaningless accusations frequently launched against the Israeli government is how they are "bad at diplomacy"; that another government, which is "more adept at diplomacy", would find more partners for its policies and more support for the war. /1 This is just empty drivel. What do these people mean by "diplomacy"? One thing that's obvious is that if the government had different (much more dovish) policies, then it would find more supporters. This is surely true: if the government had agreed to a deals with both Hamas /2

This is looking to be a blowout victory for Trump: a landslide in the EC and also a popular vote victory by several million votes, the first for a Republican in 20 years. I’ll share a few thoughts here about the election in no particular order. /1 First: this exceeds all
my expectations. I cautiously predicted a narrow Trump victory because of the Republicans’ EC advantage, but I thought it was a tossup. Apparently those who assumed that Trump is always underestimated in polls and will be even a third time, were right./2

People sometimes speculate that the timeline for the US election influences Israeli decision-making. I think this is true, but not in the way people think. The story I sometimes hear is that by timing the Third Lebanon War now, Bibi is causing a mess to get Trump elected. /1 According to this interpretation, Bibi is banking on Trump to get elected and has no plan B. But I don't think this is the correct reading of his actions. Bibi is a pessimist. I think he's managing the war, on both fronts, with a Harris rather than a Trump presidency in mind. /2

Four days ago, a new PCPSR poll came out about Palestinian public opinion about the war and some surrounding questions. The results are dramatic; I'll touch some of the highlights here and will draw some conclusions. Here's the poll itself. /1 pcpsr.org/sites/default/… Almost a year into the war, support for the Oct 7 attack is at a record low in the Gaza Strip: a mere 39%. Down from 59% in Dec and 71% in March. Recall that diplomatic pressure on Israel peaked around March-April. West Bankers are also sobering up, although much more slowly. /2

Many asked me lately what I think about the new PCPSR joint poll, which surveys attitudes to the war and related issues among Israeli Jews & Arabs and Palestinians. Here, I'll focus on Israeli Jews and Arabs; I hope to get back to Palestinians later on. /1 pcpsr.org/sites/default/… The genaral picture one gets is that the war *did* make Israeli Jews more hawkish and right-wing, and the effect didn't dissipate a few weeks into the war. Of course, this finding is belied by certain clear social trends in Israel. I'll get back to this paradox later. /2

The biggest potential game changer in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be demographic transition, especially in the Gaza Strip. But not for the reasons people usually cite. There will never be a “one state solution”; Palestinians won’t get Israeli citizenship en masse. /1 Rather, especially in the Gaza Strip, human life is extremely cheap. This is primarily due to an extreme collectivist Islamist ideology, but it also has a lot to do with (still) high fertility levels there - currently around 3.4 in the Gaza Strip. /2

I have a naive question that I have to get off my chest because it's been on my mind for a few days. Perhaps people with more understanding of these things than me, like @GhostArikSharon, will be able to help me out.

It's has to do with the anticipated big war with Hezbollah. /1 @GhostArikSharon My question is: why is it taken for granted as obvious that there *must* be a big war, and that a prolonged war of attrition with varying levels of intensity mustn't be allowed to continue for a long time? I'll explain why it occurred to me this is not such a bad option. /2

From a purely electoral perspective, Biden’s announcement to stop the shipment of artillery shells and guided munitions if Israel enters Rafah was a huge gamble, in my view. If Israel rolls over now, the gamble could pay off. /1 In that case, Biden might win back Muslims and anti-Israel voters who were alienated from him in swing states, especially in Michigan, and hope this it won’t hurt him too much among Jewish voters in places like Pennsylvania and Arizona. /2

The present historical moment reminds me of the post-Intifada period so much. I think it will also end similarly. Contrary to hasbara folklore, the Intifada didn't push Isralis rightward. It made them tired and more dovish, and in 2006 they crowned Ehud Olmert as Israel's PM. /1 Olmert was widely seen as a continuer of Sharon's legacy; he was elected shortly after his unilateral withdrawal form the Gaza Strip. But Olmert was in retrospect a failure. The Second Lebanon War ended inconclusively, and his 2008 bid for two states was dead on arrival. /2

It's interesting that there used to be so much talk in Israel about elite emigration (more suppressed since the war broke out, although not non-existent), but almost no talk about elite fertility - even though for the future of Israel's elite, the latter is no less important. /1 Imagine two scenarios. In the first scenario, the secular population continues to grow at its current rate of 1.5%/year (due to near-replacement fertility and secularization in more religious sectors). However, every year 1% of seculars emigrate. 1% a year is a lot! /2

In the past I used to write about Israeli politics in sectorial terms. But these days, I often think of it in terms of interest groups and intellectual halos. The way I see it now, it has roughly 6 groups, 3 in the coalition and 3 in the opposition. /1 Coalition groups:

1. Settler lobby
2. Israeli hawks
2.5. Israeli moderates (left flank of Likud)
3. Haredi lobby

The boundary between 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 is vague. 4 is a wholly distinct group, with special interests that 1-2.5 don't share. This is more visible now. /2

Here are some unorthodox thoughts about the whole controversy and waiting game surrounding the Rafah invasion. Contrary to many analysts, I don’t think that the waiting game is necessarily bad for Israel. /1 The assumption that the delay is awful, even in right-wing circles, tacitly relies on the artificial distinction between Hamas and its home front. Hamas’s home front is the Gazan population, which supports it. Hamas may well be undefeated, but its home front isn’t doing well. /2