I don't know what the explanation of the "Israeli demographic miracle" is, but I know this: its only truly miraculous component is one of the seemingly least impressive ones. Namely, secular Jewish TFR, which isn't sky-high but merely hovers around replacement level. Thread. /1 Israel's high fertility (a TFR close to 3, completely unique in the developed world) is often discussed in vague, general terms, linking the phenomenon to religion, nationalism, and "siege mentality". It's often ignored that Israel is an archipalego of several different tribes./2

One of the emptiest, most meaningless accusations frequently launched against the Israeli government is how they are "bad at diplomacy"; that another government, which is "more adept at diplomacy", would find more partners for its policies and more support for the war. /1 This is just empty drivel. What do these people mean by "diplomacy"? One thing that's obvious is that if the government had different (much more dovish) policies, then it would find more supporters. This is surely true: if the government had agreed to a deals with both Hamas /2

This is looking to be a blowout victory for Trump: a landslide in the EC and also a popular vote victory by several million votes, the first for a Republican in 20 years. I’ll share a few thoughts here about the election in no particular order. /1 First: this exceeds all
my expectations. I cautiously predicted a narrow Trump victory because of the Republicans’ EC advantage, but I thought it was a tossup. Apparently those who assumed that Trump is always underestimated in polls and will be even a third time, were right./2

People sometimes speculate that the timeline for the US election influences Israeli decision-making. I think this is true, but not in the way people think. The story I sometimes hear is that by timing the Third Lebanon War now, Bibi is causing a mess to get Trump elected. /1 According to this interpretation, Bibi is banking on Trump to get elected and has no plan B. But I don't think this is the correct reading of his actions. Bibi is a pessimist. I think he's managing the war, on both fronts, with a Harris rather than a Trump presidency in mind. /2

Four days ago, a new PCPSR poll came out about Palestinian public opinion about the war and some surrounding questions. The results are dramatic; I'll touch some of the highlights here and will draw some conclusions. Here's the poll itself. /1 pcpsr.org/sites/default/… Almost a year into the war, support for the Oct 7 attack is at a record low in the Gaza Strip: a mere 39%. Down from 59% in Dec and 71% in March. Recall that diplomatic pressure on Israel peaked around March-April. West Bankers are also sobering up, although much more slowly. /2

Many asked me lately what I think about the new PCPSR joint poll, which surveys attitudes to the war and related issues among Israeli Jews & Arabs and Palestinians. Here, I'll focus on Israeli Jews and Arabs; I hope to get back to Palestinians later on. /1 pcpsr.org/sites/default/… The genaral picture one gets is that the war *did* make Israeli Jews more hawkish and right-wing, and the effect didn't dissipate a few weeks into the war. Of course, this finding is belied by certain clear social trends in Israel. I'll get back to this paradox later. /2

The biggest potential game changer in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be demographic transition, especially in the Gaza Strip. But not for the reasons people usually cite. There will never be a “one state solution”; Palestinians won’t get Israeli citizenship en masse. /1 Rather, especially in the Gaza Strip, human life is extremely cheap. This is primarily due to an extreme collectivist Islamist ideology, but it also has a lot to do with (still) high fertility levels there - currently around 3.4 in the Gaza Strip. /2

I have a naive question that I have to get off my chest because it's been on my mind for a few days. Perhaps people with more understanding of these things than me, like @GhostArikSharon, will be able to help me out.

It's has to do with the anticipated big war with Hezbollah. /1 @GhostArikSharon My question is: why is it taken for granted as obvious that there *must* be a big war, and that a prolonged war of attrition with varying levels of intensity mustn't be allowed to continue for a long time? I'll explain why it occurred to me this is not such a bad option. /2

From a purely electoral perspective, Biden’s announcement to stop the shipment of artillery shells and guided munitions if Israel enters Rafah was a huge gamble, in my view. If Israel rolls over now, the gamble could pay off. /1 In that case, Biden might win back Muslims and anti-Israel voters who were alienated from him in swing states, especially in Michigan, and hope this it won’t hurt him too much among Jewish voters in places like Pennsylvania and Arizona. /2

The present historical moment reminds me of the post-Intifada period so much. I think it will also end similarly. Contrary to hasbara folklore, the Intifada didn't push Isralis rightward. It made them tired and more dovish, and in 2006 they crowned Ehud Olmert as Israel's PM. /1 Olmert was widely seen as a continuer of Sharon's legacy; he was elected shortly after his unilateral withdrawal form the Gaza Strip. But Olmert was in retrospect a failure. The Second Lebanon War ended inconclusively, and his 2008 bid for two states was dead on arrival. /2

It's interesting that there used to be so much talk in Israel about elite emigration (more suppressed since the war broke out, although not non-existent), but almost no talk about elite fertility - even though for the future of Israel's elite, the latter is no less important. /1 Imagine two scenarios. In the first scenario, the secular population continues to grow at its current rate of 1.5%/year (due to near-replacement fertility and secularization in more religious sectors). However, every year 1% of seculars emigrate. 1% a year is a lot! /2

In the past I used to write about Israeli politics in sectorial terms. But these days, I often think of it in terms of interest groups and intellectual halos. The way I see it now, it has roughly 6 groups, 3 in the coalition and 3 in the opposition. /1 Coalition groups:

1. Settler lobby
2. Israeli hawks
2.5. Israeli moderates (left flank of Likud)
3. Haredi lobby

The boundary between 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 is vague. 4 is a wholly distinct group, with special interests that 1-2.5 don't share. This is more visible now. /2

Here are some unorthodox thoughts about the whole controversy and waiting game surrounding the Rafah invasion. Contrary to many analysts, I don’t think that the waiting game is necessarily bad for Israel. /1 The assumption that the delay is awful, even in right-wing circles, tacitly relies on the artificial distinction between Hamas and its home front. Hamas’s home front is the Gazan population, which supports it. Hamas may well be undefeated, but its home front isn’t doing well. /2

Finally, the much awaited March update of the PCPRS poll about Palestinian public opinion has come out. The results are mixed and inconclusive: there are both trends that show further radicalization and trends that point toward the exhaustion of the Gazan population. /1 After a temporary divergence between Gaza and the West Bank, they are now virtually indistinguishable, 71% in each saying that the October 7 attack was a great idea. Support went up in Gaza and down in the West Bank. /2

הטוויטים הבאים נועדים לתומכי הימין. כמה מילים על עצמי: אני ליברל ש"התפכח". אף פעם לא הייתי שמאלן נלהב; הפכתי מתומך המרכז-שמאל עם הרבה הסתייגויות לתומך הימין עם הרבה הסתייגויות. בעבר הצבעתי ללפיד וגנץ; בבחירות הבאות ייתכן שאצביע למפלגת ימין ליברלי, ואם לא תהיה, לליכוד (בלב כבד)./1 אני מאמין שהימין הישראלי שבוי בשקרים שהוא מספר לעצמו, והשקרים האלה יתנקמו בו. אני כותב את זה מדאגה, בתור מישהו שהחליף צד אחרי פרוץ המלחמה אבל עדיין שייך לשכבע הסוציולוגי שמוזהה עם המרכז-שמאל. זו הסביבה שלי, אלה רוב האנשים שאני פוגש בחיים היומיומיים, זה האוויר שאני נושם. /2

I see a lot of pro-Israel, anti-DC-blob accounts on English-speaking Twitter fretting that by agreeing to a hostage deal, Israel will "agree to managed defeat".

Don't do this. Your intentions may be good, but you're helping your own worries come true, and they don't have to. /1 One of the biggest contentions in these negotiations is whether a hostage deal will put an end to the war (with binding international guarantees) or will be only temporary. Israel won't agree to any deal that doesn't allow it to renew fighting after its expiration. /2

Something puzzling is happening in Israel: after the Palestinians staged their most horrific attack ever on Jews and Israelis, Ganz is surging in polls, and the center-left is stronger than ever since the era of Labor hegemony. /1 Polls show that Israelis remain more right-wing in their views than their party preferences suggest, but even in scenarios that include a new (untainted) party under Bennett, at best it could prevent a pure center-left government; the right won’t have a majority even then. /2

Lately, an increasing number of high-profile journalists, ex-generals and intelligence officials argued that Israel should wrap up the war without realizing its objectives. You might have thought this represented the public mood, but a recent IDI poll shows that this isn't so. /1 75% of Israeli Jews oppose yielding to American pressure and shifting to lower-intensity warfare. The only groups that think otherwise in significant numbers are Israeli Arabs (56%) and self-defined leftists (57%). Note that most opposition voters aren't self-defined leftists. /2

In the past I often wrote about the phenomenon of "false consciousness" in Israel (a Marxist notion, but so what? It's useful). The group I most frequently accused of false consciousness were traditional Jews, whose alliance with Haredim never really made sense. /1 In light of recent polls, this criticism has less basis than before the war. Most non-religious traditional Jews and possibly a majority of all traditional Jews now oppose the ruling coalition (see below). But I want to write about another group. /2

https://x.com/HeTows/status/1736498372054311254?s=20

This will be highly controvesial and might piss some people off, but I have to say it. The logic and the thought patterns behind bad hostage deals, is very similar to the logic behind draconian restrictions during the Covid pandemic. I will explain. /1

https://twitter.com/David97768248/status/1737183843004645456

I should preface this with the following: my heart goes out for the hostages; I can't imagine what they're going through. If my loved ones were among them, I'd want to get them out at any cost, to the hell with the country. And for this reason, then nobody should listen to me. /2

A few scattered thoughts about the Israel that I think will emerge once the war in Gaza is over. Of course, in many ways it's early to talk about this. We still can't be sure it won't become a regional war. And we don't yet know how it will end. But we can make some guesses. /1 I should say right away that I'll talk about what I think will happen. Toward the end I will also say something about what I hope will happen, but that will be even more speculative, and I will explicitly flag that as an expression of hopes rather than a prediction. /2