I think it's likelier than not that Kherson reverts to Ukraine by EOM January 2023. Not high conviction call but multiplicity of evidence now points to that.
Main focus will be on preserving the one Pyrrhic gain from the war, the Crimean Corridor.
Kherson only useful as springboard into Nikolaev and later Odessa. Spending ≤5% of GDP on military is insufficient to man or munition such offensives, while also plugging LNR and Zaporozhye. The Dnieper is much more defensible.
Reality is, Kherson is a smallish, poor provincial city and of the 8 Novorossiya provinces, the least pro-Russian from 2013/14 polls. In denying Ukraine manpower or industries, its loss is close to inconsequential. Main problem is that the dam may then go & Crimea goes dry again.
Canceling out one of the signature early accomplishments of the SVO.
But fate of Crimean agriculture is fairly trivial, all things considered. Main problem of Kherson abandonment is political; only "real" city apart from Mariupol to be liberated, gone.
The only critical consideration, whether this remains a (very) Pyrrhic Russian victory or turns into some variant of defeat, will be determined by whether the new frontlines running along Dnieper, and in Zaporozhye and Donbass (perhaps even with Bakhmut) will prove sustainable.
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Military power is downstream of military spending which is downstream of GDP, now there's ofc modifiers to military power beyond the economic (aka why beating Germany which punched well above its economic economic potential was such a tough slog) but it's a consistent pattern.
4.7T rubles in 2022 = $75B which is 3.2% of Russia's $2.133T GDP.
Up from 3.4T rubles in 2021, or 40% increase (much less actually minus inflation). rbc.ru/newspaper/2021…
Russian (public) spending plans as of Sep 2022:
Military: 2022 - 4.7T rubles (+1.2T over prewar plans); 2023 - 5.0T; 2024 - 4.6T; 2025 - 4.2T
Police/security: 2022 - 2.8T; 2023 - 4.2T (+1.3T over old plans); 2024 - 4.3T; 2025 - 4.3T vedomosti.ru/economics/arti…
Rather doubt 40% surge to 5.0T rubles (=$80B) is enough to win the war.
Projection of police/security spending rising much faster than military spending suggests they foresee more people needing batons to the face from next year.
Considering the above, presumably not in Kiev.
It's actually pretty remarkable if those numbers reflect reality.
300k new mobiks implies a significant absolute *decrease* in spending per soldier (so either combat pay promises not getting honored, or equipment woes continuing, or both). And what about MIC output increases?
Main whitepill is that strikes to suppress electric grad happen at scale and effective.
I wouldn't be surprised if MOD is being advised by Telegram autists like those at Rybar who've studied the ins and outs of Ukraine's electricity system and calculated a methodical plan on how to maximize 🌃⚫️ per 🚀💥. t.me/rybar/40122
Basic logic:
* Mobilization -> manpower superiority.
* Electric grid kaput -> collapsed logistics --> some hope of restoring materiel superiority that Russia's been losing (tech-adjusted at any rate).
=> Front begins to advance again (good), or at least stabilizes (less good).
Mikhail Zygar's All the Kremlin's Men on battles over military budget in 2010.
In wake of Georgia, reformist DefMin Serdyukov wanted to spend 28T rubles on military modernization over 10 year period. MinFin wanted $9T. Putin okayed $13T. But Medvedev (!) wanted $20T.
Funny if OG siloviks & generals feeling threatened by Serdyukov's ambitions + Putin's perception that Medvedev was angling to create own patronage network explains 2022's failures as lower figures were adopted. Military power is aggregate of past investment minus depreciation.
At the very least military spending under a continued Medvedev Presidency would likely have been higher. And there'd surely have been more work on Russia's core military problem - which has to do with software (organization & culture), not hardware. That stopped after Shoygu.
Exit grain deal agreement Ukrainians used to import arms. Reenter a day later after some meaningless "written assurances" (pictured right).
I think kremlins just don't grok game theory in a way even capos do (funny Russia being an actual "Mafia State" might be an improvement).
Impression forming amongst foreign leaders Putin is unironic tinpot dictator who folds whenever people call his bluff.
This makes nuclear weapons usage as a last resort (e.g. NATO intervention) progressively more incredible, validating the most reckless Western & Ukr hawks.
And who knows, they might actually be right. Perhaps Putin really does intend to fold all the way to the Hague or the grave. Perhaps the Putin health rumors really are finally true and he's suffering from some cognitively impairing illness.
They have perhaps the highest disparity between the damage they actually do (basically just high explosives, if radiation is sufficiently high to kill you, you're already dead anyway), and the outrage they provoke (muh evil atomics).
While the military utility of tactical nukes (unless used on a large scale) is low, and absurdly outweighed by their costs (NATO intervention), that of dirty nukes is precisely zero.
So Russia has zero interest in breaking out dirty nukes even if losing.
However, dirty bombs HAVE historically been a consistent & deranged preoccupation of Ukrainian nationalists, who view them (as well as triggering nuclear power plant meltdowns and dam destruction) as Samson options in the event the existence of the Ukrainian state is threatened.