1/ New report from @DaniellesCave and I: 🇨🇳 cyber-enabled foreign interference continues to target women of Asian descent without consequential intervention from policymakers or social media platforms aspistrategist.org.au/musks-twitter-…
2/ We find that new iterations of the CCP-linked Spamouflage network - which Twitter attributed to the Chinese government in 2019 - are likely behind these ongoing harassment and trolling campaigns.
3/ What's new is that graphic depictions of sexual assault, homophobia and racist imagery (sometimes involving Australian lawmakers) and life-threatening intimidation are a growing part of the Party’s transnational repression. See below for some examples 👇 
4/ We focus on three ongoing campaigns targeting @changchengwai @xu_xiuzhong and @JiayangFan, in English and in Mandarin, which stand out for their threatening approach; deep misogyny; and coordinated, persistent harassment. For example, see the hashtag #TraitorJiayangFan
5/ ... and examples of physical threats
https://twitter.com/xu_xiuzhong/status/1584376162234482688?s=20&t=1LLSY_rAge44FFV9saXLSg
6/ Many of the journalists targeted earlier this year when we conducted our original analysis are still constantly abused. They include the New York Times’ @muyixiao and Washington DC–based video journalist @xinyanyu aspistrategist.org.au/smart-asian-wo…
7/ The CCP is refining its ability to incapacitate groups of people and organisations seen as critics. Common tactics now include creating hundreds of replicant accounts to harass those targets and confuse others
https://twitter.com/changchengwai/status/1582843934337662977
8/ In 🇦🇺, parts of this campaign are seeking to interfere in public debates by using the #auspol and #qanda hashtags. Concerningly, a more sophisticated subset of posts are seeking to engage in political interference by promoting a fringe Australian political party.
9/ One inauthentic account named 'Erin Chew' - which based its persona on a real Asian Australian - tweeted about Vicky Xu and tagged dozens of other organisations and individuals, including current and former politicians, gaining more organic engagement web.archive.org/web/2/https://…
10/ The CCP's increasingly global efforts to censor and interfere in public debates is a well-understood and covered issue but much more work is required for social media platforms and policymakers to deter these campaigns. @DaniellesCave and I propose 8 💡recommendations:
11/ 💡Social media platforms must better enforce their rules and terms of service and invest more resources in beefing up their capabilities, human and technical...
12/ ... 💡Social media platforms need to urgently shift their thinking and move from taking down these campaigns through a defensive ‘whack-a-mole’ approach to a more proactive stance...
13/ ... 💡Political leaders and parliamentary bodies, including in Australia, must take greater responsibility for ensuring that foreign states can’t so easily manipulate Western social media platforms to target elections, public discourse and individuals...
14/ ... 💡Cyber-enabled foreign interference, in all its forms, needs to become a standard focus for governments in both cyber and national security strategies. Most democracies only focus on it before an election...
15/ ... 💡Democracies should establish an Indo-Pacific hybrid threats centre to build broader situational awareness on hybrid threats across the region... aspi.org.au/report/counter…
16/ ... 💡 Democratic governments should step up their global signalling. A group of democracies led by the US, Australia and the UK, whose citizens are targeted in this campaign, should coordinate a joint statement denouncing harassment and disinformation campaigns.
17/ ... 💡Governments should do much more to deter this activity, with costs placed on the Chinese government’s transnational repression by summoning China’s ambassadors and consuls-general to explain the CCP’s disinformation campaigns and ongoing threats targeting these women.
18/ ... 💡Finally, governments need to consider forcing platforms to disclose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity.
19/ As @elonmusk drills down to examine @TwitterSafety work on state-backed information operations and platform manipulation he will discover he’s taking over a platform considered industry-leading in areas such as transparency, data sharing and policy responses.
20/ He has an opportunity to prioritise policy areas such as preventing state-backed info campaigns, disinfo and other online harms. Policymakers who often overinvested in admiring the problems and underinvest in developing policies must also now step up.
21/ While we wait for action, smart Asian women across the globe are being threatened and viciously abused every day by the world’s newest superpower 🇨🇳
22/ See @ellenwhinnett great reporting on our work here:
https://twitter.com/ellenwhinnett/status/1589371266154524673?s=20&t=w9AjJ9ZZGKGkJjxBmzRA3w
23/ See @SenPaterson leading by example to condemn the CCP's online behaviour
https://twitter.com/SenPaterson/status/1589375988269723648?s=20&t=w9AjJ9ZZGKGkJjxBmzRA3w
24/ See essential statements from Home Affairs and Cyber Minister @ClareONeilMP for deterrence:
"Bullying behaviour like this has a chilling effect on research and harms open discussion about critical national security problems that country faces." theaustralian.com.au/nation/chinese…
"Bullying behaviour like this has a chilling effect on research and harms open discussion about critical national security problems that country faces." theaustralian.com.au/nation/chinese…
25/ "Asian women seem to be particular targets of this bullying. It is not only anti-democratic, it is also racist and misogynistic." @ClareONeilMP
25/ Read our report here: aspistrategist.org.au/musks-twitter-…
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