Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Nov 8, 2022 9 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Using the example of the Chaplynka base, I would like to address some critical issues that need to be resolved - if we want to see the victory of the civilized world in this war. I will provide facts and evidence about lost opportunities
Despite claims from experts and politicians that Ukraine has everything it needs to reach any target on Ukrainian territory - I cannot confirm it. And here is why:
The enemy base was established at the location of an old, abandoned aerodrome in early March and continued to expand since then. In this picture from October 11th, we can observe Command & Control Center which I marked by the yellow square
With the ongoing success of the Kherson operation, Russians continue to withdraw their HQs and command nodes as soon as there is a potential threat of being hit by HIMARS. Imagery from 27.10 shows that the C&C center was disassembled and moved.
If Ukraine had Tactical Ballistic Missiles or ATACMS just a month ago, we could have easily destroyed this C2 center, completely beheading enemy command on the Corps/Army level. Furthermore, we could have easily decimated their airpower in the area
The identification of various types of rotary wing aircraft at the Chaplynka facility between May and October 2022 indicates a persistent presence of Ka-50 “Alligator”, Mi-28 “Havoc”, and Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopters as well as Mi-8 “Hip” transport helicopters.
Back to the distance problem. The M31 rockets and other modifications launched by Ukraine’s HIMARS can roughly strike up to 70-92 km, something that Russians have quickly adapted to. As soon as there is a risk to get stricken, Russians simply move important targets further away.
Some people speculate that if the West would supply Ukraine with short-range tactical ballistic missiles, it would somehow escalate the situation, yet the same people remain silent when Iran agrees to provide ballistic missiles to Russia.
We know their C2s locations. We know what they had for breakfast. Yet, we don’t have the means to strike them. I will continue providing imagery to show you all the lost opportunities for the past months. TBM/ATACMS could have changed the game a long time ago. It’s not too late.

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Jun 29
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:Image
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts. Image
Read 17 tweets
Jun 29
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.

🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
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Jun 26
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible: Image
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...

The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds Image
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds

That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
Read 8 tweets
Jun 26
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization
Read 4 tweets
Jun 23
21st-Century Dragoons: Dissecting Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Tactics

🧵Thread with key findings from Frontelligence Insight analysis on Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Groups: structure, tactics, training, equipment, battlefield performance, and the conditions that enabled them Image
2/ Though called “assault” groups, Motorcycle Assault Groups serve diverse roles beyond direct assaults - handling diversion, reconnaissance, behind-the-lines infiltration, logistics, and flanking support in larger operations.
3/ More importantly, motorcycles act mainly as rapid transport, ferrying troops to their objectives rather than acting as combat platforms. As analysts @KofmanMichael and B.A. Friedman note, a better analogy is “dragoons” - mounted infantry who rode into battle but fought on foot
Read 20 tweets
Jun 22
Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), a respected investigative group that has tracked Russian military affairs for over a decade, has published a new report on the production of T-90 tanks. 🧵Thread about their key findings on Russia’s tank production and expansion efforts: Image
2/ By early 2022, just before the invasion, Uralvagonzavod had started mass production of the upgraded T-90M "Proryv." The army had received 66–85 tanks, plus 10 sent to the Kazan Tank School. In total, Russia had about 65–85 T-90Ms and 370–380 older T-90s around February 2022 Image
3/ CIT estimates that Uralvagonzavod built 60–70 T-90Ms in 2022. Production reportedly rose to 140–180 tanks in 2023. In 2024, output may have reached 250–300 tanks. All current T-90Ms are newly built, and hull production does not appear to be a limiting factor. Photo credit: Uralvagonzavod
Read 9 tweets

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