Using the example of the Chaplynka base, I would like to address some critical issues that need to be resolved - if we want to see the victory of the civilized world in this war. I will provide facts and evidence about lost opportunities
Despite claims from experts and politicians that Ukraine has everything it needs to reach any target on Ukrainian territory - I cannot confirm it. And here is why:
The enemy base was established at the location of an old, abandoned aerodrome in early March and continued to expand since then. In this picture from October 11th, we can observe Command & Control Center which I marked by the yellow square
With the ongoing success of the Kherson operation, Russians continue to withdraw their HQs and command nodes as soon as there is a potential threat of being hit by HIMARS. Imagery from 27.10 shows that the C&C center was disassembled and moved.
If Ukraine had Tactical Ballistic Missiles or ATACMS just a month ago, we could have easily destroyed this C2 center, completely beheading enemy command on the Corps/Army level. Furthermore, we could have easily decimated their airpower in the area
The identification of various types of rotary wing aircraft at the Chaplynka facility between May and October 2022 indicates a persistent presence of Ka-50 “Alligator”, Mi-28 “Havoc”, and Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopters as well as Mi-8 “Hip” transport helicopters.
Back to the distance problem. The M31 rockets and other modifications launched by Ukraine’s HIMARS can roughly strike up to 70-92 km, something that Russians have quickly adapted to. As soon as there is a risk to get stricken, Russians simply move important targets further away.
Some people speculate that if the West would supply Ukraine with short-range tactical ballistic missiles, it would somehow escalate the situation, yet the same people remain silent when Iran agrees to provide ballistic missiles to Russia.
We know their C2s locations. We know what they had for breakfast. Yet, we don’t have the means to strike them. I will continue providing imagery to show you all the lost opportunities for the past months. TBM/ATACMS could have changed the game a long time ago. It’s not too late.
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A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence
SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable