A few broad observations on the course of war, based on observations, discussions with officers, soldiers, and analysts, data, and other relevant sources. I will begin with a high-level sociopolitical overview before gradually moving toward operational-tactical level. 🧵Thread: 2/ Overall, the situation for Ukraine has not improved since last year. Ukraine has markedly increased its long-range strike capabilities, which have very tangible effects across Russian society. However, the battlefield initiative remains with Russia, much as it did most of 2024

According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million 2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published

Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1954601747844112634

2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding

North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread: 2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.

A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread: 2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.

SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread: 2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter

Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread: 2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.

Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1976997555822358538

2/ Question (Q): Do we know what production vs. overhaul and modernization numbers look like?

A: Yes, at least for 2027–2029:

2027: 232 production, 58 overhaul/modernization
2028: 280 production, 138 overhaul/modernization
2029: 253 production, 147 overhaul/modernization

Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report: 2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery

Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated: 2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels

Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”

The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.

🧵Thread: 2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.

The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550 2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA

The Economist:

About 60% of the deep strikes on Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian Fire Point FP-1 drones, which with a smaller payload can reach targets 1,500km within Russia and have sophisticated software that has proved resistant to EW jamming.
🧵Thread: 2/ Olena Kryzhanivska, an expert on Ukrainian weapons systems, notes that the FP-1s cost only about $55,000 each and are now being churned out at a rate more than 100 a day. Ukraine is also using the heavier and more expensive Lyutyi drone, which has a range of 2,000km

Russia is resorting to increasingly drastic measures to find recruits. The list has grown: beyond coercing detainees and conscripts, Moscow is now pressuring businesses to supply contract soldiers while further raising enlistment payments. 🧵Thread with all recent updates: 2/ Thanks to recent updates from @CITeam_en and iStories, we’ve learned that In Russia’s Primorsky region, officials told local business leaders they must help recruit men for the front. Employers were instructed to pressure their staff into signing contracts or contribute money

Since January, 21 of Russia’s 38 major refineries, facilities that process crude into fuels such as gasoline and diesel, have been hit, a new BBC Verify investigation found. The tally of successful attacks is already 48% higher than the total for all of 2024. 🧵Thread: 2/ BBC analysis shows reported attacks hit a record in August, when Ukrainian drones targeted 14 refineries, followed by eight more in September. Some of the strikes reached facilities deep inside Russia.

Russia is exploiting economic struggles in developing nations, luring thousands of Africans with promises of escaping poverty - only for many to end up KIA or missing. Key findings from Frontelligence Insight’s analysis of unique mercenary records in Africa and the Middle East: 2/ According to available data, Egypt is the leading contributor, with 291 documented cases. While the full roster of mercenaries remains incomplete, Egyptians make up nearly 25% of the more than 1200 records we have manually reviewed.

Russia’s military rearmament, especially weapon production numbers, reveals much about its future plans. These numbers are usually hidden in classified documents, a problem Frontelligence Insight, with help from insiders, has solved. For the first time, we can share some of them: 2/ Before the release of the documents, spoilers of which an attentive eye may already have found in the image, we ask our followers to click the notify button in the profile so you don’t miss it. Many have reported that after updates, they don't see posts from those they follow

It’ll be like the Chechen war - said one mobilized soldier. Even if it ends, our leader will thank and leave. A new one will say: I never promised you anything. Back home they’ll say: We never sent you.
One of many remarks gathered by Verstka from mobilized Russians. 🧵Thread: 2/ Russian media outlet Verstka has interviewed dozens of mobilized. Three years in, most express regret and little desire to continue. “There aren’t many patriots here. Almost everyone just wants to go home,” said another mobilized

It’ll be like the Chechen war - said one mobilized soldier. Even if it ends, our leader will thank and leave. A new one will say: I never promised you anything. Back home they’ll say: We never sent you.

One of many remarks gathered by Verstka from mobilized Russians. 🧵Thread: 2/ Russian media outlet Verstka has interviewed dozens of mobilized. Three years in, most express regret and little desire to continue. “There aren’t many patriots here. Almost everyone just wants to go home,” said another mobilized

Russia’s government plans to raise the value-added tax from 20% to 22%, breaking Putin’s pledge not to increase taxes before 2030. The budget deficit has already widened to ₽4.2 trillion ($50 billion), or 1.9% of GDP, as revenues decline with falling oil prices, reports the FT: 2/ This is the second direct tax increase since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

For the full year, the finance ministry expects the deficit to reach ₽5.7 trillion, or 2.6% of GDP, Interfax reported, citing a draft budget law not yet published in full.

Ukraine successfully hit two refineries with drone strikes early on September 20. Geolocated videos show both the Novokuybyshevsk and Saratov refineries damaged and on fire. Ukraine has successfully targeted these facilities earlier this year. 🧵Thread: 2/ According to Rosneft, the Saratov Refinery has a designed capacity of 7.0 million tons of oil per year. It processes Urals crude, crude from the Saratov field via pipeline, as well as crude from the Orenburg fields by rail. It produces gasoline, vacuum gas oil, and bitumen