A drone attack is ongoing against Russian airbases with strategic bombers. While the full damage is still unclear, several videos show multiple bombers have been badly hit. Satellite images from yesterday confirm that Belaya hosts various Tu-95 models, Tu-22M3s, and Tu-160s Satellite imagery of Olenya Airbase from May 26 at 09:50 UTC, shared by @avivector , shows the presence of 11 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 5 An-12 (Cub), and 40 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) aircraft.

https://x.com/avivector/status/1928917683937976352

Over the past few months, Russians have focused on disrupting Ukrainian logistics, using a mix of drones, including fiber-optic. Once EW is neutralized or forced to withdraw by fiber-optic drones, it clears the way for drones like the Molniya, which can fly over 20 km. Thread: 2/ Cutting off supply lines has made vehicle transport nearly impossible. In some cases, individual soldiers must walk more than 10 km at night to deliver basic supplies: an unsustainable way for supporting any sizable unit, or even rotating troops.

Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread: 2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault

How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.

🧵Thread: 2/ Tariff wars:

China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels

Thread🧵

1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities. 2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.

While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:

1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire 2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.

One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative. 2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders

Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.

🧵Thread 2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months

Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:

1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over. 2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success

Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine

In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects 2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.

One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help: 2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:

buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence

As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report.
1/ 🧵Thread: 2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.

In collaboration with @casusbellii, our team Frontelligence Insight investigated a large Russian convoy: over 100 vehicles, including tanks, trucks, IFVs, artillery, and other equipment, that rolled into Bamako, Mali. We've assessed its composition and origins. 🧵Thread: 2/ On January 17, 2025, local media Cap Mali+, streamed a more than 30-minute video of a column of vehicles passing through unnamed Malian streets. The convoy included over 100 vehicles, with roughly half consisting of trucks and the other half made up of combat vehicles

You may not have heard of tantalum, but there’s a good chance it’s in the phone or computer you're using to read this. It’s also a key part in Russia’s military electronics, and its shortage, driven by sanctions, is causing disruptions. Frontelligence Insight's latest assessment: 2/ Russia relies on tantalum to produce tantalum powders for capacitors used in control, navigation, and signal processing systems. While Russia has tantalum deposits, they are limited, and it lacks advanced processing facilities to process a raw tantalum

1/ Why is Ukraine losing ground? There are many explanations, ranging from a lack of aid to a lack of political will to win. The reality, however, is far more complex. This thread offers a brief excerpt from my recent analysis, with the full link provided at the end.

🧵Thread: 2/ Many struggles that the Ukrainian military faces stem from before 2022 and have scaled significantly by 2025. A mobilized force, where teachers, farmers, and IT workers replaced the professional core, turned what began as 'growing pains' into systemic flaws

When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report: 2/ Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers

The Pokrovsk direction, once known as the Avdiivka direction, remains one of the most active and difficult areas. After failing to seize the town directly, as in Novohrodivka, Russian forces pushed towards south of the town, creating an increasingly dangerous situation.🧵Thread 2/ The fall of Selydove has allowed Russian forces to advance south of Pokrovsk, opening a path to Shevchenko, a key settlement before the town itself. With this vital position now almost lost, Russian forces can now expand to the south of Pokrovsk.

Famous YouTuber @johnnywharris, with 6 million followers, released a video titled "Why People Blame America for the War in Ukraine." He presented his argument in it, essentially blaming the West for causing Russia's imperialistic rise. I find it necessary to respond🧵: 2/ In essence, Johnny claims that after the USSR collapse, Russia was excluded from Western society and draws parallels to the treatment of Weimar Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, suggesting that an unjust settlement fueled militarization in both cases

With Russia's budget deficit at 3.3 trillion rubles, 21% key interest rate and 2-3 million job vacancies, Russia has to choose between hyperinflation or an economic freeze, says Vladimir Milov, former Deputy Minister of Energy in an interview with Frontelligence Insight
🧵Thread: 2/ Vladimir Milov (@v_milov), an economist and longtime ally of Alexei Navalny, explains that Russian markets are gloomy ahead of the Central Bank’s board meeting on Dec 20. The Bank is expected to raise interest rates once again, from the current 21%, possibly to 23% or even 25%

Overnight, Ukraine carried out a series of missile strikes on Khalino Airbase in Kursk Oblast, reportedly using ATACMS missiles. Here’s what we can anticipate based on previous data gathered by Frontelligence Insight:

🧵Thread 2/ In recent months, the airfield had been spotted to home SU-25 close air support jets, helicopters, and UAVs.

Gallup, the famous analytics firm known for its public opinion polls, recently released a study titled "Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War." The data might sound controversial, with many citing the headline without delving deeper into the survey. 🧵Thread: 2/ According to the latest survey, conducted in August and October 2024, an average of 52% of Ukrainians now favor a swift, negotiated resolution to the war. This a notable increase from 2023, when only 27% expressed this sentiment, reflecting a 25% increase in just one year