Commented to the FT on pressure to cede territories:

“The constitution limits his power: he has no legal right to alter Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Even more constraining is pressure from society and, crucially, the military, which opposes giving up unoccupied territory" “President Zelenskyy is caught between a rock and a hard place,” the article concludes with my comment.

Given the opportunity, I also want to add that if peace is to be negotiated, we cannot start with non-starter demands, which our President won't be able to accept

Russians plan to produce 79,000 Shahed-type drones in 2025, including 40,000 Geran-2; 5,700 Garpiya-1; and ~ 34,000 “Gerbera” and other decoys, according to Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine. More key data in the thread🧵: 2/ Around 11,000 North Koreans remain in the Kursk region and, more broadly, across the European part of Russia. They are stationed at the training grounds where four brigades were initially formed. An additional 1,200 North Koreans are expected to arrive in the Kursk region.

Good commentary on the situation from Michael Kofman: I agree with his vision. He notes, “The next few days will prove telling,” and I’d like to expand from here. This may be Russia’s most favorable moment, meaning we are already seeing, or will soon see,its peak effort.🧵Thread:

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1955290392909255000

2/ The main reason is the upcoming Aug. 15 talks between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Putin will almost certainly try to create the worst possible conditions for Ukrainian forces to strengthen his hand at the table.

Please refer to my note from four days ago - this is critical. In both 2014 and 2015, Russia launched major offensives ahead of negotiations to gain leverage. The current situation is serious, but far from the collapse some suggest. So, what is actually happening on the ground? 2/ A collapse, in military terms, means a loss of command and control, a breakdown in battlefield awareness, and an inability to regroup, withdraw in an organized fashion, or coordinate with units. To the best of my knowledge, none of these conditions are currently present.

A few more notes on Pokrovsk. Penetrations and developing envelopments rarely begin with a local commander’s decision. They stem from deeper problems on strategic level - starting with a shortage of manpower, itself the result of ineffective recruitment and a lack of trust: 2/ If units are only 25% manned but spread out as if they were fully staffed, and if there aren’t enough drones or trained pilots, then blaming a battalion or brigade commander is nothing more than scapegoating.

Desertions, AWOLs, manpower shortages, and recruitment struggles are often linked to the Ukrainian army. And rightly so - I’ve spoken about these issues at length. But the situation on the Russian side is also worsening. This issue deserves wider attention, so here’s a 🧵thread: 2/ First, while Russia continues to receive a steady flow of recruits, only a part of them can be considered true volunteers. What’s actually happening is a form of hidden mobilization that has not only persisted but accelerated in recent months. Let's talk about it in detail

As Moscow tries to spotlight Ukraine’s recruitment issues, the Kremlin is taking unprecedented steps to fill its own ranks. Here are key developments from the past two weeks:

1/ Russia’s electronic draft registry and Unified Military Register are now live and ramping up activity 2/ The Ministry of Defense has begun notifying residents of Perm of their inclusion in the Unified Military Register. Similar notices had previously been reported by residents of Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Chuvashia and the Kaluga region.

A month ago, I wrote that the situation in Pokrovsk had become critical - for the second time since 2024. This time, however, our forces have been unable to stabilize the front. The loss of Pokrovsk is a matter of time, though claims that Russians have breakthrough are inaccurate 2/ The recent incursions by small Russian units deeper beyond Pokrovsk are largely the result of porous defenses, which allow limited infiltration but do not enable these forces to establish meaningful control over the area. At least for now

This map, created by analyst and mapper Clément Molin, shows a network of visible, (some are concealed and not mapped), fortifications stretching to the edges of Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine is unlikely to give this up without a fight, in exchange for promises broken in the past. 2/ I believe there is room for compromise from both sides that could lead to some form of agreement. However, any deal in which Ukraine gives up territory in exchange for promises would be one-sided, worsening Ukraine’s position while solely improving Russia’s

Sternenko’s fund regularly raises money for Shahed interceptor drones, costing about $2,100 each. With $50 million, over 23,800 drones could be delivered: a low-cost production with high potential impact. Yet EU bureaucracy and short-sightedness remain major obstacles: 2/ Whether it’s small-drone production, interceptors, or UGVs, Ukraine has the industrial capacity, expertise, and experience. The main bottleneck is funding. Often, Europe tries to help Ukraine while also addressing its own needs, such as building new factories on EU soil

Key Insights from the Frontelligence Insight Team

Over the past two weeks, our team has been closely following battlefield advancements, troop movements, and other war data. Below is a summary of our latest assessment of the operational situation and the trends: 2/ Sumy Front: As of early August, Russian forces have failed to establish the proclaimed “buffer zone” along the border in Sumy Oblast, managing only to create small, isolated pockets. We see no signs that the situation will improve for Russia significantly in the coming weeks

The Financial Times recently published a report on Ukraine’s mobilization problems. While the article offers a broad and insightful overview, especially for those who are not familiar with the topic, I believe some additional context can help complete the picture: 2/ First, let's start with the fundamentals. One of the core underlying issues is timing. Nationwide mobilization efforts would have been most effective during the initial phase of the war. That window has closed, but that doesn't mean the situation can't be improved

A few observations drawn from insider insights, open-source data, information from russian internal documents, and conversations with senior officers, frontline soldiers, and volunteers - based on developments from Spring through Summer 2025. Thread🧵: 2/ Since early 2025, Russia's personnel losses have remained among the highest since the war began. But at the same time, Ukraine has faced a sharp rise in desertion and AWOL cases. The pace of Russian territorial advances is higher than during the same period in 2024.

Penza Military Plant “Elektropribor”: Preliminary Damage Assessment

🧵Thread:

1/ In the early hours of August 2, Ukrainian UAVs struck multiple targets in Russia, including refineries and military-industrial sites. Here’s what’s known so far about the strike on Elektropribor 2/ First, we verified the strike by geolocating both the recording’s POV and the impact site. The location matches satellite imagery, confirming social media reports that the Elektropribor plant in Penza was targeted by a drone. Impact coordinates: 53.224696, 44.966005

What we know about today's ambush on Russian mercenaries in Mali.

🧵Thread:
1/ The attack likely took place on August 1st in the Mopti/Segou region, central Mali. At least 3 mercenaries were killed, though the actual toll is likely to be 4 KIA and 8 WIA from the African Corps: 2/ The perpetrators are JNIM, an Al-Qaeda branch in Sahel. There are currently no indicators suggesting Tuareg separatist involvement.

Equipment was damaged as well. In the video, our team identified what appears to be a Ural-4320 MTP-A2.1, delivered to Mali earlier this year

Early Damage Assessment of Drone Attack on Penza Radio Plant - July 31, 2025

Preliminary analysis of imagery reveals multiple buildings suffered damage ranging from light to severe. One building appears likely to be completely inoperable. Frontelligence Insight reports. Thread: 2/ Based on high-resolution imagery, unavailable for public release due to license, our team concluded: at least one building sustained severe damage; another has signs of penetration and fire, a third likely suffered penetration but no fire; and a fourth appears lightly damaged

In July, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte claimed Russia produces 4 times more artillery ammo than the NATO. To assess this, RFE/RL and CIT analyzed data on Russian vs. NATO ammo production and concluded that the situation is not as nearly dramatic. Thread with key findings🧵: 2/ According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia produced 250,000 152mm rounds in 2022, one million in 2023 and planned to produce 1.325 million in 2024. In practice, however, researchers note that Russia produced slightly more than 1.3 million 152mm rounds

An earthquake with a magnitude of 8.7 struck near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, a city located in the same bay that hosts several key Russian submarine facilities and naval infrastructure. Given the quake's intensity and the resulting tsunami, some damage is possible. 🧵Thread: 2/ The earthquake’s epicenter was located roughly over 100 kilometers from Avacha Bay, home to Russia’s Pacific Fleet, which hosts both diesel and nuclear submarines. Early footage from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, indicates damage from both ground shaking and tsunami.

Over three days, Ukrainian long-range drone strikes have dealt a tangible logistical blow to a rail line linking the military and industrial hubs of Volgograd and Rostov-on-Don. Preliminary analysis points to the destruction of traction substations and fuel tanks. 🧵Thread: 2/ The strikes have repeatedly targeted infrastructure along the rail line, which serves both industry and the supply of Russian forces, including those in Donetsk and Luhansk. The pattern points to a deliberate and systematic effort to disrupt the route

Units like K-2, Madyar’s Birds, the Lasar Group, and the 3rd Corps stand out as well-organized formations that, through leadership, organization, media savvy, and initiative, have delivered solid results often to the point where their unit presence can shift battlefield dynamics: 2/ For all their success, these units are just a small part of Ukraine’s forces. They can’t hold the whole frontline or make up for systemic flaws. Nurturing leaders takes time - they can’t be copied. To extrapolate personal skill into institutional strength , you need a system.

In June, Reuters reported that North Korea could deploy more troops to Russia as early as July or August to support its war in Ukraine, citing South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun. With July coming to an end, it’s worth revisiting this 2/ According to earlier reports in June and July, an additional 25,000 - 30,000 troops could be deployed, a force roughly equivalent to a military corps. As of late July, there has been no confirmation or evidence of additional North Korean troops near the Ukrainian border.