When it comes to the results of Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia, one of the most asked questions is why Ukrainian drone strikes cause damage that often appears insufficient. The answer lies largely in engineering trade-offs: the balance between range and payload. Thread 🧵: 2/ Drones that fly far have to allocate a lot of their weight and space to fuel/batteries, which leaves less room for explosives. Long range also creates aerodynamic issues - to carry more fuel, drones needs to be bigger, which makes them heavier, slower, easier to intercept

In the early morning of July 26th, multiple videos surfaced showing a UAV strike on the Russian "Signal" radio plant in Stavropol. Our team has conducted a preliminary BDA assessment and gathered key context on the facility’s role in Russia’s military production. 🧵Thread: 2/ The factory is located roughly 500 km from the area under Ukrainian control. The strike targeted one of its production facilities, around the 2nd and 3rd floor. The building appears to have avoided critical structural damage, though localized fires were reported

Frontelligence Insight estimates that by the end of June 2025, Russian combat fatalities may have reached, or even surpassed, 250,000. The projection is based on a synthetic estimation model that extrapolates from regionally confirmed, by-name casualty records.
🧵Thread: 2/ The team drew on confirmed casualty data compiled by Idel.Realities and Baikal Stories, tallying losses by region of origin and comparing them to each region’s working-age male population (defined as ages 16 to 60). The analysis covered 17 Russian regions.

Brief Update: Pokrovsk Operational Direction

The Pokrovsk area remains the most active, with over a third of the 174 combat engagements recorded along the frontline in the past 24 hours taking place in this area, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: 2/ Russian forces continue pressing to cut the T0515 Pokrovsk – Dobropillia road, particularly around Rodynske and Bilytske. This route, once a logistical route for Ukrainian troops, has seen reduced use due to sustained drone threats

Strong and timely piece from the FT on Andriy Yermak, head of the Presidential Administration and Ukraine’s “Grey Cardinal.” While I don’t agree with everything, the reporting offers valuable criticism worth unpacking in a thread. Key takeaways: 2/ Andriy Yermak isn’t Ukraine’s president but he often acts like one. As Head of the Presidential Office, he drafts peace plans, conducts back-channel diplomacy, and appoints key official. Both the prime minister and senior military leaders are said to routinely defer to him.

Instead of replying to each question, I decided to put together a thread that better explains the context of the recent protest, and why this particular law triggered such an unexpected reaction, especially for those, who don’t follow internal Ukrainian politics. 🧵Thread: 2/ It’s no secret that Ukraine has struggled with corruption. That was one of the main drivers behind the 2013–2014 protests, which eventually led to President Yanukovych being ousted. In the years that followed, Ukraine created specialized anti-corruption institutions to fight it

Given the many questions surrounding a recent and highly controversial decision passed by the Ukrainian parliament, led by the President's party, I’ve summarized key points from reports by The Kyiv Independent and The Financial Times. Full article links are provided at the end: 2/ On July 21, several Ukrainian law enforcement agencies - the Prosecutor General’s Office, SSU and the State Bureau of Investigation, conducted searches of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has released a video compilation showcasing the battlefield deployment of Unmanned Ground Vehicles. The video has a range of combat applications, from delivering explosive ordnance to serving as mobile grenade launcher platforms. Key details: 2/ Logistics and ammunition delivery: particularly valuable in current conditions, where troop rotations and resupply are often difficult or impossible. If targeted and destroyed, the loss of a drone is far preferable to that of a soldier.

You may have seen a graph circulating that compares the number of bodies returned to Ukraine (blue) and to Russia (red) during humanitarian exchanges, used to argue that casualty ratios can be extrapolated from these figures. The logic is simple: dead bodies equal losses. Thread: 2/ This is little more than manipulation, easily refuted by both calculations and logic. As Ukrainian forces lose ground and retreat under constant drone pressure, they often lack the means to recover their dead. In some cases, units can’t even rotate, let alone retrieve fallen

In light of recent photos and videos drawing public attention to Shahed drone production, a common question has emerged: Why can’t Ukraine simply strike the facility? Hit the archer, not the arrow! The answer, however, is more complicated than it seems. Here are a few key points: 2/ The drone production site is located more than 1,200 kilometers from Ukrainian territory. It's not a modest workshop - the facility occupies roughly 160,000 square meters, with additional ongoing expansion.

Ukrainian drone strikes continue to be persistent and frequent, yet verified information and detailed BDA assessments remain scarce. Our team conducted a brief review of several known strikes, drawing on recent satellite imagery to make a few preliminary observations: 2/ As with earlier research conducted jointly with RFEL this past winter, we found that when Ukrainian drones have successfully reached and hit their targets, the actual damage to facilities appears limited. The relatively small payloads prevent from chasing lasting disruptions

Fundamentally, both Russia and Ukraine face organizational challenges, though of different kinds. Ukraine suffers from delayed mobilization and delayed structural adaptations, while Russia struggles to translate its vast resource advantage into a combined and coordinated force: 2/ For example, Russia continues to rely on small tactical group not only due to Ukrainian drones, but also because it struggles to effectively organize combined-arms operations above the battalion. Reverting to smaller units is forced choice - they remain possible to coordinate.

Lately, Russia’s slow progress in the Sumy region is being explained away by some as a diversion, an attempt to pull Ukrainian forces from Donbas, with no serious objectives in Sumy itself. That idea might seem reasonable for some - until you look closer. 🧵Thread: 2/ Since the start of the full-scale war, Russia has usually concentrated what it sees as elite assault units in directions it considers valuable, strategic or otherwise important. The current makeup of Russian forces in Sumy direction speaks volumes:

The Russian offensive in Sumy so far resembles the late spring 2024 attempt to expand their presence in Kharkiv Oblast, which was ultimately contained and never developed into the larger incursion they had intended. Despite some progress, there is no threat to Sumy at this time: 2/ The situation around small village - Kindrativka was especially precarious for Russian forces, who were forced to retreat after their initial advances.

The "I Want to Live" project, operating under the umbrella of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, has published documents detailing losses within Russia's 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Central Military District. 🧵Brief thread with details and numbers: 2/ As of June 2025, at least 8,645 personnel have been officially declared dead and buried. Among all units, the 74th and 35th Separate Motor Rifle Brigades appear to have suffered the highest number of casualties - 2479 and 1975.

The seriousness of the situation on the frontlines was recently laid out in detail by Olexandr Solonko, a soldier currently serving in Donetsk Oblast. I strongly recommend reading the translated version closely if you’re trying to understand the situation on the ground. Thread: 2/ We are approaching a moment when we will very likely face another major crisis on the front. While the world's powerful play their games of "two weeks" and "50 days" and try in every way to demonstrate resolve where there is none, we will have to withstand the desperate pressure of the Russians. Both on the front and in the rear

According to the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, in early 2025, the Russian occupation authorities intensified forced passportization in the temporarily occupied territories.

Starting September, those refusing Russian passports will be treated as illegal immigrants: 2/ The occupied territories are seeing a surge in paramilitary programs across schools and colleges. Educational institutions are forming Yunarmiya units, cadet classes, and “military-patriotic clubs” that focus on military drills, airgun shooting, grenade throwing, survival etc

With increasing frequency, I hear directly from soldiers, sergeants, and officers on the ground: despite proclamations from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, little has changed for them in the ground, compared with 2024. 🧵Thread: 2/ In the coming days, I intend to elaborate further. But I can already point to systemic resistance, where a clique of generals and colonels pushes back against reforms that could dilute their entrenched power - power rooted in seniority earned during the 1990s and 2000s.

From the Barents Sea to China’s southern coast, Russia’s tanker fleet has been quietly tracked by Ukrainians. Thanks to an investigation by the analytical group Dallas Park, we now know more. With their permission, I analyzed the report and put together a thread of key takeaways: 2/ Built in 2011 and flagged in the Marshall Islands as SUEZ VASILIS, the oil tanker was reflagged to Liberia in 2021 and renamed NAUTILUS I. In November 2022, after Russia’s invasion, it changed owners, managers, flag, and name again, becoming SABLE under the Panama

Kirill Dmitriev, who was involved in earlier talks with Witkoff, is now trying to salvage the situation. Russia always intended to escalate the war while publicly presenting pressure on Ukraine as a path to peace and de-escalation. It worked - until it didn’t. You had six months 2/ What has Russia done in the six months since it “agreed” to negotiate? It announced an offensive in Sumy (so far unsuccessful), allegedly threatened to seize multiple oblasts within 60 days (also not going well), ramped up Shahed drone strikes and presented ultimatums

One and a half months after the successful Operation Spiderweb, which targeted and destroyed Russian strategic bombers, our latest satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still at several airfields, with the largest concentration at Belaya. A thread with updates on airbases: 2/ Additional analysis of bases such as Olenya and Engels-2, where Russian strategic bombers are deployed, shows no visible effort to reinforce the airfields. Olenya appears more cleared from debris than Belaya Airbase, but bomber wreckage remains visible on the apron.