Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms: 2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production

So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread: 2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast

Drones, ISR, communications, battlefield awareness, electronic warfare, and mobile anti-tank systems: North Korea appears to have taken notes from the battlefields of Kursk. Its latest propaganda video offers clues, Frontelligence Insight finds in its newest analysis. 🧵Thread: 2/ When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments: countermeasures, offensive drone tactics, and battlefield surveillance.

Russian investigative outlet The Insider spoke with numerous volunteers supplying troops with equipment and donations and discovered an eye-opening situation: in recent months, the volunteer movement has plunged into crisis, with rising signs of fatigue and frustration. 🧵Thread: 2/ A significant share of supplies for the Russian army, from uniforms to thermal imagers and drones, has come from volunteers since the start of the full-scale invasion. One of them, Natalia from the Bryansk region, says that people used to donate an average of 500 to 1,000 rubles

China is reportedly ready to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, according to Welt am Sonntag, citing European diplomats. Meanwhile, Frontelligence Insight is releasing a list of Chinese companies involved in scaling Russia’s Shahed drone program. Here is the list: /2 Despite its efforts to present itself as a geopolitical actor capable of peacemaking, Chinese companies help to scale Russia's military production. As the data show, most of these companies are either not sanctioned or face restrictions from only a limited number of countries

iStories recently reported that Russian recruitment was falling, citing federal budget data on sign-up bonuses. In reality, enlistment still runs above 30,000 a month, and the dip reflects changes in published data, not an actual slowdown 🧵There are a few nuances, though: 2/ They reported that several regions, including Irkutsk and Vladimir, are struggling with recruitment. That is true, and has been an issue in many areas, which helps explain the steady rise in sign-up bonuses. Some recruits even register in other regions to secure higher payouts

News of Ukrainian missile production (Flamingo missile) is inspiring, both at home and abroad. Yet, unless the production site, which was opened for journalists, was staged for cameras, it is striking how many details were left exposed - enough to make geolocation possible. 2/ Equally concerning is the decision to show crew members’ faces and list their positions. In our past investigations, my team was able to identify Russian servicemen and intelligence officers using just one facial photo, tracing some even to their actual home addresses

Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread: 2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has posted a 3D model of an unidentified Russian UAV on its WarSanctions platform, complete with detailed descriptions and an interactive view. Key details on the drone, in 🧵thread: 2/ It can serve as a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, or a decoy meant to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Structurally, the drone features a delta-wing fuselage, similar to the Geran-1 (Shahed-131) but slightly smaller.

If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today: 2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.

So far, Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated strategic goals in this war:

Demilitarization – failed.

Regime change in Kyiv – failed.

Full control over Donbas – failed.

Preventing NATO enlargement – failed.

🧵Short thread: 2/ Demilitarization of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military is now larger, better armed, and far more experienced than before the war. It is more technologically advanced and capable than ever before.

Brief update on Dobropillia situation.🧵Thread:

1/ As I noted from the outset, based on the limited information then available, there was no “operational breakthrough”. The penetration was tactical, involving roughly a battalion-sized force. Still, it is too soon for celebration 2/ Initially, the situation was especially risky, as Russian units managed to break east of Dobropillia. I would not describe this as a DRG (sabotage group) operation or a simple raid, since neither term accurately reflects the size of the force or its mission in the context

Missing Targeting Pods, Inflated Bills: An Exclusive Investigation into the Su-57 Procurement Problems by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵Thread:

1/ Newly obtained classified documents, show that Russia purchased its 5-generation Su-57 fighters for more than 3 billion rubles each; 2/ Data provided by Analytical Company "Dallas" (@dallasparkua) shows that in 2021 & 2022, Su-57 fighter jets were delivered without targeting pods, leaving them short of their advertised capabilities. At the time, the cost of a single Su-57 was roughly $42.1 million in USD terms

8th Army MIA Cases, 2024–2025:

Debates over losses are always heated, but hard data cuts through the noise. Frontelligence Insight analyzed Russian documents released by the I Want to Live project, giving insight on soldiers of the 8th Army who went missing in action. 🧵Thread: 2/ From January 2024 to June 2025, 6,921 soldiers and officers of the 8th Army were reported missing in action. Part of the Southern Military District, the 8th Army has primarily operated in Donetsk Oblast, with elements recently deployed at Pokrovsk to reinforce the 58th Army.

Commented to the FT on pressure to cede territories:

“The constitution limits his power: he has no legal right to alter Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Even more constraining is pressure from society and, crucially, the military, which opposes giving up unoccupied territory" “President Zelenskyy is caught between a rock and a hard place,” the article concludes with my comment.

Given the opportunity, I also want to add that if peace is to be negotiated, we cannot start with non-starter demands, which our President won't be able to accept

Russians plan to produce 79,000 Shahed-type drones in 2025, including 40,000 Geran-2; 5,700 Garpiya-1; and ~ 34,000 “Gerbera” and other decoys, according to Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine. More key data in the thread🧵: 2/ Around 11,000 North Koreans remain in the Kursk region and, more broadly, across the European part of Russia. They are stationed at the training grounds where four brigades were initially formed. An additional 1,200 North Koreans are expected to arrive in the Kursk region.

Good commentary on the situation from Michael Kofman: I agree with his vision. He notes, “The next few days will prove telling,” and I’d like to expand from here. This may be Russia’s most favorable moment, meaning we are already seeing, or will soon see,its peak effort.🧵Thread:

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1955290392909255000

2/ The main reason is the upcoming Aug. 15 talks between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Putin will almost certainly try to create the worst possible conditions for Ukrainian forces to strengthen his hand at the table.

Please refer to my note from four days ago - this is critical. In both 2014 and 2015, Russia launched major offensives ahead of negotiations to gain leverage. The current situation is serious, but far from the collapse some suggest. So, what is actually happening on the ground? 2/ A collapse, in military terms, means a loss of command and control, a breakdown in battlefield awareness, and an inability to regroup, withdraw in an organized fashion, or coordinate with units. To the best of my knowledge, none of these conditions are currently present.

A few more notes on Pokrovsk. Penetrations and developing envelopments rarely begin with a local commander’s decision. They stem from deeper problems on strategic level - starting with a shortage of manpower, itself the result of ineffective recruitment and a lack of trust: 2/ If units are only 25% manned but spread out as if they were fully staffed, and if there aren’t enough drones or trained pilots, then blaming a battalion or brigade commander is nothing more than scapegoating.

Desertions, AWOLs, manpower shortages, and recruitment struggles are often linked to the Ukrainian army. And rightly so - I’ve spoken about these issues at length. But the situation on the Russian side is also worsening. This issue deserves wider attention, so here’s a 🧵thread: 2/ First, while Russia continues to receive a steady flow of recruits, only a part of them can be considered true volunteers. What’s actually happening is a form of hidden mobilization that has not only persisted but accelerated in recent months. Let's talk about it in detail

As Moscow tries to spotlight Ukraine’s recruitment issues, the Kremlin is taking unprecedented steps to fill its own ranks. Here are key developments from the past two weeks:

1/ Russia’s electronic draft registry and Unified Military Register are now live and ramping up activity 2/ The Ministry of Defense has begun notifying residents of Perm of their inclusion in the Unified Military Register. Similar notices had previously been reported by residents of Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Chuvashia and the Kaluga region.