The Iran backed militias are feeling hugely confident under this new Iraqi govt, and it shows in how unrestrained is their glee that a US citizen can be killed with no consequences - and that the attack can be turned into a non-sequiter attack on USAID, who are uninvolved.
The Iran backed militias that undergird the Sudani government did not hesitate for a second to justify the killing of an unarmed teacher on the grounds that he may have been a spy. This coincides with an immediate snap back of militia presence at key Baghdad intersections.
There is likely an anti access / area denial motive to the killing - a big signpost that Iraq is closed to Western engagement - people to people, civil society, critical journalism, election monitors. Keep your nose out, is the message, amplified by the growth of hostage taking.
My mate @HamdiAMalik did a great job of quickly digging out and preserving evidence of the unhesitant militia embrace of this killing. See his documenting work and our conclusions here washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
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Looking at the video, tonight's action in the IZ is almost all at the northern edge and it looks very demonstrative, and not very effective. Sadrist fighters are moving through ECP1 into the spaces between MOD, embassies and PM residence, and Council of Ministers secretariat.
Very interesting to see fire going into the IZ near ECP9. Who exactly are Sadrists shooting at? Is there a PMF militia or ISF force actively defending the COR entrance to the IZ? Or move likely, are hundreds of Sadrists just bombarding the symbols of govt in a collective scream?
Reminds me of the occasional mass salvos Sadr would send to the IZ pre 2011 - just a reminder and a collective venting by JAM cells.
Just a mindmap of indications: yellow is CF/Iran-backed PMF, and red is Sadrist. Green shading is ISF primacy, kinda. Lots of attempted maneuver today: Sadrists to the palace, then fell back, and Sadrists trying to breach Jadriya. CF militia arrayed for all-round defense.
The route between Sadr City and Tahrir and northern IZ is not exactly clear of CF militias but nor is it hard for Sadrists to force and keep open. If Sadrists went hard for CF, Palestine St and the eastern edge of Sadr City might be early clearance targets. Tough fighting.
Interesting to see Sadrists potentially moving on Jadriya and Karrada - that would be a good way to clear a dangerous CF launchpad away from the IZ, and open a clear way for southern reinforcements. Northern belts are the CF reinforcement route. Hard for Sadr to close them.
See my new @WashInstitute piece on the evolving military realities of Turkey's war in northern Iraq since 80s and its growing negative effects on Turkey's relations in Iraq, on US interests, on Kurdistan, and on protecting Iraq sovereignty from Iran also bit.ly/3zj0DLA
The Turkish military has arguably gained a stronger voice since elements of it backed Erdogan in the coup and kept him alive. They probably look at N Iraq and feel really satisfied at how much their counter-terrorism ops have technically/tactically improved.
Interestingly, the July 20 deaths of 9 Iraqi civs and wounding of 33 at Parakh (probably by Turkish fire) came at a point when major/visible strikes were declining, in part due to KRG requests for a toning-down in June. A lot of folks got unlucky.
To me, presuming the US can still do hard things, the answer here is innovate with disruptive technologies and change the attack-defense balance appreciably with AI, directed energy, tube-launched hypersonics, via a US hub al-monitor.com/originals/2022… via @AlMonitor
This is what I wrote about in this piece on the need for a US-Mid East-Asian "Manhattan Project" in air/missile/drone/rocket defense, akin to our fast-forwards on Poseidon, moon landing, etc. We're starting - but let's aim very high and think big washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
With the infusion of NATO member, Gulf and Asian (India, SK, Japan, Taiwan) money, the cresting capabilities for advanced defenses might be pushed over the top
Adding to my @WashInstitute colleague @HamdiAMalik, IF (as is becoming more likely) Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq came out of hibernation and DID launch drones at the UAE today, THEN this was likely an Iran-directed or at very least Iran-tolerated operation. The point is, they knew.
Why do I say that Iran would likely have foreknowledge of an Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq attack on UAE? 1) strategic weapons systems still require Iranian green light & tech help. 2) Kataib Hezbollah continues to look to IRGC for approvals. 3) Slick media rollout looks directed.
To me, this fits with a broader trend: Iran doesn't want Americans killed right now in Iraq, but it is willing to let Houthis and Iraqi proxies use signature Iranian long-range systems, packed with telltale technical intel, against the UAE and Saudi.
Terrible timing for this piece. I'd have re-cast it based on Shabwah/Marib dynamics. It was worth one more edit, which could have said - "we're back to stalemate" and that's a better place to begin negotiating peace than an impending Houthi victory brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
The premise of the piece is dead on arrival, pending a future shift in the military balance, which could itself be rapidly reversed, as history shows. If the thrust of this piece is that the US has to accept facts on the ground, then there's some new facts to consider.
Here's the piece we need: 1) We shouldn't be backing either side to win, and certainly not the Houthis. 2) We shouldn't want the war to draw on. 3) We pressured the Gulf, now we need to do the same with Houthis and Hadi, reflecting that both deliberately extend the war.