So, who was US-designated terrorist movement Kataib Hezbollah's Abu Baqir al-Saeedi who was just killed in Baghdad alongside a deputy and drivers? He was a very bad man: here's a tour through some moments we tracked at @WashInstitute Militia Spotlight. 🧵 1) Contacts who people should have listened to highlighted him as a fmr bodyguard of Muhandis who could stand alogside him at prayers, be allowed into the room during IRGC-QF meets, and even carry weapons around senior IRGC-QF leaders.

In another horrible war - Yemen - I spent a lot of time looking at airstrikes and things that were erroneously identified as airstrikes. I am quite struck by how immediately and concretely a number of observers know for absolute certain that this was caused by an airstrike. 🧵 In many cases, the situation was a little different than it first appeared, and many of those incidents happened in daylight in a less pressurized information environment. Worth taking a breath, seeing what shakes out, before making strong statements. There will be time.

Great new @HamdiAMalik piece here in @WashInstitute #MilitiaSpotlight on 3 new facade brands being readied for use by militias in Iraq. What does this herald? A real escalation of security threat or fake resistance & whitewashing of other militia leaders? washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… None of the three new facades - Kataib al-Sabereen, Kataib Karbala and Kataib Saifollah - has yet claimed an attack, nor do they have any obvious specialization (such as a geographic focus or method of attack, such as anti-air operations) washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

The AAH (and KH/Hoquq) role in maximizing the punishment of the KRI and specifically the KDP has been interesting to watch. They have had real and negative effect on Baghdad-KRI relations, and they have exploited KDP/PUK divisions very effectively. A determined unilateral effort.

https://twitter.com/shahokurdy/status/1668230711503880198

This is a demonstration of a number of trends:
1) That a sub-section of the CF can derail Sudani deals it does not like, partly top prevent Sudani forming alliances.
2) That Iran/fasail have special grudges against Barzanis still to enact, years after 2017.

مجلة الإيكونوميست تنشر مقالاً بعنوان
*الميليشيات العراقية تقتدي بإخوانها ذات القوة المفرطة في إيران* economist.com/middle-east-an… أبرز ما جاء في المقال
⬅️ تجري عملية تقويض الديمقراطية في العراق على يد مسلحين تابعين للأحزاب السياسية.

See the new #MilitiaSpotlight ⁦@WashInstitute⁩ piece by ⁦@HamdiAMalik⁩ and myself on how Iran-backed militias immediately justified the killing of a U.S. citizen in Baghdad yesterday. Zero hesitation, zero regard for the truth washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… The Iran backed militias are feeling hugely confident under this new Iraqi govt, and it shows in how unrestrained is their glee that a US citizen can be killed with no consequences - and that the attack can be turned into a non-sequiter attack on USAID, who are uninvolved.

Looking at the video, tonight's action in the IZ is almost all at the northern edge and it looks very demonstrative, and not very effective. Sadrist fighters are moving through ECP1 into the spaces between MOD, embassies and PM residence, and Council of Ministers secretariat. Very interesting to see fire going into the IZ near ECP9. Who exactly are Sadrists shooting at? Is there a PMF militia or ISF force actively defending the COR entrance to the IZ? Or move likely, are hundreds of Sadrists just bombarding the symbols of govt in a collective scream?

Just a mindmap of indications: yellow is CF/Iran-backed PMF, and red is Sadrist. Green shading is ISF primacy, kinda. Lots of attempted maneuver today: Sadrists to the palace, then fell back, and Sadrists trying to breach Jadriya. CF militia arrayed for all-round defense. The route between Sadr City and Tahrir and northern IZ is not exactly clear of CF militias but nor is it hard for Sadrists to force and keep open. If Sadrists went hard for CF, Palestine St and the eastern edge of Sadr City might be early clearance targets. Tough fighting.

See my new @WashInstitute piece on the evolving military realities of Turkey's war in northern Iraq since 80s and its growing negative effects on Turkey's relations in Iraq, on US interests, on Kurdistan, and on protecting Iraq sovereignty from Iran also bit.ly/3zj0DLA The Turkish military has arguably gained a stronger voice since elements of it backed Erdogan in the coup and kept him alive. They probably look at N Iraq and feel really satisfied at how much their counter-terrorism ops have technically/tactically improved.

To me, presuming the US can still do hard things, the answer here is innovate with disruptive technologies and change the attack-defense balance appreciably with AI, directed energy, tube-launched hypersonics, via a US hub al-monitor.com/originals/2022… via @AlMonitor This is what I wrote about in this piece on the need for a US-Mid East-Asian "Manhattan Project" in air/missile/drone/rocket defense, akin to our fast-forwards on Poseidon, moon landing, etc. We're starting - but let's aim very high and think big washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

Adding to my @WashInstitute colleague @HamdiAMalik, IF (as is becoming more likely) Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq came out of hibernation and DID launch drones at the UAE today, THEN this was likely an Iran-directed or at very least Iran-tolerated operation. The point is, they knew.

https://twitter.com/HamdiAMalik/status/1488908963068272642

Why do I say that Iran would likely have foreknowledge of an Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq attack on UAE? 1) strategic weapons systems still require Iranian green light & tech help. 2) Kataib Hezbollah continues to look to IRGC for approvals. 3) Slick media rollout looks directed.

Terrible timing for this piece. I'd have re-cast it based on Shabwah/Marib dynamics. It was worth one more edit, which could have said - "we're back to stalemate" and that's a better place to begin negotiating peace than an impending Houthi victory brookings.edu/blog/order-fro… The premise of the piece is dead on arrival, pending a future shift in the military balance, which could itself be rapidly reversed, as history shows. If the thrust of this piece is that the US has to accept facts on the ground, then there's some new facts to consider.

Worth a slow read. This gives you one fact-based viewpoint on "greatest misses", though obviously not on the far larger number of entirely successful zero-collateral damage strikes/cancelled strikes. Useful corrective to the fiction of the sanitized air war, which never existed.

https://twitter.com/AzmatZahra/status/1472258695534944261

Thousands and thousands of airstrikes were withheld, often up to the last second on valuable targets, because of collateral damage considerations. Once the fight gets urban, with partner troops in heavy contact, standards do slip due time/visibility/overwork. For example, Mosul.

See our new @WashInstitute two-parter on Iran-backed militia desperation to avoid political isolation - first their Nov 4-6 protest gambit (washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…) and then the totally nutty Nov 7 drone attack that basically undid any gains they made (washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…) The Iran-backed militias - Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah mainly - reacted ferociously when they sensed Moqtada al-Sadr was splintering away Badr and (indirectly) Nouri al-Maliki.On Nov 4-6 they tried to regain the narrative, changing the story to protestor-killing.

Returning to our thread of threads on the new @CTCWP article by Crispin Smith, @HamdiAMalik & myself on Iraq's discordant Iran-backed militias - what next for these groups? washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… This image from today is a good pointer to the future - we expect the muqawama to eventually recognize that top-down state capture has failed, and that their future is a new bottom-up effort at rebuilding a popular base, Hezbollah-style disloyal opposition to Iraqi govts.

The idea of the Badr-led 5th Iraqi Army division moving from Diyala to eastern Anbar (which apparently is slowly happening) is hard for me to grasp, as it has been such a fixture of Diyala since 2005. The 1st IA division is supposedly replacing in Diyala, a straight swap. What does this mean? That Diyala gets less Badri - seems unlikely - or that east Anbar/western Baghdad gate to Anbar gets more Badri? That a new IA division succumbs to gradual Badr influence or that GoI gets fresh eyes in Diyala, who can receive CJTF air/ISR support?

Please see my new @WashInstitute @ibtauris book with @vvanwilgenburg on the inside story of US-YPG/SDF “by, with and through” effort in Syria, based on around a hundred interviews with key commanders. Thread follows.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… This is a lovely piece. It is based on an interview program of around a hundred Syrian Kurdish / Arab/ Christian commanders plus US & French officials, commanders & SOF. The interview material is very candid and rich in detail, backed by intensive document and imagery research.

So, DoJ has seized a range of websites based on their membership of the Islamic Radio and Television Union, an Iranian propaganda operation. Separately Kataib Hezbollah sites were also seized - a great move - but the IRTVU seizures are arguably too broad
justice.gov/opa/pr/united-… My colleague @HamdiAMalik is to top guy on IRTVU and will no doubt be dropping the science today but worth noting that this was a disconnected DoJ law enforcement policy decision that was not run through the interagency - so (FWIW) this is not some deliberate US foreign policy.

One reason I wanted for a while to write this @WashInstitute piece (with @haningdr) is that I felt the Iraqi dissidents were somehow being ignored in the US. As protests shook Chile, Hong Kong, etc, noone ever seemed to mention the brave Iraqi Tishreenis bit.ly/3bBZyCZ I've noticed for many years that Iraq still has such a taint in the minds of many American leaders, politicians and writers that Iraqi dissidents and reformers are done a disservice: many Americans cannot recognize greatness or goodness if it comes from Iraq. This should end.

Read this paper carefully, a couple of times. @renadmansour has situated it beautifully within a blossoming literature, where it stands out as a real step forward, the result of a rare combination of hard thinking & on-the-ground research. Nice job.

https://twitter.com/renadmansour/status/1364890689520230401

This is like the old ICG reports on Iraq -- the big picture message and policy implications are there, but there's also a ton of gold in the details. That's why you have to read this @renadmansour piece a few times, for the message and the detail. Nice graphics too, see below.

See my @Newsweek piece with @haningdr on "The Other Khashoggis", a piece I've wanted to write for a while about the overlooked industrial-scale killing of dissidents in Iraq & Lebanon that gets less US attention than the Khashoggi killing. Thread follows newsweek.com/other-khashogg… This section captures the key message - the infanticide of a whole generation of reformist leaders by Iran-backed militias, for the express purpose of delaying societal change. Not a niche human rights issue, this is also political warfare & a strategic threat.