🧵In my latest piece for @WashInstitute, I take a look at how the US could increase pressure on Iranian energy exports, in light of Tehran's support for Russia in Ukraine, domestic suppression, and nuclear advances.
Iran's crude + condensate exports over past 3 months were 810,000-1.2m bpd, according to data from @TankerTrackers, @Vortexa, @Kpler & @UANI.
That's much lower than pre-Trump withdrawal from JCPOA, when exports topped 2.7m. But they're higher than at peak of max pressure, ~500k.
Biden admin did not rigorously enforce oil sanctions in word or deed, prioritizing diplomatic efforts to revive JCPOA.
But this was likely counterproductive: Lack of enforcement may have weakened Iran's urgency to get a deal & reduced a deal's marginal benefits.
The US appears to be shifting course, with several new oil-related sanctions, including last week. But there is much more headroom.
To design a strategy aimed at cutting into Iran's oil revenue, we need to understand how Iran's exports & revenue fit together.
I've obsessed for years over the question of oil exports & budget revenue. Thanks to periodic Iranian data releases & industry data, I'm able to estimate how much Iran *should be* earning, and how much it *is.*
I found that the gov't is losing as much as *half* of potential oil revenue on discounts, transaction costs & lack of accessibility. That's billions of dollars/month.
The data lay out clearly the cost of Iran's intransigence on #irantalks. If sanctions were relieved, not only would Iran be able to ~double its exports, it would be able to earn much more from every barrel it currently sells.
How can the US constrain Iranian exports, and cut into the money Tehran can earn?
The goal would be to change the perception of risk among companies, banks, & governments. That would likely require a comprehensive campaign to demonstrate that lax enforcement was over.
The piece lays out a few ideas in the diplomatic, sanctions, and public diplomacy realms. It also flags that the US should also prepare for any Iranian retaliation to such a campaign by bolstering defensive capabilities in the region.
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In an op-ed in @thehill, I outline a new way to hold Iran accountable for supporting Russia's war in Ukraine: Along with G7, Washington should argue that a “business-as-usual” attitude toward Iranian energy purchases cannot continue. (1/7)
US & Europe have sanctioned those involved in Iranian drones shipments & they will do more. This is important but insufficient.
The US should look broader & seek to take advantage of Iran's decision to throw its lot in w/Russia by isolating it in a place that will hurt. (2/7)
U.S. should call on countries buying or facilitating purchase of Iranian energy products to halt, and it should diplomatically pressure those that do not comply.
Iran's top buyer, China, will be a tough sell. But I suggest looking specifically at intermediary countries. (3/7)
Claim: Under JCPOA, Russia will get a “get-out-of-jail-free card” to export oil using swaps with Iran in the aftermath of the EU maritime insurance ban.
This is based on four main assumptions, which aren’t supported in the piece.
(1) Maritime insurance ban will disrupt Russian oil shipments, forcing it to seek other buyers.
Yes, it will in some cases. But how long will that last until alternative channels or exemptions are created?
A brief #irantalks reflection: With benefit of some hindsight and (incomplete) information, it’s become clearer that two of the key assumptions undergirding the IRGC FTO debate earlier this spring were wrong or, at best, incomplete.
(1/9)
(1) Iran would not accept a deal that didn't include FTO removal.
--It was a "red line" & "must have."
--IRGC's heft within the Iranian system meant negotiators had no room to move.
--Tehran wasn't likely to blink, and the US would have to remove it if it wanted a deal.
(2/9)
Based on the latest reports from the negotiations, Iran has backed off the FTO demand, and Iranian media and officials have tried to reframe the issue as one that could be addressed in the future.
The supposedly immutable Iranian position shifted substantially.
Notable comments by Iranian FM Amir-Abdollahian today in Davos, appearing to downplay importance of IRGC FTO removal following US refusal to do so.
“Israeli side made (FTO issue) public, magnified it, and now this issue is being portrayed as the main hurdle…”
But… “The main obstacle is we are not convinced that the people of Iran and we are going to benefit fully from the economic gains of the JCPOA.”
Says FTO is “just one level of our talks between us and the Americans indirectly.”
Did not demand its removal.
Pressed by @FareedZakaria, HAA said: “The most important thing is that the economic sanctions need to be lifted in an effective way…reducing these fundamental things to just one subject and focusing on it, I think this is not a good behavior.”
As the Iran policy debate heats up, I'm going to keep a running thread of myths that flourish on this website and in analysis pieces from across the political spectrum.
With JCPOA arguably in its most perilous position, keeping the facts straight is more important than ever.
Myth #1: "Biden's Iran policy is identical to Trump's."
This is a favorite line from Khamenei. It's nonsense. Trump's strategy of max pressure sought to force Iran to capitulate or collapse, giving Tehran no credible way out. Measured by its main goals, the policy failed. (1/3)
The Biden policy is, first and foremost, to resurrect the JCPOA with diplomacy: sanctions relief for nuclear constraints. Ambitions for regional talks are real but nuclear deal is top priority. Iran has a clear and credible path. Whether it chooses to take it is unknown. (2/3)
Inauguration thread: With Joe Biden taking the oath of office tomorrow, what better time to think back 32 years to the inauguration speech of another seasoned former VP and the resounding (and often misunderstood) impacts on US policy toward Iran that linger to this day. 1/15
When George HW Bush took office in 1989, Iran was not near the top of a foreign policy agenda dominated by deterioration of USSR, potential reunification of Germany, and turmoil in China. Iran was severely weakened and its nuclear program and regional influence was limited. 2/15
But Iran-aligned groups continued to hold Americans hostage in Lebanon, an issue that weighed on Bush as it did Reagan. In his inaugural, Bush called on Iran to help bring home those Americans, pledging that "good will begets good will." 3/15