These two quotes to @ArshadReuters neatly summarize US policy toward Iran, which @BrewerEricM & I call Plan C:

(1) “There are no talks about an interim deal.”

Easy denial to make. There will be no “deal” because a deal triggers Hill review, which is politically unacceptable. (2) “We have made clear to them what escalatory steps they needed to avoid to prevent a crisis and what de-escalatory steps they could take to create a more positive context.”

Of course, US can also take reciprocal steps “to create a more positive context,” eg on sanctions.

There’s been a blizzard of speculation re US/Iran diplomacy – but little analysis on what the US seeks to accomplish & what will happen to Iran if it actually succeeds.

That’s where @BrewerEricM & my piece in @ForeignAffairs comes in:

foreignaffairs.com/iran/bidens-ir…

#OOTT

1/15 US strategy can be summed up as “Plan C.”

“Plan A” was revive JCPOA. It failed. Replacement agreement is a mirage for foreseeable future.

“Plan B” was proposed by many observers & Israeli officials to significantly ratchet up pressure. US opposed this.

Enter "Plan C."

2/15

Next week marks 5-year anniversary of Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, a decision that left the Iranian nuclear program unconstrained, stoked regional tensions, divided US from its allies & hobbled the prospects for future diplomacy.

5 brief reflections on this period: (1) US withdrawal/max pressure scored some tactical successes but, on its own terms, was a strategic failure.

The campaign (+Covid) severely weakened Iran’s economy–sending it into recession and driving up inflation & unemployment.

The past few months have been volatile for Iran at home —socially, politically, economically—and there is little prospect for a lasting improvement.

But, ironically, the recent trajectory of its foreign policy has been quite positive. A brief thread: Focused on China & Russia/Ukraine, Washington has aimed to de-escalate tensions with Iran over the nuclear program and regional issues — easing off some political and economic pressure. This has exacerbated tensions with Europe, which, for its part, also is distracted elsewhere.

🧵Netanyahu at cabinet meeting today re Iran: "We will work openly, from a position of strength, in the international arena against a return to the nuclear agreement, not only in talks with leaders behind closed doors but strongly and openly in the sphere of global opinion..." "Unfortunately, in contrast to the prevailing opinion that this dangerous nuclear option has disappeared from the agenda following the recent events in Iran, I think that this possibility has not yet finally disappeared from the agenda."

In an op-ed in @thehill, I outline a new way to hold Iran accountable for supporting Russia's war in Ukraine: Along with G7, Washington should argue that a “business-as-usual” attitude toward Iranian energy purchases cannot continue. (1/7)

thehill.com/opinion/intern… US & Europe have sanctioned those involved in Iranian drones shipments & they will do more. This is important but insufficient.

The US should look broader & seek to take advantage of Iran's decision to throw its lot in w/Russia by isolating it in a place that will hurt. (2/7)

🧵In my latest piece for @WashInstitute, I take a look at how the US could increase pressure on Iranian energy exports, in light of Tehran's support for Russia in Ukraine, domestic suppression, and nuclear advances.

In short: US is not "sanctioned out."

washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… Iran's crude + condensate exports over past 3 months were 810,000-1.2m bpd, according to data from @TankerTrackers, @Vortexa, @Kpler & @UANI.

That's much lower than pre-Trump withdrawal from JCPOA, when exports topped 2.7m. But they're higher than at peak of max pressure, ~500k.

We should be wary of and closely analyze what a revived JCPOA would mean for relations btwn Moscow & Tehran.

But we should also be wary of claims that are based on layers of assumptions that aren’t carefully parsed. Here’s an example:

politico.eu/article/russia… Claim: Under JCPOA, Russia will get a “get-out-of-jail-free card” to export oil using swaps with Iran in the aftermath of the EU maritime insurance ban.

This is based on four main assumptions, which aren’t supported in the piece.

A brief #irantalks reflection: With benefit of some hindsight and (incomplete) information, it’s become clearer that two of the key assumptions undergirding the IRGC FTO debate earlier this spring were wrong or, at best, incomplete.

(1/9) (1) Iran would not accept a deal that didn't include FTO removal.
--It was a "red line" & "must have."
--IRGC's heft within the Iranian system meant negotiators had no room to move.
--Tehran wasn't likely to blink, and the US would have to remove it if it wanted a deal.

(2/9)

Notable comments by Iranian FM Amir-Abdollahian today in Davos, appearing to downplay importance of IRGC FTO removal following US refusal to do so.

“Israeli side made (FTO issue) public, magnified it, and now this issue is being portrayed as the main hurdle…” But… “The main obstacle is we are not convinced that the people of Iran and we are going to benefit fully from the economic gains of the JCPOA.”

Says FTO is “just one level of our talks between us and the Americans indirectly.”

Did not demand its removal.

As the Iran policy debate heats up, I'm going to keep a running thread of myths that flourish on this website and in analysis pieces from across the political spectrum.

With JCPOA arguably in its most perilous position, keeping the facts straight is more important than ever. Myth #1: "Biden's Iran policy is identical to Trump's."

This is a favorite line from Khamenei. It's nonsense. Trump's strategy of max pressure sought to force Iran to capitulate or collapse, giving Tehran no credible way out. Measured by its main goals, the policy failed. (1/3)

Inauguration thread: With Joe Biden taking the oath of office tomorrow, what better time to think back 32 years to the inauguration speech of another seasoned former VP and the resounding (and often misunderstood) impacts on US policy toward Iran that linger to this day. 1/15 When George HW Bush took office in 1989, Iran was not near the top of a foreign policy agenda dominated by deterioration of USSR, potential reunification of Germany, and turmoil in China. Iran was severely weakened and its nuclear program and regional influence was limited. 2/15

As the debate over the Iran arms embargo heats up, I'm excited to share my latest for @IranPrimer, which takes a data-driven look at the Iranian defense budget and industry over the past two decades. A few highlights (1/5)

iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jun/… Defense spending *increased* in 2020 vs 2019, contrary to US claims that sanctions have deprived Tehran of cash needed to fund repression at home and aggression abroad. Mil spending in 2019 was $18.4 bn and $20.5 bn in 2020 budget, by my calculations. Breakdown below: (2/5)

Thread / Rouhani's #UNGA speech this morning was constructive from a diplomatic point of view, and there were several new phrases (if not ideas) worth noting. But it's equally important not to get too carried away with the implications of what he said. 1/9 Disclaimer: as @laurnorman's reporting showed yesterday, there is much going on behind the scenes with the French. It's possible that portions of the speech validated (or refuted) elements of the secret talks. For the time being, we'll have to take the speech at face value. 2/9

THREAD/I wrote my dissertation on George HW Bush's policy toward Iran, which I found to be doggedly pragmatic and non-ideological, offering a largely overlooked opportunity for a reduction in tensions between Washington and Tehran. /1 I think a few episodes in his presidency are worth noting today as we remember Bush's impact on the presidency and the country. /2