There are three reasons why Putin is losing this war. Two of them cannot be fixed. That’s why Putin doubles down on solving the third 1/9
First: Motivation. Russian army has no business in Ukraine. No number of draftees will solve this problem. In fact, it will only make things worse, because every next batch is less motivated that the previous one. Russia is simply running out of idiots 2/9
The Kremlin has just started severe ideologization and militarization of Russian education to get the young committed to fight. Most probably, it is too late. Russian young are skeptical about this war, and will be increasingly opposed to it 3/9
Second: Russian army is too hierarchical and corrupt. Replacing one butcher with another in military command will change nothing 4/9
Russian military is built on despise of soldiers’ lives and suppression of their initiative because Putin’s state is founded on the same principles. It will take changing the state to repair the army 5/9
Third: Russia faces a coalition with practically unlimited resources. Ukraine will never stop fighting because Putin frames it as a genocidal war. The question is whether Ukraine will have resources for that 6/9
This is Putin’s only hope at this point. Nuclear, energy, or grain blackmail, creating divisions in Europe and in the US – all of this is meant to break the coalition 7/9
Those who say that Putin cannot be defeated, or that he should be offered a chunk of sovereign Ukraine as an off-ramp, or that he should be kept in power to avert the worst – these people are the only ones who can help him snatch victory from the jaws of defeat 8/9
Putin is not invincible. He will be soundly defeated, and rather soon. If only some useful idiots don’t step in to save him 9/9
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The chaotic and barbaric shelling of Ukrainian cities looks like an act of desperation. Rather than pursuing a military purpose, it is rather meant to solve the rapidly internal problem 1/8
First, these attacks are precisely something the radicals were demanding long time ago. Putin was ignoring these demands for quite a while, and now he yielded to them immediately after the blowup of the bridge 2/8
Second, they are preceded by appointment of Surovikin – again, something the radicals were pushing through for a long time. This is not typical of Putin to give in to pressure so evidently – and now these people aren’t even afraid to claim they have forced Putin’s hand 3/8
There will probably appear very soon some poll numbers suggesting that Russians are incredibly enthusiastic about annexation. This was the case in 2014 with annexation of Crimea: on the Russian territory proper polls functioned as ersatz-plebiscites on admission 1/21
Several concepts that might be helpful in interpreting Russian polls.
1. Depoliticization. Almost all Russians have deep scorn and contempt for politics. Those who believe politics is meant to make society more just or free are usually considered childish or outright insane 3/21
A brief summary of what current mobilization is from the political viewpoint.
It is, of course, not partial at all, but I would still call it targeted/selective, and therefore not total.
There is a clear asymmetry in terms of groups affected 1/10
In the villages and little towns roughly 3% are mobilized, which is up to 10% of adult men (elderly excluded). The numbers tend to be higher among ethnic minorities that have even less real political representation and leverage compared to other Russians 2/10
In the bigger cities the number decreases to 1% of the population. In Moscow, it is likely to be somewhere at 0,1%. 300,000 looks plausible as a figure. There are strong rumors that this is only the first wave, and the total number will be above 1,000,000 3/10
Many requests to explain how Russians are likely to react to Putin’s speech.
Basic fact: the majority of Russians only care about their everyday life.
Hence, the reaction will depend on whether these decisions will affect everyday lives 1/5
This is unclear yet. Putin can very well continue with his piecemeal strategy. He created legal framework to extend it and stop/compensate for the leaks in his military. In that case, few people will be affected. 2/5
We witness a rush to leave the country/break a leg etc. However, the borders are not closed. It could be that people are allowed to leave and then return freely when they realize there is no imminent danger – as it happened in February.
Several points on recent dramatic developments in Armenia. They are largely overlooked but provide evidence of a catastrophic collapse of Russian foreign policy in a hugely important region🧵1/10
Point #1. Azerbaijan is not Ukraine, and Armenia is not Russia. Armenia is a democratic republic where large-scale protests against the government are normal. Azerbaijan is a despotic state. Azerbaijan has a common border with Russia, while Armenia doesn’t 2/10
Thinking in blocs is not useful, we’re not warming up for a sequel of the Cold War between Good Democracies and Evil Autocracies. World remains a complicated place 3/10
Since there is a lot of interest in what is the reaction to the recent military setbacks in Russia, a🧵with an update.
There are three distinct groups in Russia:
1/25
1) radicals – a sizeable but extremely loud minority that actively supports war, is engaged, follows the news and in rare cases even goes to the frontlines (15-25%). This is the audience of the milbloggers, Telegram channels and vampires like Solovyov or Skabeeva 2/25
2) dissenters – a sizeable minority that categorically opposes the war. It is banned from Russian-based media and generally depressed (20-25%) 3/25