@SamBendett has posted an insightful translation 🧵of the Russian combat experience using Orlan-10 drone & Lancet loitering munitions in hunter-killer teams
It explains how the US Army's M109 field artillery cannon has turned into the T-62MV 1/
Those Russian videos show towed guns and M109 SP are obsolescent in a loitering munition filled battlefield.
We are seeing the battlefield replacement of ballistic shell counterbattery with drone loitering munitions.
The M109 class SP gun and 155mm towed guns are
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...literally the T-62MV of Western 155mm artillery because it can't realistically function under a blanket of enemy loitering munitions any more than a T-62MV can operate inside the engagement range of a Javelin or Stugna-P ATGM.
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This still leaves out the threat of drone observed counter battery fire when there are no Lancets.
Ukraine has a quadcopter team every 5-to-7 km of frontline with every platoon, mortar team & forward observer team.
Russia is trying to copy that per @SamBendett thread.
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A gun with a 24 km standard range shell has to emplace fire & move in 2 minutes plus carry organic anti-drone point defense or jamming to operate in that sort of drone rich environment.
If artillery guns aren't both longer ranged and operating in combined arms group with
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...organic kinetic and soft kill drone defenses.
They will simply die like the horse cavalry of the WW1 Maxim machine gun battlefield or like unescorted battleships to land based (1941's Force Z) or carrier planes like the HIJMS Yamato did in 1945.
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Western armies -- with the possible exception of Finland -- simply do not understand what the loss of air superiority under 300 meters above ground mean.
It isn't like the 2022 Western militaries haven't been warned.
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The US military has been 'pretend tracking' this trend since ISIS started using quad-copter drones in Syria and Iraq against US Coalition ground forces.
More recently the USMC has been piggybacking off of US Army anti-drone tech, but that tech simply isn't being fielded in anything but "make believe" quantities versus the "quad-copter here, there and everywhere" drone threat density we are seeing in Ukraine.
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The US Army has been using anti-drone high power microwave (HPM) weapons in prototype form for years.
People on my Outlook list demonstrated a very effective HPM system in the early 2010's.
This tweet is a current example of that technology. 👇
They're using microwaves against drones! Even though there is no Bang! or Flash! or even a puff of smoke.
Drones just drop out of the air with nothing spiffy to show to Congress Critters.
And that's the exact problem.
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When the US Army testers got done killing an early version 'drone swarm' in 45 seconds, at range, the guy running the range was burbling with joy.
Then said:
"But can you get them to blow up?
Because we're going to have to get the money from Congress and it's easier
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...when stuff blows up." (Paraphrase.)
The HPM system never got close to fielding until the Ukraine War except as multiple prototypes STILL trotted out whenever there's a serious drone threat.
This procurement problem lives inside one of the four...call them structural...
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...issues of the American republic.
The other three being freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of religion. I say 'issues' rather than problems because this issue are two-edged swords.
Sometimes the 'congressman's baksheesh' can be a good thing.
Points that come to mind here are logistical vehicle/vessel buying for the US military with Armed Service Chairman Les Aspin's HEMET truck orders in the
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...1980's that provided the fuel for Desert Storm's "Left Hook," Sen Trent Lott's amphibious vessels for the US Navy and Speaker Newt Gingrich forcing the USAF to buy C-130Js.
There are other such examples.
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HPM weapons don't generate $10 billion procurements in 40 states and all the districts of the House & Senate Appropriations & Armed Services Chairman and ranking members districts.
So HPM weapons need to have big sexy explosions to sell them to Congressmen
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...without the procurement 'baksheesh,' but HPM doesn't have any sexy bangs.
Because HPM weapons work.
But no bangy, no money.
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I don't consider the #Leonidas HPM weapon the US Army is starting to field because the numbers are so ludicrously small.
Nine for a modern US Army heavy division for only nine heavy divisions and none for the rest?
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When a Cold War short range air defense battalion had 36 M163 Vulcan SPAA and 12 M48 Chaparral missile launchers?
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Let's be honest.
36 modernized M163 Vulcan SPAA with a 4-shot Stinger launcher is simply better than nine #Leonidas HPM weapon because there are four times as many places they can defend from cheap Shahed-136 or Lancet drones.
A single propellor drone bum rushing a 30/
... Gatling autocannon with modern fire control is gonna lose.
A pod of quick firing, fire & forget, Stingers or a seven pack pod of the new laser guided 70 mm rockets gives you options against a swarm.
The 70mm laser guided rocket being cheap enough to trade for a Shahed.
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In the era of $20,000 GPS guided propeller cruise missiles for fixed targets, and TV guided propeller loitering munitions to hunt artillery or tanks, requires a lot of AA-autocannons, cheap missiles and numerous high powered microwave weapons because of line of sight issues.
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The anti-unmanned air systems (UAS) weapons mix Western Armies are looking at to protect artillery and light infantry based intervention forces, shows both serious gaps in UAD threat knowledge and an unwillingness to educate political leaders.
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I'm afraid it will take some serious military defeats of Western, and particularly American, militaries at the hands of Iranian or Chinese drones before we get to real widespread & comprehensive UAS defenses.
This loss of fuel for Russia's Crimean based aviation accelerated the Siege of Kherson's right bank by denying the VKS the closely based fuel it needed to contest Ukrainian air superiority.
This loss means a great deal for the Ukrainian Navy's Neptune ASCM launchers.
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""More than half of russian forces stationed on the right bank of Dnipro river before russian command decided to withdraw from the stronghold are still there, Defense Intelligence of Ukraine informs. The statement contradicts the russian claim that...
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...all the forces were evacuated from the west of Dnipro to fortified positions of the other bank.
"To the left bank, the entire personnel, weaponry and military equipment has been removed," said russian defense ministry’s spokesperson Igor Konashenkov...
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And Russia knows Ukraine won't settle for anything less than its pre-2014 border as the Russian Army's new fortifications of northern Crimea makes clear.
This is a really useful thread by @CollinSLKoh on the Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea (SCS) & their usability as fortified air bases.
He brings all the science paper receipts, so check it out 1st.
This is going to be a subject matter summary thread of individual tweet & tweet 🧵 on Russian casualties & casualty ratios throughout the Russo-Ukrainian War.
As I post new tweets on the subject, they will be appended to this 🧵.
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8 February 2022
This thread is a background on the Russian casualties in the 2014 - 2015 Donbass invasion.