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Nevin Climenhaga

Nov 12 • 3 tweets • 1 min read

My latest in Philosophy & Phenomenological Research: "Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief". I argue that epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief. Check it out here: philpapers.org/rec/CLIEPA-3

Abstract:

https://twitter.com/NevinClimenhaga/status/1591547898768281600

And here's a tweetstorm summarizing the paper:

https://twitter.com/NevinClimenhaga/status/1591547898768281600

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Nevin Climenhaga

@NevinClimenhaga

Nov 12

https://twitter.com/NevinClimenhaga/status/1591545570648543232

1/ What does our 'probability'-language mean when we say things like: "it's probable the dinosaurs were killed by an asteroid" or "it's more likely the butler’s fingerprints would be on the gun if he's the murderer than if he's not"? A🧵on my latest paper.

https://twitter.com/NevinClimenhaga/status/1591545570648543232

2/ Note: it's common to distinguish the "epistemic" probabilities in the examples above from the "physical" probabilities in, e.g., quantum mechanics. My focus is on the former. (In fact I think my account can extend to physical probabilities, but that's a paper for another day!)

3/ So what are epistemic probabilities? The dominant philosophical view is that they are degrees of belief, or "credences": either someone's actual credences, or the credences someone would have had under some circumstances, or the credences it would be rational to have.

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