#October7Surprise Prospects for China getting around Oct 7 controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment by enticing non-US vendors and governments to go against US preferences.
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As the very insightful @fudaoge notes, the de-Americanization option for foreign vendors is a tough one, and is caught by the US persons provisions added to 2018 ECRA but now weaponized: chinatechtales.wordpress.com/2022/11/06/as-…
Then there is the question of whether Japanese players would be willing to really fall on their sword on this one, including possibly going against METI. Already Tokyo Electron is putting out figures for losses resulting from controls in China: asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/…
TEL: "We are seeing changes and postponements in capital expenditures, mainly in memory," Kawai said.
TEL expects sales of new production equipment for memory products to fall 40% in second half of fiscal year, compared w/ first half ended in September. We will come back to this.
While there are no Japanese government regs similar to end use controls put in place October 7, TEL + other Japanese tool makers Nikon/Canon likely have voluntary internal controls that would have to be overridden for there to be major effort to replace US tool makers in China
Japanese officials and leading tool makers are looking for guidance at Dutch tool making giant #ASML. Senior US administration officials and export control experts will descend next week on The Hague for discussions with Dutch officials on the issue.
After at least a year or more of trilateral discussions, talks likely broke down over the specific controls in the 7 October package, which appear to have caught both Tokyo and The Hague off guard, US officials will have to persuade Dutch officials to go along under duress.
Raimondo's comments last week that it could be 6-9 months before trilateral agreement is reached seem off, as there will be need to align with rules much sooner to signal industry. Transposing them into domestic regulations will take much longer of course. japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/11/0…
The Chinese semiconductor industry continues to digest controls, but move has already put a major damper on sentiment in the sector and among investors.
Last year alone, China added 592 chip design firms, or about 11 new start-ups per week. Chinese semiconductor-focused cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Wuxi and Nanjing had a total of 2,810 such firms by the end of the year
The situation has since changed drastically. During an event at November's Semicon China summit, four of five executives from Chinese chip firms predicted that 2023 would be worse than this year, adding that they are “preparing for winter. scmp.com/tech/tech-war/…
Major players such as SMIC, are alreading warning about the long-term impact. co-CEO Zhao Haijun said on Friday on an earnings call that recent export controls from the United States will have an "adverse impact" on the company's production. reuters.com/technology/smi…
Hence, while the intent of end use controls may have been narrow, attempting to draw a line on domestic manufacturing capabilities, result is likely to be some consolidation, per SMIC, among major players, but significant long-term pessimism about overall direction of industry.
Memory sector is much different than logic, a commodity sector driven by market conditions and sensitive to price changes. Also questions about inclusion of memory in the 7 October package, for more, see: thechinaproject.com/2022/11/11/mem…
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ICYMI US policymakers could be alienating the Chinese AI researchers they want to attract - Protocol protocol.com/enterprise/us-…
Profit goals and nationalistic rhetoric clouded the collaborative environment that helped advance U.S. AI research. Now the goodwill fostered among Chinese students eager to study in the U.S. could be faltering.
The researcher suggested that claims of the Chinese government’s control over AI research and development were exaggerated. It would be “impossible” for the government to fund the thousands of research papers submitted by Chinese researchers to global AI conferences each year.
China’s chip equipment makers struggle to profit at home from US export controls ft.com/content/01bd6d…
Since Washington introduced sweeping restrictions on October 7 to limit Chinese companies’ ability to obtain or manufacture advanced computer chips, YMTC, China’s largest memory chip maker, has issued at least 20 tenders for a broad range of chipmaking equipment.
“The current strategy is that if there is workable domestic semiconductor production equipment, even though [the suppliers] need help, we will buy from Chinese companies. If not, we shop from non-US vendors, mostly Japanese,” said a senior YMTC engineer.
Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China | The White House whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
Biden reiterated that this competition should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication.
The two leaders discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals and tasked their teams to discuss them further.
Deja vu all over again from November call a year ago: staff to develop more lines of communication.
Biden’s Chip Curbs Outdo Trump in Forcing World to Align on China
The mood in Japan’s government, meanwhile, was said by an official to be one of bemusement that its sovereignty could be so disregarded. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Rutte said. “We should not be naïve,” he added. “Discussing the issue of tech and also the export of the latest technology itself is a legitimate debate which we have amongst our partners.”
There’s a sense in Japan that US companies will manage to continue to do business with China while others suffer. One complaint was the controls will spur Beijing to advance its chip technology, leaving the US and China strengthened and everyone else at a disadvantage.
Medeiros: “Will both leaders discuss, even implicitly, the terms of coexistence amid competition? Or, by default, will they let loose the dogs of unconstrained rivalry?” nytimes.com/2022/11/12/wor…
Pentagon's Kahl: Chinese leaders have “been much more willing to signal that this thing is edging toward an alliance as opposed to just a superficial partnership.” Mr. Biden seems doubtful. “I don’t think there’s a lot of respect that China has for Russia or Putin,” he said.
Summits on neutral ground, like this one in Bali ahead of the Group of 20 meeting of leaders, have an increasingly Cold War feel: more about managing potential conflict than finding common ground.
....bending the trajectory of competition away from enmity and conflict will also free up the political space and resources on both sides to drive forward an inclusive, affirmative vision of the future.... foreignaffairs.com/china/bidens-c…
...that measures success in terms of positive achievements rather than by the extent to which the other’s capabilities and initiatives can be downgraded or blocked.
Efforts by the two leaders to establish a modus vivendi will be made more challenging, but no less important, by recent U.S. actions to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors, combined with growing congressional activism and Biden’s own recent statements on Taiwan.