Trent Telenko Profile picture
Nov 13 16 tweets 5 min read
The Siege of Kherson is over.

The Siege of Crimea has begun.

I've laid out the logistics of the Kherson siege previously, plus the water implications for Crimea if Kherson's right bank fell.

Now it is time for a Crimean siege logistical 🧵
1/

The Siege of Crimea began before the Siege of Kherson ended, on October 8th 2022.

When the Kerch Straits road and rail bridge was bombed.

This attack cut Crimea off from its primary fuel supply, crippling VKS aviation based there.

2/
This loss of fuel for Russia's Crimean based aviation accelerated the Siege of Kherson's right bank by denying the VKS the closely based fuel it needed to contest Ukrainian air superiority.

This loss means a great deal for the Ukrainian Navy's Neptune ASCM launchers.
3/
Stanislav, Kherson Oblast represents a key piece of strategic Ukrainian terrain for the siege of Crimea for basing the Ukrainian Navy mobile Neptune anti-ship cruise missile launchers.

Their reach from there covers well south of the port of Sevastopol.

4/
The Russian Black Sea Fleet operational patterns in screening Sevastopol have changed.

Whether from the drone boat bomb attack or the fall of the Dnipro's right bank increasing the Neptune's engagements range isn't clear.

It is consistent with both.
5/
Given the changed operational pattern @CovertShores spotted, the ability of Russian Black Sea Fleet to move fuel by coastal tanker or fuel filled cistern rail cars by ferry to Sevastopol port has been fatally compromised.

6/

The most extreme western tip of occupied southern Ukraine is the Kinburn peninsula at the right bank of the Dnipro's mouth.

It is the most fuel starved territory in Russia's grasp & it has no air cover from AFU drones.

7/
Worse, with the fall of Stanislav, the Kinburn peninsula is under the footprint of Ukrainian Army, drone directed, 155mm guns firing basic shells, AKA "Fire Control."

A Ukrainian helicopter and/or boat lifted light infantry force with Stugna-P ATGM,

8/
...Switchblade drones, mortars and long range artillery radios that reach Stanislav would be able to take & potentially hold the Kinburn peninsula inside that artillery footprint.

Whether AFU actually does this is a different matter.

9/
The problem is the Russians have to honor this threat to the Western flank the Dnipro line.

Forcing the Russians to occupy Kinburn peninsula, which hasn't been fortified yet due to a lack of roads, gives the Ukrainians lots of Russian soft artillery targets out in the open.

10/
If the Russians leave the Kinburn peninsula an unoccupied "Grey Zone." It becomes a sanctuary for Ukrainian Partisans, Special Forces and especially AFU drones.

And the threat to their Western flank remains as Russian aircover recedes.

11/
And by that I mean the presence of AFU HIMARS on the Dnipro's right bank puts the Russian VKS helicopter base in Chaplynka in GMLRS range with all the explosive implications that fact represents.

See👇

12/
Nor is that the only GMLMS problem the Russian face in S. Ukraine. The following are within the GMLRS footprint:

o The E97 route from Western Crimea
o All the P57 route to the Black Sea
o The supply hub at Myrne
o The P47 route to Malachka
o The M14 route to Druzhbivka

13/
The Russian Army's "Dnipro line" screening Crimea has an open western flank at the Kinburn peninsula, with its sea and ground lines of communications interdicted, and its Crimea supply source being short of fuel to support combat operations because of the bombed Kerch Bridge.
14/
The reality of interdicted routes, short fuel and the threat of the open flank at the Kinburn peninsula represent the Russian Army's new logistical tar baby for the Siege of Crimea.

Just as the Kyiv 40 km parking lot, Snake Island, Chornobaevka & Kherson all were before it.

15/
We are seeing yet again Ukraine's "Death of a Thousand Cuts" operational strategy at work against Russians.

Russia's trucks supporting the Dnipro line screening Crimea are in a kill jar of Ukraine's making.

Defeat & retreat, to & thru Crimea, are the only Russian outcomes
16/16

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Trent Telenko

Trent Telenko Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @TrentTelenko

Nov 14
If true, the Southern/Left bank of the Dnipro has become "Grey Zone."

It is land held by neither side as AFU & RFAF patrols skirmish with one another.

The other implication, if true, is the 49th Combined Arms Army really did lose tens of thousands in the withdrawal.

1/9
Again, if true, then the Russians strategic position in the south of Ukraine has become untenable.

There is too much land and not enough Russian troops or logistics to hold it.

You need some minimum density of infantry forces to hold ground and Russia has fallen below

2/9
...whatever that magic number is in southern Ukraine. If Ukrainian SF can occupy Russian abandoned towns on the Left/Southern bank of the Dnipro.

The reality is Ukraine's trained infantry numbers are getting stronger relative to Russia every day.

3/9
Read 9 tweets
Nov 11
@SamBendett has posted an insightful translation 🧵of the Russian combat experience using Orlan-10 drone & Lancet loitering munitions in hunter-killer teams

It explains how the US Army's M109 field artillery cannon has turned into the T-62MV
1/
...of the 21st century indirect fire combat.

And no, I'm not kidding.

Both weapons entered service in the early 1960's and the M109 served in every (Afghanistan excepted) US war since Vietnam.

2/
And towed artillery pieces like the M777 and FH-70 are even worse off facing this Russian Orlan-10/Lancet-3 team.

This tweet is Russian thinking about that team.

3/
Read 36 tweets
Nov 11
Ukrainian military intelligence reckons maybe half of the 49th Combined Arms Army was left behind:

1/6
en.defence-ua.com/news/more_than…
From the article link:

""More than half of russian forces stationed on the right bank of Dnipro river before russian command decided to withdraw from the stronghold are still there, Defense Intelligence of Ukraine informs. The statement contradicts the russian claim that...

2/6
...all the forces were evacuated from the west of Dnipro to fortified positions of the other bank.

"To the left bank, the entire personnel, weaponry and military equipment has been removed," said russian defense ministry’s spokesperson Igor Konashenkov...

3/6
Read 6 tweets
Nov 10
This is a Russian Kherson bug out report & the 'Strategic-Operational level' logistical implications tweet thread.

Report:
"Stanislav and Kyselivka confirmed liberated."



1/
Report:

"Near Snihurivka, the village of Pavlivka has been liberated."



2/
Report:

"Ukrainian forces steamrolling south along the Dnipro river. Novokairy has been visually confirmed and likely Mylove, too."

3/
Read 13 tweets
Nov 10
Others have already mentioned it, but Ukraine is over 1/2 way to recovering all the territory it lost in February & March 2022.

This Kherson withdrawal marks the 1st Russian mass movement out of the other 1/2 of Ukraine's 23 February 2022 lands.

1/6
And Russia knows Ukraine won't settle for anything less than its pre-2014 border as the Russian Army's new fortifications of northern Crimea makes clear.

2/6
Crimea without a fully operational Kerch Straits rail bridge is not logistically supportable due to a lack of rail delivered fuel tonnage.

As others have repeatedly underlined in their tweets, Russia is trying to buy time with Mobik lives.


3/6
Read 6 tweets
Nov 9
This is a really useful thread by @CollinSLKoh on the Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea (SCS) & their usability as fortified air bases.

He brings all the science paper receipts, so check it out 1st.

I'm going to embellish upon it with this🧵

1/
While this paper @CollinSLKoh posted touches on the 'dissolvability' of concrete structures in the SCS maritime environment.

None of the snap shots he posted goes into the two most important factors required for usable runways.

2/
Those two factors are minimum Load Classification Number (LCN) and runway deformation.

Runway LCN are a vital characteristic as to how heavy an aircraft can operate on a runway.

Below is the standard definition of LCN.

3/
encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/load+classific…
Read 17 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(