Thread by @TondaMacC

Day 22 of testimony at the Emergencies inquiry starts today. Here’s where we are at after 21 days/ analysis by me and @aballinga

https://twitter.com/tondamacc/status/1591452708422455298

If you need a primer on how Canadian parliamentary democracy works (not the Canada Unity version), listen to the live webcast of the inquiry.
Otherwise, I'll wait until there's testimony in about 45 minutes from now.

Spoke too soon.
Inquiry counsel actually just said two full cabinet mtgs discussed the Emergencies Act on Feb 3, and Feb. 15. (Feb 3 is news to me. But we await details.)

Inquiry lawyer: 3 other overview reports tabled re various lawsuits, judicial review proceedings around the EA declaration; protests at 6 ports of entry; oversight responsibilities of the parliamentary review cttee.

Seems like they've shortcut the reports.
Rob Stewart straight to the stand.
He'll be questioned by comm co-counsel Shantona Chaudhury.

Stewart was former dm public safety (now at int'l trade) Testifying in tandem is also Dominic Rochon, adm at same dept back then (now at Transport Cda)

(We'd been told the overviews wd take about 45 mins, but Judge Rouleau told the room that the various lawyers should review them, and cross-examine if/where necessary later). So...zipping along.

Stewart, top bureaucrat responsible for public safety told his Ontario counterpart there was “great reluctance to invoke” the federal Emergencies Act the day before the federal government invoked it.
Our set-up here and where you can follow live updates:

thestar.com/politics/feder…

Rochon: a bureacrats' nat sec ops committee first discussed convoy on Jan. 25, and after that held daily briefings on it.

Rochon draws distinction between intelligence collectors (CSIS, RCMP, prov & municipal police), assessors (ITAC, PCO, CSIS, RCMP) & consumers (Dept PS).

Rochon: during convoy RCMP brought intel to fed table, He says there's a diff between policing vs natsec matter.

Asked to explain why early on the public safety natsec branch didn't assess convoy as a natsec concern, Rochon talks about Govt OPs Centre, "otherwise known as the GOC" - Stewart smiles. (The acronyms are gonna kill us this week) - says GOC was 1st pub safety org collecting info.

Rochon: Transport Cda also collecting info, flagging to the nat sec ops cttee bc it had potential to rise to national security threat level bc "this was happening across Cda."

Inquiry counsel notes GoC started collecting convoy info around Jan 19, w reports produced, distributed later.
Stewart said key points went to group of deputies, sr pub servants.

Stewart: GoC sums up open source intel and info, not actual "classified" intelligence.

q- What's the diff between intelligence and information?
Stewart: it's info that doesn't need to be protected in any way. Intel is info that needs to be protected and disclosure itself cd represent a threat.

(You'll appreciate I'm paraphrasing! If you want a deep dive on intel vs info, tune in when CSIS is here).

Chaudhury notes neither of these guys had ever heard of the OPP's Hendon reports. She asks them to explain.

Rochon: I assume the OPP would have started operation Hendon, I'm certain RCMP wd have been aware of, pulling together info from OPP and OPS and feeding to us, but wouldn't specifically say where intel was coming from.

Rochon is basically saying that he trusts that the RCMP was fully up to speed on OPP intel and fed into the senior bureaucrats' committee the relevant info, without identifying the specific source of the intel.

Chaudhury asks them to explain OPP Comm. Carrique's explanation of what PS Canada defines by national security.

Rochon: Canada's natsec strategy came out in 2004, hasn't been updated since. (many calls to do so).
"There's no definition in legislation of national security" tho CSIS ACT defines threats to security of Cda, so does law protecting secret info.

But he says national security covers all kinds of things, incl climate change.
He also noted CSIS can only collect intel if certain thresholds met, but his testimony paints a much broader picture of what govt might consider a natsec concern.

Stewart: as of Jan 27 "we were very concerned" about growing convoy numbers, asking RCMP questions "what is the plan for managing this protest when it manifests?"

The Jan. 27 email advises there's a plan to have trucks park out in Vanier (about 4-5 km from core)

Q-what were you expecting?
Stewart: The expectation I had was that the convoy would park and leave on the Sunday.
Rochon: yes, the expectation was that they'd all be peaceful and they'd leave after that weekend.

Rochon says there were discussions around where they'd park, and how would affect supply chains at ports of entry, but the expectation at GOC was situation was "fluid" and could go on a lot longer.

Stewart: "the convoys were very organic" and it was very difficult to have intel around what...we were starting to see slow rolls...we were concerned that this movement would grow, not be a onetime only event, and wd manifest across the country. Already blockade at Coutts.

Stewart: As (Jan. 28-29) weekend ended it became clear they would stay, we had regular briefings of a small group of ministers.
(He outlines other meetings and sighs deeply as he tries to recall all involved) incl Communications Security Establishment (signals intel/spy agency)

Stewart: OPP and OPS were not on these calls, the RCMP Comm Lucki was the one who collected that info and brought it to these various committees/tables.

As for meetings that included people outside fed govt, there's a standing fed-prov meeting of dep ministers to talk crime prevention & policing matters, says Stewart.
PS and Transport deputy ministers met ad hoc to discuss convoys too, and he reached out to city of Ottawa.

Stewart on Feb. 6 mtg, fed ministers were "concerned" by now. "At no time did anybody start to think about instructing police to do anything but they were very interested in what the plans were...across the country."

Stewart says he was trying to convey there was a growing sense of concern about the convoys, and that it was taxing local abilities to manage, also highlighting a lack of particular coordinated federal provincial approach.

Stewart disputes accuracy of this note taken about his intervention. "We weren't entirely clear what it was he needed in terms of ..policing resources."
Sloly had asked right after the 1st weekend for extra resources. RCMP had already provided officers by then.

Stewart: there'd been a "shack" erected, fuel supplies stored, at a fed park (Confederation Pk ?) that he says was causing "quite a lot of heartburn."
Chaudhury asks Stewart about Di Tommaso's version of what Jody Thomas and he argued about.

Stewart: Mr Di Tommaso "misinterpreted" what Jody Thomas "was driving at."
The fed govt wasn't looking to not take action, it was the opposite, "the concern was that the province was not taking enough action."

Stewart disputes Di Tommaso's take, that the feds were "washing their hands" of it all. Stewart says he never thought the OPP weren't doing enough. But the intent, he says, was to understand if provincial ministers were coming to the table as feds were.

Chaudhury asks Stewart about his prior statement to inquiry, here in his evidence summary, why he felt ON was treating Ottawa as if it were Washington, D.C.

Stewart says it was clear that "more needed to be done," even though the OPS, the OPP, the RCMP, & the PPS were working together on this.
"Technically the OPS should ask the OPP not RCMP for assistance in first instance," Stewart says, but he says RCMP would never refuse request.

(Stewart is trying to downplay the idea that the feds were taking an overly legalistic view of what the right procedures were to follow in the face of the entrenched occupation. He's suggesting that was not the case, that the ministers and RCMP were trying to offer help.)

Stewart: the tripartite calls that ON political ministers didn't join were coordinated by him and the city of Ottawa. Those meetings were held Feb 7, 8, 10.

Stewart says his view that Windsor was a priority for the Ontario govt "speaks for itself": He and Di Tommaso talked about it, there was a more active plan to deal with Windsor, and resources had to be mobilized from across the province.

Shown readout of Feb. 7 fed-prov mtg of dep ministers, Stewart cited intel: "not been a significant element of violent extremism" in terms of the "threshold under the CSIS Act..It's a very high threshold..that's a high bar for them." It's a small number of Cdns that are monitored

Rochon says CSIS tracks extremist elements. From a terrorist perspective, CSIS is coming to grips with IMVE movement, and is now trying to define/and go after "emerging threats."
"There's been an evolution wrt terrorism" & lone actor can perpetrate a violent event.

(This is consistent with years of CSIS reports to Parliament.)

Rochon says at that point, CSIS was indicating it did not have specific info to broaden its intel-gathering activity to a greater number of individuals, but it "doesn't mean they weren't monitoring certain extremist targets of theirs."

Another note from that Feb. 7 dep mins mtg: Stewart says "strong desire not to engage" meant ministers did not want to meet with the protesters.

Stewart re Feb. 8 NSIA talking points memo refers to support for "maximum and strategic enforcement" which he says meant support for use of ticketing bylaw offences, other provincial trucking offences, deregistering commercial vehicles, not renewing licenses, etc.

Inquiry lawyer: what was in the "rolodex" of ideas?
Stewart can't remember specifically, but whether max enforcement was taken up by provinces, he says the most obvious was Ontario's Feb. 11 declaration of emergency (enacted & regs issued Feb 12)

Stewart: The main request for fed assistance came fr AB govt, normally would be flagged by provincial emergency authority to Govt Ops Ctr. This came by letter fr AB minister for CAF tow trucks to fed minister, "a bit out of the blue."

Stewart says fed govt didn't want to use military, and in case of Edmonton base, there were only a few tows, not the same heavy tow trucks appropriate to task, would have been damaged if used on semis + AB had ability to compel trucks under prov critical infrastructure law.

Stewart describes being on a call w/ Canada's US ambassador, and White House official responsible for Homeland Security, which offered tow trucks from Detroit.
There were other calls w DHS officials. Rochon did two.

Rochon says the Americans wanted "situational awareness...and wanted to know if threats were emerging."
He briefed the DHS officials on "how we were coping with the potential threat to national security."

Rochon said US official, post Jan 6 insurrection, was concerned about potential convoys in Washington, "They certainly had it on their radar, they were expressing concern...were we coping and whether or not it could manifest on their side of border."

Notes of Feb 3 cabinet cttee mtg says Dep Min of view OPS will not be able to end it "without the assistance" of the fed govt...

Stewart says that view came to him from "Chief Sloly," that he "was not trying to pick who would come to his assistance and assistance of the OPS"...it was "implicit" that the provincial govt would also be required, Sloly's ask -1,800 police officers "is a v large number."

Feb. 6 mtg of same cabinet committee. Stewart said then negotiation was still preferred option.

Inquiry lawyer asks Stewart about his take on the OPS, Lucki's comments, how over time the "OPS pulled it together" after OPP got involved, he says.
Stewart says there were differences in what right strategy should be. Initially, it wasn't a take-down-the-protest plan-came later.

Asked about the "personality issues involved," Stewart says he cannot elaborate - there were disagreements about the right strategy.
"I would not want to lay this at the door of Chief Sloly, to be honest with you," says Stewart.

Stewart hadn't met Sloly before all this, knew he had a strong personality, but he stresses there were tensions among police trying to come up with right way to manage the protests.

Stewart: RCMP were "always willing to help" but he says before RCMP can work in Ontario requires paperwork, a request by province and agreement by feds.

Stewart says that's why the EA exempted RCMP fr swearing-in because large numbers fr outside province would be coming in and that was an impediment.

Stewart explains his view that "negotiation" was the preferred option in conversations w/ Di Tommaso, esp after the Tyendinaga rail blockades two years earlier.

Stewart (feels the need to underline this) "The RCMP is very concerned about public safety," and in general faced w protests wants to "prevent violence without taking enforcement action..safer for their members and the public."

Chaudhury asks Stewart about a Feb. 8 cab committee mtg where he opines the horns had stopped post-injunction, and convoys were "well organized" ...he says it "may have been an overstatement."
"We were not well-sighted when it came to how ppl were communicating w/ each other."

Stewart: feds watching what was going on across the country: after Coutts, there was Windsor, Emerson, Blue Water bridge, Peace bridge in Niagara, Cornwall, later in B.C. there was Pacific Hwy convoy.

Stewart: Ottawa's the most extreme example but the general impression we had was that what had begun as a protest of vaccine mandates had become something more than that...had become a kind of popular thing...it was seen in other countries too btw."
Cdn flags in NZ convoy protest

Stewart says "Incident response group" is not a standing cabinet committee but an ad hoc group the PM convenes as required, no regular meetings. First met on Feb 10 in relation to the convoy.

Stewart says the below info came from "lead negotiator Insp. Marcel Beadin" that most protesters had "weak connection to the cause," 5% strong devotion and 15% were a "swing factor."

Stewart: at first feds not interested in meeting, not clear who was leader of convoy protests. Over time the idea of meeting became a potential police tactic. Di Tommaso and Stewart talked about roles of police negotiators and de-escalation.

Stewart says Di Tommaso told him "there was some possibility that if they could identify...6 leaders of a sort" and offer an opportunity for them to be heard, would have effect of allowing people to achieve something. And therefore leave.

Stewart says it was engagement "as a stepping stone to enforcement," which was only a matter of time, he says.

Stewart tells Chaudhury the engagement they contemplated was intended to shrink the size of the protest.

Stewart drafted a plan with Insp Beaudin, that would have the fed govt acknowledge the desire to meet, offer to do so at a later time away from the protest, on the basis that a protester (organizer) would denounce it and leave.
The proposal was brought to cabinet table.

Asked about RCMP Comm. Lucki's concerns, Stewart says she worried if it came to cabinet decision, would it be a direction to police to do it. She didn't want it construed like that. She also had concerns about how it could play out, that OPP police liaison teams cd be blamed.

Stewart says he now thinks the RCMP Act should be clarified on this point (of when govt discussions w/ police are or are not direction). He says so, based on convoy experience, and the NS shootings/conversations w/ Blair/ and the govt's decision to ban assault weapons.

Stewart is shown note re Feb. 12, says he had support of unnamed "colleagues" to bring the option of engagement proposal to the cabinet table.

Stewart re this text: he hadn't yet briefed Min Mendicino on the engagement proposal. Stewart says minister felt "uncomfortable" that he didn't have opportunity to contribute to it.

(There is a lot of hacking and coughing at the inquiry today. It's not just info overload...seems there's a bit of viral overload going around.)

Stewart: engagement proposal brought to IRG on Feb 12, but "was not taken up."
Stewart says he only knows what Beaudin told him, that it "might" have an effect. "I had a feeling it was a very low order of probability" (yes they talk like this. He thought chances were slim.)

Stewart, asked when EA became "seriously considered" around Feb 11?
Stewart says about a day earlier, Feb. 10.
The Act has a history, wasn't determined as a tool in pandemic, he notes.

Stewart: serious consideration (of the EA) came in latter part of week, Feb. 6 or 7th.

On development of the emergency order: Stewart says all departments involved in managing aspects of convoy fallout were asked to come up with options.

Stewart is quoted by transport dep minister as fearing EA "can backfire." Testifies he was concerned about the potential for violence if the EA were to be invoked.

(Keenan hasn't yet testified but he will.)

Stewart, asked about Feb 14 11:12 email, where he said there weren't "specifics" about what EA could do.
He said "this was me reacting to what I'd seen drafted" but says he underestimated what EA provided.

Rochon says there were 3-4 technical briefings for Oppo MPs, Senators, staff, and a briefing for media (of which we don't have fond memories).

Stewart said he underestimated the potential of the EA because "the police have attested to the value of the act in terms of getting the protests to disperse in Ottawa, and within two weeks there was very little manifestation of the protests in the country."

Stewart: "Others have come forward to say this was a tool they could use and found useful."

(Which is kind of saying he didn't think it was necessary and useful at the time but in hindsight now thinks it was at the least helpful and useful because some cops have said so).

Here's more of Stewart, according the evidence summary, in case it clarifies his view:

And this follows on that last excerpt. Stewart reiterates that the deterrent effect of the EA, esp the financial measures, "could not be overstated"

Convoy lawyer Brendan Miller first up to cross-examine them.

Miller asks if Stewart understands the difference in law on "reasonable suspicion" --Stewart corrects him, "reasonable grounds to suspect" -- and "reasonable grounds" ...(which should continue "..to believe/mixing up a few things in law. #natsec #crimlaw lawyers jump in here!)

Miller notes these references to Vigneault/CSIS concerns around invocation of the EA: which Stewart acknowledges.

Stewart says it did not meet threat as defined in s. 2 in the CSIS Act.
Challenged by Miller to say that nobody in the intelligence apparatus believed it met the standard of a threat, Stewart disagrees. Only CSIS looked at CSIS definition.

Stewart says nobody other than CSIS assessed for threshold under its act, but the ministers were making a decision based on their interpretation of what info was before them.

Miller presses: CSIS was responsible for making an statutory interpretation.
Miller asks when did Blair tell you he was thinking he was going to invoke the EA, from Feb 4 on?
Stewart says he was not aware of that.

Miller:"none" of the CSIS input here was used in the public messaging? Stewart says he doesn't know as he's not the spokesman.
(Miller's done, but his point is the convoy didn't rise to level of threat to national security, that CSIS told them so &they decided to ignore it.)

(break for lunch.)

Stewart testifies he heard concerns about OPS' ability to manage the Ottawa convoy, but he did not share the view of Brenda Lucki (in email to OPP's Carrique) that the govt had lost confidence in Chief Sloly.

(BTW, when we came back the inquiry lawyer clarified the full cabinet meetings when EA was discussed were Feb. 13 and 15 - not Feb. 3 as earlier referenced --which had raised eyebrows in the media room..)

Asked by Sloly's lawyer if they agreed the convoy became a national security threat, Stewart says he was concerned about the potential for serious violence, and Rochon agrees.

Sloly's lawyer suggests police preferred negotiation, the ministers were pressing for enforcement, Sloly faced "high level of impatience" "challenging" situation: Did you two also feel enormous pressure to resolve situation?
Stewart disputes the ministers wanted enforcement but

...but Stewart and Rochon agree that they felt enormous pressure to find a resolution.

Rochon cites a whole range of concerns that ultimately emerged bc of the convoy, asserts "yes it definitely rose to the level of a national security concern."
Ottawa residents' lawyer says maybe it only did so based on failure of police to understand what was coming their way.

Lawyer Tamman suggests the threat wasn't articulated as a national security threat because of certain types of biases about what constitutes such a threat.

Q- Fair to say fed govt didn't see EA as necessary until the int'l border blockade?
Stewart: no, that was a consideration along w others.
He admits that problems at border points of entry were a big factor.
EA a "tool of last resort," he says. "There were other tools as well."

(Which...is confusing. He says in conversations w/ provincial counterparts there were other tools...so which is it? last resort, or there were other tools?)

OPP lawyer Chris Diana asks which law enforcement agencies were consulted about the act?
Stewart stammers, no agency was asked about the act, they --RCMP, OPP and OPS --were asked if they needed more tools.

OPP lawyer says Carrique testified OPP was not consulted.
Stewart doesn't have direct info to contradict Carrique, but he says RCMP was the govt's "primary interface"...

Latest from me and @aballinga. CSIS told Trudeau govt convoy was not a national security threat, according to spy agency's definition.
thestar.com/politics/feder…

Stewart says he did not directly consult w/ police agencies other than RCMP, then corrects, he talked to Sloly and Carrique, and had first-hand info fr Sloly "he needed more tools as well."

Stewart, shown this email fr RCMP's Lucki to Mendicino's staffer, says this "under these circumstances, is not unusual." Says Lucki is a direct report to the minister.
(Unlike, Diana notes, how the OPP reports to deputy sol-gen, not to the minister)

Stewart says, again fwiw, he thinks it's worth clarifying what are appropriate requests for ministers to make for info and advice, as opposed to requests deemed giving police directions. But he has *no* suggestions for Rouleau about how that clarification could be made.

JCCF Lawyer Kittridge asks Rob Stewart about the Liberal research bureau. Stewart says he has no idea what that office does. (Shows a document that says the NDP was going to support EA) Stewart says he only learned that at the vote.

Stewart says he's not in a position to say whether the EA was necessary or just useful, but goes on to say that the invocation of the Act soon brought an end to protests, so it shows it was more than just useful.

Kitteridge asks how he knows EA was a deterrent, Stewart says the intent of it was to be a deterrent. Kitteridge says you did no polls, it's just speculation?
Stewart- If you want to call it that, I call it a conclusion.

Stewart agrees EA requires consultation, explanation to parliament.
He says even if talks didn't specifically state the feds were thinking of invoking EA, any conversations about what tools law enforcement needed were consultations in that regard.

Stewart says that "even on the eve of the enforcement action, we had no idea what was in the trucks ..call it an intelligence gap.. but we did not have a line of sight" on what would happen.

Stewart says focus on violent extremism in Canada shifted from sources abroad to domestic, notes 26 ppl killed, 40 injured in over a dozen attacks, often by lone actors w/ no prior warning. He suggests authorities lack tools and mandate to target the new threats.

Govt of Cda lawyer underlines that the govt heard of threats to rail lines as well during convoy, but Stewart says that never materialized, tho he points to previous rail blockades two years prior that caused significant economic damage.

Chaudhury briefly re-examines. Shows text exchange between Lucki & Carrique, reference to Stewart believing "lot of political infighting going on."
Says it was in reference to city council which was not in the loop on the OPS board's decision to replace Sloly w an interim chief.

Okay. Stewart and Rochon done. Next two witnesses coming up are from Global Affairs Canada.

Global Affairs Cindy Termorshuizen is associate deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, and former Windsor area MP Joe Comartin now consul general in Detroit.

In interest of saving tweetspace, I'll call them CT and JC.

JC was consul-gen until end Sept. (was also formerly a very engaged NDP MP, who did a lot of work on public safety.)

CT: the other crisis brewing at the time was the imminent invasion by Russia of Ukraine, so the dep minister delegated to CT responsibility for convoy files.

CT says Joly, foreign affairs minister, was wrapped up in Ukraine files at the time.
CT: "We first started hearing about a convoy potentially coming to Ottawa was late January, when it was on the news."

CT: in downtown core, about 50 diplomatic properties were affected by the convoy (most diplomatic residences or apartments that diplomatic staff lived in).

Here's your go-to page for convoy coverage to date, where you'll find stories by me and @aballinga as well as Star columnists and our provincial Queens Pk buro too! thestar.com/news/convoy-pr…

Tweets by Democratic Rep. Elissa Slotkin (narrowly re-elected last week) that used the convoy to urge bringing back manufacturing to the U.S. are shown at the inquiry. JC says her comment's were the strongest from American elected representatives.

Comartin says all the same it showed a degree of ignorance about the integrated cross-border economy and the NAFTA.
But he says there was a great deal of pressure in the U.S. where lawmakers "did not see" that the Cdn authorities were responding in a coordinated effective way.

Inquiry lawyer shows White House staffer's email showing US concerns, CT says Canada was hearing that from the US embassy here too, and via other cross-border channels.

Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer also put out statement Feb. 7 that the Ambassador Bridge had to remain open.
JC says auto industry right away talked about shutting down lines of production, on night of Feb. 7, the day convoy blocked bridge traffic.

JC says he'll put on his "diplomatic" hat and says auto industry was "much more aggressive" that Canada had to get its act together to address the bridge closure.

(correction to my earlier tweet re a White House email...it was a Global Affairs email referencing US concerns.)

CT: There were American concerns that a large amount of the funding for convoy was coming from U.S. donors, and concerns that a lot of callers flooding 911 in Ottawa came from the U.S. Both were referenced on a Biden-Trudeau call, she says.

CT explains Global Affairs was concerned Cdn "model" was being used, and about 'reputational' problem ie that Cdn flag was being used around world as a symbol of defiance of the law.

CT doesn't think Global Affairs did specific economic assessments of economic impact (however there is a document already in evidence at the inquiry that did assess Amb. Br. closure at between $45 million and $161 million in losses a day.)

(That's a smaller estimate of damage than Premier Doug Ford pegged it, btw.)

Ralph Goodale, high commissioner in UK, reported that there was "disbelief" the convoy was happening in Canada "of all places" - CT says she understood that was because of the widespread defiance of law.

CT: Some of biggest companies directly affected by Windsor bridge blockade were Korean and Japanese. She notes Toyota and Honda experienced immediate effects, so while those countries didn't raise it, Cdn govt was worried about damage to reputation w/ trading partners.

CT: as many as 8,000 foreign diplomats work in Canada. Most in Ottawa. She says Cda has obligations to protect diplomatic missions, and Global Affairs received complaints about convoy and their ability to function effectively.

CT: Complaints, both formal and informal, were focused on access to downtown core, also concerns about noise as Ottawa residents testified, & about fumes.
"We of course were also concerned about ability of staff and consular clients to access their offices."

CT is asked about this RCMP assessment that there was no "specific" concern for diplomatic missions insofar as the protests were not directed at any mission, ie they weren't the target. It was more like the concerns like regular Ottawa residents had, eg. potential for harassment.

CT: It wasn't that Canada could not meet its international convention obligation to protect diplomatic personnel, but that it might not be able to as tensions rose.

CT: Global Affairs provided input to several different levels, she agrees it "may have" had an influence on the EA decision-making process.

CT: on reports prepared by rapid response mechanism that were fed into the Govt Ops Center, which looked at open source info and said they had "not seen evidence of significant foreign state sponsored involvement" in online convoy information spaces.

After EA was declared, CT says there was a lot of relief amongst stakeholders.
JC says there was also a clear message received that Canada was not prepared to let that kind of situation happen again.

CT: after EA, streets were cleared, and concerns around foreign missions and international obligations of Canada's "disappeared."

CT says while there was no evidence of foreign state actor influence on the convoy, she says there was "a real underlying environment of disinformation through the two years of pandemic" that fed into it, and she says was led by foreign actors.

JC: It was a "high risk period" for the convoy to have occurred. The economy and manufacturing sector was trying to recover from pandemic, Cdn govt was trying to convince the U.S. that Canada was a serious and reliable partner. (His suggestion was that was at risk.)

Convoy lawyer Brendan Miller cross-exam, suggests it was really just a matter of inconvenience for a few diplomats.
CT disputes that, says it wasn't just a matter of inconvenience, it was about convention obligation to protect them.

Miller says there were only 5 assault charges, and says you have no evidence that any diplomat was assaulted, or threatened.
She agrees, but says it was always a concern.

Miller says it's not like the FLQ crisis where a diplomat (Brit James Cross) was kidnapped and threatened with murder? You just feared they'd be threatened.
She again points to the Geneva convention obligations to protect diplomats, & they were aware what Ottawa residents faced.

Pressed by Miller about overblown reputational fears, CT says, "We were actually very concerned about this country's economic security."

CT: there were actually concerns about US funding through the platforms.
Miller: there's nothing illegal about a Cdn donating to an American cause or charity, and nothing illegal about an American donating to a Cdn one.

CT: it was the matter of the illegal aspects ..that we were concerned about.
Miller asks what those were.
CT: a question better directed to other witnesses.

Testimony done today but much discussion around the firehose of documents for parties.
Adjourned.