#October7Surprise China’s domestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) industry is perhaps the most overlooked party to the October 7 export control package.
A Thread.
I wrote about the overall semiconductor industry in China, government strategies and policies, including the tool maker segment here: americanaffairsjournal.org/2021/02/the-fu…
As @JPKleinhans and @JohnLee laid out nicely in their piece here: thediplomat.com/2021/09/mappin… Chinese domestic tool makers are well behind global counterparts, which is not surprising given their late entry to the market, and innovative capacity of US, Dutch, and Japanese leaders.
The new US controls are designed to both slow the domestic Chinese tool making industry, and prevent workarounds by extending US persons requirements to semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
One of new key areas of controlled US person support activities is aimed squarely at newly controlled SME intended for use in producing advanced node semiconductors + software/hardware/technology required for the development or production of such equipment, now also controlled.
The US persons support control has already forced Chinese companies to begin looking for domestic alternatives to Applied Materials, Lam, and KLA, YMTC China’s largest memory chip maker, has issued at least 20 tenders for a broad range of chipmaking equipment.
Also, while YMTC has not cancelled or postponed already placed equipment orders, the company has suspended any plans to expand. CXMT, YMTC’s smaller rival focused on DRAM, has also put some expansion plans on hold.
“The current strategy is that if there is workable domestic semiconductor production equipment, even though [the suppliers] need help, we will buy from Chinese companies. If not, we shop from non-US vendors, mostly Japanese,” said a senior YMTC engineer. ft.com/content/01bd6d…
To make matters worse, Chinese chip producer loss of access to certain US-made tools has stopped majority of construction projects for production facilities that drive domestic SME market. There are more than a dozen new fabs under construction in China that could be affected.
Chinese equipment makers thus face a double whammy. In addition to expansion plans put on hold, they also rely on imports of key semiconductors to make the equipment that makes semiconductors.
“Only the assembly part of our products is completely based in China, while the rest requires foreign technology and components . . . just limitations on components can easily choke us,” said a senior engineer at AMEC.
The future mix of SME available in China from foreign + domestic sources will depend in large part on ability of US officials to convince the Dutch and Japanese governments to implement similar restrictions on their leading SME firms, such as ASML and TEL. ft.com/content/4a060f…
Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC) and Naura Technology Group manufacture a range of semiconductor production systems, including oxidation, epitaxy, laser annealing, etching, and chemical vapor deposition (CVD) systems.
In addition, Chinese tool makers face a major potential brain drain, as engineers seek higher-paying jobs in semiconductor design houses and manufacturers. The current complex situation facing these firms is also forcing them to collaborate to seek solutions.
Highlights how new rule differs from other U.S. export controls: it applies to commercial items like SME that are used at stages farther upstream in production chain than traditionally covered by multilateral controls more directly related to production of military systems/WMD.
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ICYMI US policymakers could be alienating the Chinese AI researchers they want to attract - Protocol protocol.com/enterprise/us-…
Profit goals and nationalistic rhetoric clouded the collaborative environment that helped advance U.S. AI research. Now the goodwill fostered among Chinese students eager to study in the U.S. could be faltering.
The researcher suggested that claims of the Chinese government’s control over AI research and development were exaggerated. It would be “impossible” for the government to fund the thousands of research papers submitted by Chinese researchers to global AI conferences each year.
China’s chip equipment makers struggle to profit at home from US export controls ft.com/content/01bd6d…
Since Washington introduced sweeping restrictions on October 7 to limit Chinese companies’ ability to obtain or manufacture advanced computer chips, YMTC, China’s largest memory chip maker, has issued at least 20 tenders for a broad range of chipmaking equipment.
“The current strategy is that if there is workable domestic semiconductor production equipment, even though [the suppliers] need help, we will buy from Chinese companies. If not, we shop from non-US vendors, mostly Japanese,” said a senior YMTC engineer.
Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China | The White House whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
Biden reiterated that this competition should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication.
The two leaders discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals and tasked their teams to discuss them further.
Deja vu all over again from November call a year ago: staff to develop more lines of communication.
Biden’s Chip Curbs Outdo Trump in Forcing World to Align on China
The mood in Japan’s government, meanwhile, was said by an official to be one of bemusement that its sovereignty could be so disregarded. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Rutte said. “We should not be naïve,” he added. “Discussing the issue of tech and also the export of the latest technology itself is a legitimate debate which we have amongst our partners.”
There’s a sense in Japan that US companies will manage to continue to do business with China while others suffer. One complaint was the controls will spur Beijing to advance its chip technology, leaving the US and China strengthened and everyone else at a disadvantage.
Medeiros: “Will both leaders discuss, even implicitly, the terms of coexistence amid competition? Or, by default, will they let loose the dogs of unconstrained rivalry?” nytimes.com/2022/11/12/wor…
Pentagon's Kahl: Chinese leaders have “been much more willing to signal that this thing is edging toward an alliance as opposed to just a superficial partnership.” Mr. Biden seems doubtful. “I don’t think there’s a lot of respect that China has for Russia or Putin,” he said.
Summits on neutral ground, like this one in Bali ahead of the Group of 20 meeting of leaders, have an increasingly Cold War feel: more about managing potential conflict than finding common ground.
#October7Surprise Prospects for China getting around Oct 7 controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment by enticing non-US vendors and governments to go against US preferences.
Thread 🧵
As the very insightful @fudaoge notes, the de-Americanization option for foreign vendors is a tough one, and is caught by the US persons provisions added to 2018 ECRA but now weaponized: chinatechtales.wordpress.com/2022/11/06/as-…
Then there is the question of whether Japanese players would be willing to really fall on their sword on this one, including possibly going against METI. Already Tokyo Electron is putting out figures for losses resulting from controls in China: asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/…