On Nov 19th I did a thread on the Przewdow missile strike making the case it wasn't a Ukrainian missile and I mentioned a radar & electronic warfare angle I didn't address.
The thing about being one of the few people who have researched General MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters is you learn all the old tricks with mechanically rotating antenna radars like that on the 1977 vintage E-3 Sentry AWACS APY-1.
A radar design fielded in 1977 is a lot closer to 1945 than 2022.
Both phased arrays and mechanically scanned antennas were 36 (+) years old when the APY-1 was fielded 45 years ago.
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The primary weakness of a mechanically rotated radar antenna is dwell time. The radar beam is only looking the right way a fraction of every revolution.
This fact can be exploited for both gain intelligence on radar, like the USMC did at Okinawa in 1945, or to spoof direction 4/
...finding on a radar with active decoys by imitating the detection beam of a rotating radar antenna (see photo).
The Westinghouse APY-1 was designed & implemented in the early 1970's during the shift from discrete transistor devices to integrated circuit chips that enabled
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...the use programmable software for consistent pulse doppler detection.
It was also given a radar beam shape with very small 'side lobes' to defeat 1960's jamming.
The pulse doppler effect the APY-1 exploits is an artifact of the reflection of energy waves from an object to calculate speed. An approaching object compresses sound or radio waves. A departing object stretches them.
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And an object going perpendicular to a radar beam is undetectable by pulse doppler techniques.
The APY-1 radar on the E-3 Sentry had to be programed with a relatively high pulse doppler floor because of how fast Germans drove their cars on autobahns. 8/
The Soviet and now Russian military has known all of what I've laid out for the APY-1 radar for 40 odd years.
You can't classify radar physics, rotating antennas or German autobahn car speeds.
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All of the previous tweets were a build up to this map of a possible 5V55K missile shot trajectory from Belarus.
Simply flying parallel to the border is going to reduce the doppler shift an APY-1 or APY-2 (same radar w/sea search) on an E-3 Sentry. 10/
The dogleg you see at the end is plotted over a Ukrainian SAM base using the 5N63 FLAP LID to direct it.
That velocity bleeding turn would have generated a large doppler return from the 5V55V nose seeker antenna for the APY-1 to track & also resulted in a smaller crater.
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The S-300 can launch the 5V55K missile in the 4.5 seconds of every six when the APY-1 isn't looking and then command it to fly s-curve trajectories when the E-3 radar beam is looking to reduce the detectable doppler shift.
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The Track Via Missile command uplink of the Patriot connected to a late Cold War era electronic warfare system could pull this off versus an AWACS type plane with a rotating antenna.
US Military just never thought of it because it had plenty laser and now GPS guided bombs. 12/
The Russians in the 21st Century with their TVM missile uplinks -- and empty guided bomb and tactical ballistic missile inventories in the middle of this war -- certainly can.
Different militaries having the same technology can and do use that technology very differently.
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This was one of the biggest lessons of watching Imperial Japanese radar development in WW2 through Section 22's reports.
It was an important lesson suppressed by the Joint Chiefs after WW2 and not relearned in the 80 odd years since then.
The first was the UK's Operation Outward. It was noticed after a windstorm during 1940's Battle of Britain that barrage balloons dragging severed cables under them caused shorts on power lines, damaging the power grid in occupied Europe.
This would be the 2nd reported downing of a Tu-22M by an S-200. The earlier Tu-22M being in December 2023.
It looks like these Tu-22M are still using Soviet era EW suites which were not geared against the S-200 C-Band, 100 KW, 5N62 Square Pair FMCW tracker/illuminator. 2/
Between ~1996 and 2005, most FMTV trucks accepted by DCMA for the US Army had my signature on the truck property forms along with my DSN phone number.
I got three or four calls in Sealy Texas from NCO's in Iraq trying to score ballistic composite glass armor because they stopped these EFP attacks⬇️
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DCMA Sealy was getting photos from contractor relatives of bombed FMTV's with sheet metal armor and receiving IED damaged trucks to get rebuilt.
You could tell the blast damage from how the windows were missing and the roofs were bowed at the top.
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When you pulled out the stowage boxes in the cabs there were usually spent 5.56mm or 7.62mm brass casings...
Or SAM hunters can use a weather balloons with a set of commercial off the shelf ELINT and thermal imaging sensors - connected via a smartphone - hanging underneath to listen for radars and look for SAM missile launches 24/7.
The world has changed.
(I wonder if the Houthi are doing this balloon surveillance trick to the Western merchantmen?🤔)
The thing that has deeply bothered me about this RuAF Tsar-shed tank with jammer and the earlier "Pallet Jammer" tank is the complete lack in any public analysis of the mention of Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).
You can't throw radio-electronic systems together and expect them to work properly.
EMC🧵
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I have spend too many hours on too many days outside an Anechoic RF chamber with EMC test procedures and fiddly oscilloscopes to miss the fact that the drone jamming systems the Russians have deployed on tanks in Ukraine are missing such testing.
Corrugated steel doesn't an effective R/F ground plane make.🙄
Ukrainian reports claim four FPV drones were stopped by the "Pallet Jammer" tank while the fifth managed to immobilize the tank for later capture and analysis.
There were some claims that this 5th drone was immune from jamming