Thread by @John_A_Ridge

A 🧵with some detailed takeaways from this infographic and some of my thoughts:
0/n

https://twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1594998365170896896

A) No numbers are provided for Iskander-K (9M728/9M729 [SS-C-7/SS-C-8]) ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), the Kh-59 [AS-13 Kingbolt/AS-18 Kazoo] air-to-surface missiles, or the Tochka-U [SS-21 Scarab-B] ballistic missiles (BMs).
1/15

B) 🇷🇺 is averaging production of 26-28 units of cruise missiles per month (50/50 Kh-101 [AS-23 Kodiak] and 3M-14T/K Kalibr [SS-N-30A])
C) 🇷🇺 is averaging production of ~5 units of Iskander-M [SS-26 Stone] BMs per month. This is consistent with other independent estimates.
2/15

D) 🇷🇺 is averaging production of 1-2 units of Kh-47M2 Kinzhal [AS-24 Killjoy] per month and has replenished all units expended
E) 🇷🇺 has expended ~16 Kinzhals. This is more than I thought as I had only seen references to 4 Kinzhal strikes, one of which was a dud on launch.
3/15

F) 🇷🇺 has used the Kh-35 [AS-20 Kayak/SS-C-6 Sennight/SS-N-25 Switchblade] extensively in a land-attack role, which is news to me. The Kh-35 is an anti-shipping missile (AShM) with a secondary land-attack capability. 🇺🇦's R-360 Neptun AShM is derived from the Kh-35.
4/15

G) 🇷🇺 seems to have surprisingly robust Kh-35 production, averaging ~40 units per month, and they have been able to replace all units expended thus far.
5/15

H) There is no production of new Kh-555 [AS-15 Kent-C] units. This seems consistent with the notion that they are upgraded from Kh-55 [AS-15 Kent] units. The lack of noted production may also indicate that 🇷🇺 is no longer actively upgrading Kh-55 units to Kh-555s.
6/15

I) 🇷🇺 has a larger inventory and expended fewer units of 3M55 Oniks [SS-N-16 Strobile], a supersonic AShM, than I expected. Perhaps it's an indicator of poor performance in land-attack, presumably due to an ill-suited terminal guidance system (just INS + ARH/PRH)?
7/15

J) 🇷🇺 seems to be holding a number of units of Kh-22/32 [AS-4 Kitchen] supersonic AShMs in reserve for whatever reason. Not sure what the reasoning is. Perhaps poor performance as a result of a severe lack of precision in a land-attack role?
8/15

K) Standard Cruise/Ballistic Missile Inventory: IF these numbers are accurate, 🇷🇺 only has ~500 total Kh-101s, Kh-555s, and Kalibrs left. IOW, 🇷🇺 only has ~500 of its standard cruise missiles currently in inventory. That becomes ~620 if we include the Kh-22/32s.
9/15

For ballistic missiles, 🇷🇺 only has a total of ~160 left (~120 Iskander-Ms & ~40 Kinzhals). That gives ~780 total standoff munitions based on this figure. This is almost certainly an undercount due to Iskander-K numbers not being included.
10/15

For a more conservative estimate, I would round to ~1,000 land-attack standoff munitions (assuming ~120 Iskander-K GLCMs plus a fudge factor of 100 units of arbitrary munitions). There is also the matter of the Kh-59s, so the actual number may be somewhat greater.
11/15

L) I'm skeptical that we will see significant future use of 🇷🇺's remaining inventory of Iskander-Ms and Kinzhals. I suspect that 🇷🇺 will withhold most of them as part of a minimum strategic reserve to preserve their capabilities as part of their tactical nuclear triad.
12/15

M) If these numbers are accurate, the upshot of K and L is that it seems 🇷🇺 does not have the capability to launch many more saturation strikes against 🇺🇦. Based on the Nov. 15 strikes, it takes at least 100 CMs for 🇷🇺 to achieve any degree of saturation of 🇺🇦 AD.
13/15

Even with ~100 CMs, saturation was minimal as 🇺🇦 intercepted 80-85%, a small decrease compared to the usual 90-95%. So unless 🇷🇺 just accepts 90-95% intercepted, they will have to use 100+ CMs to attempt saturation. But 🇷🇺 inventory can only support 5-6 more such strikes.
14/15

N) Given K, L, and M, I anticipate that land-attack S-300/400 interceptors (e.g. 5V55 series) will be one of the main future threats. This is due to the massive number remaining in 🇷🇺 inventory plus the difficulty their (quasi)-ballistic trajectories pose to 🇺🇦 AD systems.
15/15