Some observations on China crude imports, storage levels and product consumption.
Short thread...
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Basics first:
China's baseline crude imports are 10.5mbpd (pipe & seaborne).
It has an apparent consumption of up to 14.8mbpd which it satisfies from additional 4.1mbpd of its own production (on- and offshore) and storage (if need be).
In 2020, China imported 11.3mbpd (1.2 more than 2019) to take advantage of distressed prices until storage went tank-top. That was "peak China".
YTD 2022, it's at 10.2mbpd, 0.5mbpd below 2021.
Note how it dropped EU crude to add 200kbpd Urals?
3/n
So China loves cheaper but not more crude!
China's procurement strategy, dictated by a fine-tuned CCP quota system, is an intentional endeavor.
There’s a two-decade effort to diversify not just its oil import sources but also its trading routes to enhance energy security.
4/
In that strategy, Russian imports are maxed out at or 20% of total imports but preferrably at 16%.
Evidence of that are RUS Oct imports, down 200kbpd & reversing elevated purchases bw April - Sept.
China however bought more KSA in Oct to match 2021. Relations matter!
5/n
Can China buy more RUS crude to replenish SPRs?
Some, yes, but highly unlikely. More precisely, it could add 56mb to max out 403mb of SPR storage which is 86% full currently. That leaves aside crude quality needs, if any.
6/n Source: Kayrros
There is more: China likes to negotiate for the right deal.
Think about that: The commercial negotiations for the ESPO oil pipeline contract took the 2 countries 15 years! Here some colour.
Meanwhile, China's storage is increasing again from elevated purchases in Sept, Oct & Nov while higher demand remains below such increased imports.
In case you haven't noticed: that is not bullish.
8/n Source: Kayrros
Nov consumption numbers are yet to arrive but higher real time imports & storage suggest runs were in line with 14.4mbpd in Sept to explain 1.2mbpd builds for past 3 weeks.
Did product stocks go down? Answer: IDK. Energy Aspects had them unchanged in Oct.
7/n
What is however noticable is that Q3 2022 refining margins were nil - that is gross margins!
That is the first time since we can measure it to see such depressed margins - not an incentive to push runs even in China's largely state-controlled context.
8/n
Meanwhile, the rise in confirmed cases has now increased "Chinese oil demand at risk from lockdowns" to nearly 40% in mid-October (Figure 6).
That said, EA expect a slightly more permissive zero-Covid regime from November, comparable to June–August levels. Who knows.
9/n
More policy easing may be expected after the People's Congress in March, but even if Beijing begins to deploy more efficient vaccines (big if) by then, it will still require at 3 quarters to achieve a sufficient vaccination rate before a full reopening. Expect little.
10/n
So where I sit, China has 200kbpd room for higher jet consumption vs Sept in Q4 and otherwise this "reopening theatre" has played out and is priced in - at least on the crude import side that is..!
1) oil on water (includes floating storage) and oil in transit well surpassed Covid levels.
Part of it reflects inefficiency of the sanctioned Russian & Iranian oil trade as well as the recent US sanctions on Rosneft & Lukoil.
Part of it is an outright bearish oil market = too many barrels chasing too few buyers -> needs lower prices.
2/n: Oil in transit
2) Weak Chinese petroleum product consumption:
China is in recession due to its property bust and despite the CCPs desire to steer clear of it by forcing every other industry to build what isn’t required domestically (overcapacity issue) and then dump goods onto global trade.
Because of the latter most observers still don’t get the painful economic status China is in. But China is in it.
Also, the CCP prefers coal fuelled transportation as well as LNG truck driving for the purpose of geopolitics.
Both requires less, not more, diesel and gasoline in 2026 vs 2025. Jet and Naphtha are different story but won’t drive oil buying by refineries => Oil demand by 2nd largest economy globally is bearish. Accept.
However, the CCP may take the absurd to the next level in 2026 and force refineries to build even more floating-roof oil tank storage (as part of meeting an artificial Soviet 2.0 plan within its Investment-led Growth Model) in which case refineries may buy more oil next year, but not for the purpose of producing more petroleum products but solely for storages. If they do so, however, their crude oil buying will be EXTREMELY price sensitive.
Time and State companies oil quotas will tell.
PS: If u care to understand China’s property bust structurally, here is a link to my 7 part Stack series. It remains as valid then as now.
Let me add a few more facts & figures and some high level observations about the United States goods trade deficits with Switzerland of some $20bn annually.
The Swiss government and certain companies have little reason to lament—these tariffs were foreseeable.
Yes, the real issue is their scale: 39% compared to Europe’s 15%, which clearly puts some Swiss exports at a competitive disadvantage. It is what it is.
And while I still believe this situation is fixable, we must be prepared for the worst-case scenario to persist—or even worsen, with potential new tariffs on pharmaceuticals (currently exempted).
So, who is at fault? As some of us learned in officer school during military service: the Bundesrat misjudged the fundamentals of strategic assessment—Lagebeurteilung (judgement of enemy situation). That needs to be addressed. Trump wants balanced trade. Address it. Period.
History is not kind to those who choose dreams over reality—or to the weak who paint themselves as victims.
Therefore, whether Trump’s trade deficit logic makes any sense whatsoever (which it clearly doesn't in the Swiss case) is beside the point.
He’s the president. He has communicated his views clearly and consistently for decades. Adapt. Take the man seriously.
Trustworthy or not, as lamented by President Keller Sutter is none of our business.
2/n @SecScottBessent @BobgonzaleBob
Let’s now take a closer look at Switzerland’s goods trade surplus with the United States.
At Burggraben, we rely on the OEC tool (a paywalled MIT spin-off) for robust global trade data as part of our investment analysis process of all sorts—so we can assess this with confidence. I hope our readers will appreciate the data quality shared herewith for free.
While the annual trade surplus has fluctuated in recent years, the underlying—or let’s call it intrinsic—gap consistently hovers around $20 billion, as the data below will show.
More concretely, Iran likely enriched some 250kg of HEU stockpiles since 2021. Worse, it also said to adds significant new capacities.
That material so far could quickly be turned into the fuel for the equivalent of 10 bombs, should Iran’s leadership take the political decision to pursue weapons, according to Bloomberg.
Here is my theory how the major incident - a so called blackout - occurred at 12:30 CET today in the power system of Spain & Portugal:
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At the time of the incident, Spain and Portugal operated the grid at very high renewables share of about 66% - i.e solar (55%) and wind (11%; eolica)
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While this isn’t unusual for Spain, it does mean that the grid operates with little inertia (resistance to change) during such time. The grid is therefore vulnerable to external effects…!
On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
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What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).