The difficulty of stopping the grey market electronic component trade to Russia doesn't mean it should not be tried.
It can and should be.
The issue is how difficult, costly, and unreliable sanctions can make the supply chain for Russian high tech weapons.
2/n
Production lines need parts at a rate that can support production.
Simply making it so that the full build of materials needed for a finished drone or missile are highly irregular in showing will have the same sort of effect as strategic bombing.
You reduce both the total
3/n
...number built and their quality because incomplete drones, missiles or vehicles will accumulate awaiting that one chip needed to complete them.
Then you have to dig through multiple levels of sub-components to install that electronic fiddly bit to make what Russia is
4/n
...producing work.
And the very act of removing things to get to that one spot on a printed circuit board to install a chip will introduce some amount of electro-static discharge (ESD) damage whenever the Russian worker doing isn't being *very* careful.
5/n
Economic sanctions are a form of "Attrition Warfare."
The point of sanctions isn't about "It must be be perfect or it is a failure."
It is about making the target of sanction work harder and pay more to achieve a specific economic or military capability.
6/n
Sanctions targeting commercial electronic components found in Russian weapons won't stop the grey trade
What it will do is force Russia to pay grey market dealers a "Risk Premium" to get the electronics & make their consistent delivery to support a production line impossible
7/n
A recent post on Strategypage-dot-com made clear the western component problem & China's sensitivity to the risk of secondary sanctions.
Russia's gangster state's biggest weakness is its inability to effectively administer complicated supply chains.
Everyone steals, everyone lies, everyone gets a piece of the grift and few are punished for doing so.
9/n
Western sanctions on commercial electronics push Russia's military supply chain farther into 'Grey Zone' where there are more opportunities for traditional Russian theft, lies and taking a percentage.
This is why "Attrition" is often called the strongest form of warfare.
10/10
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This is an interesting development on a number of levels. As in, TRLG 230 has the same "legs" (range) as a GMLRS-ER.
So Ukraine now has multiple sources of guided rocket deep strike capability. This means political pressure by any one supplier to negotiate 'land for peace'
This is really good advertising for Turkish high tech weapons for nations on the West's export control lists.
Another possibility is we are seeing a cover story for use of the Luchs 300 mm Vilkha-M.
2/4
Whether we are looking at a Turkish TRLG 230, a US GMLRS-ER or a indigenous Ukrainian Vilkha-M.
A missile with the reach shown in the @DefMon3 map means all of Russia's truck, train and Sea of Azov port logistics north of Crimea in Southern Ukraine are under AFU's thumb.
3/4
On Nov 19th I did a thread on the Przewdow missile strike making the case it wasn't a Ukrainian missile and I mentioned a radar & electronic warfare angle I didn't address.
The thing about being one of the few people who have researched General MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters is you learn all the old tricks with mechanically rotating antenna radars like that on the 1977 vintage E-3 Sentry AWACS APY-1.
The missile attack on Przewodow has become a Rorschach test for how strong the West’s de-escalation faction’s "directed cognition" is in dealing with Reality in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The “It was a Ukrainian missile” narrative doesn't match reality. This🧵will explain
1/
...why.
**Directed cognition, in rough layman terms, means making a quick & incorrect analysis from limited data and only picking more data to support that analysis.
The way to cure a directed cognition conclusion is to audit all the available data.
To do this I’m going to walk you through 5V55K missile design, fuzing, weapon effects, and some Ukrainian evidence. I'm going to leave radar & electronic warfare for another thread.
Below are infographics of the 5V55K & a data table. 3/
The irony of Biden Administration National Security Advisor Sullivan's 'de-escalation' phobia about not letting Ukraine receive the 55 NATO Mig-29's has come home to roost.
Sullivan's role in preventing adequate PSU fighter air defense may well lead to a NATO escalation from 1/6
This loss of fuel for Russia's Crimean based aviation accelerated the Siege of Kherson's right bank by denying the VKS the closely based fuel it needed to contest Ukrainian air superiority.
This loss means a great deal for the Ukrainian Navy's Neptune ASCM launchers.
3/