Thread by @MarkHertling

Good military units will conduct “after action reviews” (AARs) many time during the conduct of training & operations.

AARs assess what’s happened & determine required adaptations.

Many of my followers are asking for a new Ukraine thread, but perhaps an AAR is better. 1/

Ukraine is 9 months into this fight. They're at the start of a new phase (Phase IV). Let’s review & then look at what may be ahead.

In this AAR, I’ll include past descriptions, slides I made at different times, news articles…and predict what we may need to watch.

Here goes. 2/

On 2/24 - the first night of the war - I did a twitter 🧵 on what I thought would happen.

That 🧵was based on an assessment of RUF (Russian Force) & Ukrainian Army (UA) & things gleaned from intel reports from my time in command of @USArmyEURAF 3/

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1497035826139738125?s=20&t=pSMjhSpOlCwcpEDmCU-Rbw

That 2/24 thread was also a reflection of something that helps evaluate the outcome of a conflict based on this simple formula: MC (or P) =R x W
MC is Military Capability (or Power),
R is Resources,
W is Will 4/

When one uses that formula, one must also consider the “size” of each force & their missions.

While never stated by the Kremlin, one might conclude Putin wanted to accomplish several strategic objectives. My guess on what Putin wanted to accomplish is on this slide. 5/

Any operational-level commander is required to translate Strategic Objectives into Operational Goals.

This slide depicts how I would have done that, if I were Putin’s field general, with “main efforts” and “supporting efforts.”

But there were all sorts of disconnects.6/

While RU had massive force (190k) around UKR border, it wasn’t enough to accomplish the missions they had.

Too many large cities to secure, not enuf combat power, dysfunctional logistics, no unity of command, faulty intel, poor leadership. Violations of the POW 7/

In six weeks, RU knew they had to reduce their objectives, shift their force, improve command & control (C2), fix logistics.

In my view, this started Phase II (2 April-30 July).

Unfortunately, RU could not effectively adapt. 8/

For an army to make battlefield adjustments requires good leadership, competent C2, maneuver, logistics, high morale.

RUF had none of those. UA had all of them. And new precision weapons (HIMARs, M777s) to complement the precision shoulder-fired weapons employed in Phase I. 9/

The fight in the east was not a “stalemate” as many proclaimed. It was a slugfest.

RUF tried to regenerate mauled forces & throw them back into the fight. That was foolish.

Based on good intel, UAF moved (& maneuvered) to counter RUF & take back land. 10/

Then, things started to get very interesting. UA started to beat back the RUF in the NE.

In late July thru October, I was paying close attention to 4 different areas (using this focus) map.

A UA counterattack combined with a succesful deception effort caught RUF off guard. 11/

The start of Phase III in July achieved key UA military operational objectives by early Nov.

The battle of Bakhmut in the Donbas & the operational maneuver in Kherson will rank w/ the battles for Kyiv & Mariupol at the start of this war as critical victories for Ukraine. 11/

Here's what were the main points of Phase III 12/

Which brings us to Phase IV.

Here are a couple of thoughts:

-RU may attempt to create another “frozen conflict” in eastern & southern Ukraine that mirror Transnistra, Nagorno-Karbakh, South Ossetia/Abkazia... 13/

...they will do that in an attempt to gain a pause to rebuild their force and attack again. UKR & the west should not fall for this ruse.
-RUF will continue their failed attempts at mobilization, and it will not make a difference. Nor will any support from Belarus. 14/

-RU will get more support from Iran, and will incorporate more strategic aircraft with long-range missile launches.
-Primary RU focus is continued destruction of UKR infrastructure & the suffering of the Ukrainian people as a strategic objective to gain concessions. 14/

-Ukrainian morale will be tested with continued RUF attacks against civilian infrastructure…but UKR will persevere.
-UA will slowly grow in capabilities, but a continued maneuver east of the Dnipro River & into RU occupied Donbas will prove to be a much tougher fights. 15/

The UA fights in the east & south will be tougher due to several factors:
-more difficult terrain (rivers and routes)
-longer supply lines
-an attempt to simultaneously incorporate ever new weapons & tactics (it is VERY difficult to fielding equipment while in combat). 16/

Additionally, while RUF are badly bruised, they are not completely beaten...and their defensive positions (and indirect fires) are stiffening. Shorter frontages, more green troops, shorter supply lines.

Some have asked: when will this end?
Hard to say, but it won't be soon.17/

But here are some of the things I'll be watching in "Phase IV." 18/

There will be more military and economic aid from the US and the West. Any US GOP house action to slow or stall this MUST be quickly defeated.

There will be continued war crimes by RU and RUFs directed at UKR civilians. RU will not win any military contests with UA forces. 19/

RU must NOT be allowed to create another "frozen conflicts" with shifty attempts at cease fires.

Ukraine will still win this fight, regain their territory and sovereignty.

But there's lots of fighting ahead. 20/20