MarkHertling Profile picture
Nov 24 22 tweets 6 min read
Good military units will conduct “after action reviews” (AARs) many time during the conduct of training & operations.

AARs assess what’s happened & determine required adaptations.

Many of my followers are asking for a new Ukraine thread, but perhaps an AAR is better. 1/
Ukraine is 9 months into this fight. They're at the start of a new phase (Phase IV). Let’s review & then look at what may be ahead.

In this AAR, I’ll include past descriptions, slides I made at different times, news articles…and predict what we may need to watch.

Here goes. 2/
On 2/24 - the first night of the war - I did a twitter 🧵 on what I thought would happen.

That 🧵was based on an assessment of RUF (Russian Force) & Ukrainian Army (UA) & things gleaned from intel reports from my time in command of @USArmyEURAF 3/
That 2/24 thread was also a reflection of something that helps evaluate the outcome of a conflict based on this simple formula: MC (or P) =R x W
MC is Military Capability (or Power),
R is Resources,
W is Will 4/
When one uses that formula, one must also consider the “size” of each force & their missions.

While never stated by the Kremlin, one might conclude Putin wanted to accomplish several strategic objectives. My guess on what Putin wanted to accomplish is on this slide. 5/
Any operational-level commander is required to translate Strategic Objectives into Operational Goals.

This slide depicts how I would have done that, if I were Putin’s field general, with “main efforts” and “supporting efforts.”

But there were all sorts of disconnects.6/
While RU had massive force (190k) around UKR border, it wasn’t enough to accomplish the missions they had.

Too many large cities to secure, not enuf combat power, dysfunctional logistics, no unity of command, faulty intel, poor leadership. Violations of the POW 7/
In six weeks, RU knew they had to reduce their objectives, shift their force, improve command & control (C2), fix logistics.

In my view, this started Phase II (2 April-30 July).

Unfortunately, RU could not effectively adapt. 8/
For an army to make battlefield adjustments requires good leadership, competent C2, maneuver, logistics, high morale.

RUF had none of those. UA had all of them. And new precision weapons (HIMARs, M777s) to complement the precision shoulder-fired weapons employed in Phase I. 9/
The fight in the east was not a “stalemate” as many proclaimed. It was a slugfest.

RUF tried to regenerate mauled forces & throw them back into the fight. That was foolish.

Based on good intel, UAF moved (& maneuvered) to counter RUF & take back land. 10/
Then, things started to get very interesting. UA started to beat back the RUF in the NE.

In late July thru October, I was paying close attention to 4 different areas (using this focus) map.

A UA counterattack combined with a succesful deception effort caught RUF off guard. 11/
The start of Phase III in July achieved key UA military operational objectives by early Nov.

The battle of Bakhmut in the Donbas & the operational maneuver in Kherson will rank w/ the battles for Kyiv & Mariupol at the start of this war as critical victories for Ukraine. 11/
Here's what were the main points of Phase III 12/
Which brings us to Phase IV.

Here are a couple of thoughts:

-RU may attempt to create another “frozen conflict” in eastern & southern Ukraine that mirror Transnistra, Nagorno-Karbakh, South Ossetia/Abkazia... 13/
...they will do that in an attempt to gain a pause to rebuild their force and attack again. UKR & the west should not fall for this ruse.
-RUF will continue their failed attempts at mobilization, and it will not make a difference. Nor will any support from Belarus. 14/
-RU will get more support from Iran, and will incorporate more strategic aircraft with long-range missile launches.
-Primary RU focus is continued destruction of UKR infrastructure & the suffering of the Ukrainian people as a strategic objective to gain concessions. 14/
-Ukrainian morale will be tested with continued RUF attacks against civilian infrastructure…but UKR will persevere.
-UA will slowly grow in capabilities, but a continued maneuver east of the Dnipro River & into RU occupied Donbas will prove to be a much tougher fights. 15/
The UA fights in the east & south will be tougher due to several factors:
-more difficult terrain (rivers and routes)
-longer supply lines
-an attempt to simultaneously incorporate ever new weapons & tactics (it is VERY difficult to fielding equipment while in combat). 16/
Additionally, while RUF are badly bruised, they are not completely beaten...and their defensive positions (and indirect fires) are stiffening. Shorter frontages, more green troops, shorter supply lines.

Some have asked: when will this end?
Hard to say, but it won't be soon.17/
But here are some of the things I'll be watching in "Phase IV." 18/
There will be more military and economic aid from the US and the West. Any US GOP house action to slow or stall this MUST be quickly defeated.

There will be continued war crimes by RU and RUFs directed at UKR civilians. RU will not win any military contests with UA forces. 19/
RU must NOT be allowed to create another "frozen conflicts" with shifty attempts at cease fires.

Ukraine will still win this fight, regain their territory and sovereignty.

But there's lots of fighting ahead. 20/20

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More from @MarkHertling

Nov 15
It's right to analyze the explosion/strike near the Polish town of Przewodow before making accusations.

There won't be any conclusive evidence of the type of missile or where it came from until a thorough "bomb damage assessment (BDA)" is complete. 1/

nytimes.com/2022/11/14/wor…
But looking at the map in this @nytimes article shows
1) how close the strike is to the Polish border
2) how close the strike is to the Ukrainian town of Lviv
3) while it's not shown on the map, how close the strike is to the Ukrainian military base at Yavoriv, NW of Lviv. 2/
One must also considered
1) RU missiles (even "precision" ones) have shown to be VERY inaccurate
2) Most UKR mid-range air defense is near the front lines (& short range AD would not cause the type explosion shown on film)
3) BDA will revel pieces of whatever hit the ground. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Nov 11
Happy Veterans' Day!

I've had this photo hanging in my office everyday since 2004 as a reminder of what we ask of our military. Let me tell the story in a short 🧵.

It's a picture of a soldier from the 173d Airborne Brigade.
He had just parachuted in on a mission. 1/4
When most see it, they are appalled by the soldier's load. And yes, that's what they carry into combat.

But look closer...

It's hard to see, but he has a comrade right next to him. Soldiers always have "battle buddies" to help them through the tough times. 2/
He looks exhausted. He likely is. But the load is more than physical.

Looking at his face, there's more to his load.
-Is it the mission?
-Is he wondering if he'll live up to expectations of his troopers?
-Is he concerned about his family back home? 3/
Read 4 tweets
Nov 11
@soledadobrien @CNN Basically, Kherson is a critically important piece of terrain due to major roads (from Rostov in Russia to Odesa and beyond), wide rivers, important bridges, and ability to control access to Crimea. RU army made a bad operational mistake of moving forces beyond their ability.. 1/
@soledadobrien @CNN …to resupply. They also made the mistake of attempting to establish a RU government w/o the adequate supply of troops to “secure” cities in the Oblast. But the biggest mistake was pushing 40k troops across the Dnipro River. Without going into tactical details…2/
@soledadobrien @CNN …the RU Army was split on two sides of a wide river without resupply capabilities, and the UA blew bridges behind them…then maneuvered to surround they forces who had their backs to the river (tough to escape). The RU move is similar to the mistakes German forces made…3/
Read 4 tweets
Nov 9
Lots of commentary on RU withdrawal from Kherson & potential for UA capturing equipment & personnel.

Yes. Watching RU activities in this Oblast since about 3 Oct, was predictable.

Plus, from experience an enemy's withdrawal provides many opportunities. 1/6
Please know that armies can gain a great deal of intelligence from an enemy's withdrawal.

The UA has great intelligence gathering and that capability is supplemented by its partners & allies.

They won't be fooled. They'll know if RU action is a "ruse" or "feint." 2/
A real (or a fake) RU withdrawal from Kherson will provide a lot of intelligence.

Intel will consist of new targets, signal intercepts, routes, new locations for assembly areas and supply caches, and things "left behind" that will indicate the capabilities of those who left. 3/
Read 6 tweets
Oct 30
Last week, @SpyTalker published a solid piece commenting on how RU's lack of an NCO Corps were the chief cause of failure in UKR.

It not the only one, but it's a huge contributor.

We'll see implications of that as winter approaches

A new 🧵 1/17

spytalk.co/p/russian-army…
I've been evaluating the actions of both sides based on something the Army calls "Warfighting Functions."

Warfighting functions are defined in an Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0. It's a group of tasks & systems commanders use as a guide to successfully accomplish missions. 2/
The Warfighting Functions provide an intellectual organization for thinking about actions of different groups in combat.

A framework of how to "see" the battlefield to determine how things "fit."

This chart comes from the manual. It's a bit "power-point-ish," but it's great. 3/
Read 17 tweets
Oct 23
The @washingtonpost was one of many reporting on @SecDef call w/ Russian MOD Shoigu.

There isn’t much substance in the reporting, because governments either don’t provide the substance or they skew what they want people to know based on their messaging.1/ washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
Having been on these kinds of contentious calls with foreign counterparts (with less at stake) sometimes it’s just feeling each other out.
The pentagon describing the call with the term “professional” tells me there was little to no significant breakthroughs. 2/
Sec Austin likely provided some pointed but nuanced communication that gave Shoigu pause. And Shoigu was likely testing Austin…and lying.

Remember, Shoigu is corrupt, a crook, a grifter, & is the guy most responsible for how poorly the Russian army is performing. 3/
Read 7 tweets

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