🧵As numerous experts argue whether the era of tanks has ended, tanks continue to play a crucial role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The dismissal of tank relevance leads to flawed conclusions that Ukraine doesn’t need tanks, which only worsens the situation.
I want to emphasize that these concepts might be irrelevant in other wars or doctrines, such as the US doctrine, which is centered around air supremacy, but the current focus is Ukraine. My analysis is based on the experience of troops on the receiving end, as well as tank crews.
Poor combined arms readiness of the Russian army, cooperation and communication issues, unsatisfactory logistics, inadequate training, and incorrect strategic and tactical use of tanks led to an opinion that tanks are no longer needed
While it’s true that at the beginning of the invasion Russia tried to use swift tank blitzkrieg and moved tank units into cities under impression that there would be little to no resistance, the situation dramatically changed since then.
The enemy has been learning from us and copied the UAV+MBT combination. The problem is that they have much more tanks, and they adapted to minimize exposure to modern AT weapons. Let’s take a closer look:
- Russia uses small quadcopters to perform reconnaissance: find and identify targets or anti-tank threats. Due to the relatively small cost of small copters, many tank units got commercial drones from volunteers and donations
- Instead of engaging in direct fire, the tank takes a covert position, avoiding the direct fire from anti-tank weaponry and staying outside of AT range or vision. This was ineffective in the past but changed completely with fire-adjustment drones.
- Some observers might question the accuracy of such a fire; however, experience tells us that with fire adjustment from the drone, tanks can accurately hit targets even 4-6 km away. Example of a methodical use:
- A tank remains an effective tool in urban warfare. When enemy infantry faced fortified positions in Mariupol multistoried buildings, covered by infantry fire, the enemy used tanks to demolish the building floor by floor
- Mines remain a major problem for tanks, but Russians use mine-clearing line charges, mine flails, artillery barrage, or a combination of both. Some German mines are quite resistant to that, but they are scarce.
Artillery strikes have limited effect on a tank unless hit it directly. Many people have seen videos where Ukrainian artillery precisely hits tanks, but they don’t see hundreds of unsuccessful or missed hits (survivorship bias)
- It’s great if you have precision-guided munitions, but with the frontline that stretches thousands of kilometers and involves thousands of tanks, the limited number of such munitions plays against you.
I agree that some tank doctrines are obsolete, but not a tank itself. It remains a “Swiss-army-knife” solution for many situations due to its adaptability. Any slightly modernized tank from the 80-90s can expand Ukraine’s both defensive and offensive capabilities.
It’s understandable why the general public is amused by the presence of the Russian T-62, nevertheless, its 115mm gun continues to cause destruction and kill people. AT ammo supplies are depleting, but old Russian tanks are still coming.
I think it’s time for the West to work on providing Ukraine🇺🇦 with even more guided munitions, AT means, as well as even older tanks, crew training, and logistics support, as tanks are still a major force in this war.
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With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”
The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
Thread:
2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.