🧵As numerous experts argue whether the era of tanks has ended, tanks continue to play a crucial role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The dismissal of tank relevance leads to flawed conclusions that Ukraine doesn’t need tanks, which only worsens the situation.
I want to emphasize that these concepts might be irrelevant in other wars or doctrines, such as the US doctrine, which is centered around air supremacy, but the current focus is Ukraine. My analysis is based on the experience of troops on the receiving end, as well as tank crews.
Poor combined arms readiness of the Russian army, cooperation and communication issues, unsatisfactory logistics, inadequate training, and incorrect strategic and tactical use of tanks led to an opinion that tanks are no longer needed
While it’s true that at the beginning of the invasion Russia tried to use swift tank blitzkrieg and moved tank units into cities under impression that there would be little to no resistance, the situation dramatically changed since then.
The enemy has been learning from us and copied the UAV+MBT combination. The problem is that they have much more tanks, and they adapted to minimize exposure to modern AT weapons. Let’s take a closer look:
- Russia uses small quadcopters to perform reconnaissance: find and identify targets or anti-tank threats. Due to the relatively small cost of small copters, many tank units got commercial drones from volunteers and donations
- Instead of engaging in direct fire, the tank takes a covert position, avoiding the direct fire from anti-tank weaponry and staying outside of AT range or vision. This was ineffective in the past but changed completely with fire-adjustment drones.
- Some observers might question the accuracy of such a fire; however, experience tells us that with fire adjustment from the drone, tanks can accurately hit targets even 4-6 km away. Example of a methodical use:
- A tank remains an effective tool in urban warfare. When enemy infantry faced fortified positions in Mariupol multistoried buildings, covered by infantry fire, the enemy used tanks to demolish the building floor by floor
- Mines remain a major problem for tanks, but Russians use mine-clearing line charges, mine flails, artillery barrage, or a combination of both. Some German mines are quite resistant to that, but they are scarce.
Artillery strikes have limited effect on a tank unless hit it directly. Many people have seen videos where Ukrainian artillery precisely hits tanks, but they don’t see hundreds of unsuccessful or missed hits (survivorship bias)
- It’s great if you have precision-guided munitions, but with the frontline that stretches thousands of kilometers and involves thousands of tanks, the limited number of such munitions plays against you.
I agree that some tank doctrines are obsolete, but not a tank itself. It remains a “Swiss-army-knife” solution for many situations due to its adaptability. Any slightly modernized tank from the 80-90s can expand Ukraine’s both defensive and offensive capabilities.
It’s understandable why the general public is amused by the presence of the Russian T-62, nevertheless, its 115mm gun continues to cause destruction and kill people. AT ammo supplies are depleting, but old Russian tanks are still coming.
I think it’s time for the West to work on providing Ukraine🇺🇦 with even more guided munitions, AT means, as well as even older tanks, crew training, and logistics support, as tanks are still a major force in this war.
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According to the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, in early 2025, the Russian occupation authorities intensified forced passportization in the temporarily occupied territories.
Starting September, those refusing Russian passports will be treated as illegal immigrants:
2/ The occupied territories are seeing a surge in paramilitary programs across schools and colleges. Educational institutions are forming Yunarmiya units, cadet classes, and “military-patriotic clubs” that focus on military drills, airgun shooting, grenade throwing, survival etc
3/ According to the same report by the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, from January to June 2025, occupation authorities took at least 2,300 Ukrainian children from occupied territories to various regions of the Russian Federation.
With increasing frequency, I hear directly from soldiers, sergeants, and officers on the ground: despite proclamations from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, little has changed for them in the ground, compared with 2024. 🧵Thread:
2/ In the coming days, I intend to elaborate further. But I can already point to systemic resistance, where a clique of generals and colonels pushes back against reforms that could dilute their entrenched power - power rooted in seniority earned during the 1990s and 2000s.
3/ The organization of fortifications, defense, as well as operational command and coordination, remains weak. Efforts to build a capable corps of noncommissioned officers, critical to any modern military, have yet to materialize.
From the Barents Sea to China’s southern coast, Russia’s tanker fleet has been quietly tracked by Ukrainians. Thanks to an investigation by the analytical group Dallas Park, we now know more. With their permission, I analyzed the report and put together a thread of key takeaways:
2/ Built in 2011 and flagged in the Marshall Islands as SUEZ VASILIS, the oil tanker was reflagged to Liberia in 2021 and renamed NAUTILUS I. In November 2022, after Russia’s invasion, it changed owners, managers, flag, and name again, becoming SABLE under the Panama
3/ In November 2023, Mikhail Gushchin became the ship’s master, according to a signed contract in Primorsk, Russia. At the time, the vessel was managed by Prominent Shipmanagement Limited.
Kirill Dmitriev, who was involved in earlier talks with Witkoff, is now trying to salvage the situation. Russia always intended to escalate the war while publicly presenting pressure on Ukraine as a path to peace and de-escalation. It worked - until it didn’t. You had six months
2/ What has Russia done in the six months since it “agreed” to negotiate? It announced an offensive in Sumy (so far unsuccessful), allegedly threatened to seize multiple oblasts within 60 days (also not going well), ramped up Shahed drone strikes and presented ultimatums
3/ It’s been clear since day one of the so-called negotiations that Russia’s only goal was to persuade the current US administration to halt support for Ukraine in exchange for a facade of goodwill diplomacy aimed at a truce -- one it never intended to follow through on.
One and a half months after the successful Operation Spiderweb, which targeted and destroyed Russian strategic bombers, our latest satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still at several airfields, with the largest concentration at Belaya. A thread with updates on airbases:
2/ Additional analysis of bases such as Olenya and Engels-2, where Russian strategic bombers are deployed, shows no visible effort to reinforce the airfields. Olenya appears more cleared from debris than Belaya Airbase, but bomber wreckage remains visible on the apron.
3/ At Khalino Airbase, previously targeted by Ukrainian forces, Russian troops appear to have completed or nearly completed around 10 reinforced shelters with soil cover, 12 concrete shelters without it, and 8 hangar-style structures positioned on the aprons.