🧵As numerous experts argue whether the era of tanks has ended, tanks continue to play a crucial role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The dismissal of tank relevance leads to flawed conclusions that Ukraine doesn’t need tanks, which only worsens the situation.
I want to emphasize that these concepts might be irrelevant in other wars or doctrines, such as the US doctrine, which is centered around air supremacy, but the current focus is Ukraine. My analysis is based on the experience of troops on the receiving end, as well as tank crews.
Poor combined arms readiness of the Russian army, cooperation and communication issues, unsatisfactory logistics, inadequate training, and incorrect strategic and tactical use of tanks led to an opinion that tanks are no longer needed
While it’s true that at the beginning of the invasion Russia tried to use swift tank blitzkrieg and moved tank units into cities under impression that there would be little to no resistance, the situation dramatically changed since then.
The enemy has been learning from us and copied the UAV+MBT combination. The problem is that they have much more tanks, and they adapted to minimize exposure to modern AT weapons. Let’s take a closer look:
- Russia uses small quadcopters to perform reconnaissance: find and identify targets or anti-tank threats. Due to the relatively small cost of small copters, many tank units got commercial drones from volunteers and donations
- Instead of engaging in direct fire, the tank takes a covert position, avoiding the direct fire from anti-tank weaponry and staying outside of AT range or vision. This was ineffective in the past but changed completely with fire-adjustment drones.
- Some observers might question the accuracy of such a fire; however, experience tells us that with fire adjustment from the drone, tanks can accurately hit targets even 4-6 km away. Example of a methodical use:
- A tank remains an effective tool in urban warfare. When enemy infantry faced fortified positions in Mariupol multistoried buildings, covered by infantry fire, the enemy used tanks to demolish the building floor by floor
- Mines remain a major problem for tanks, but Russians use mine-clearing line charges, mine flails, artillery barrage, or a combination of both. Some German mines are quite resistant to that, but they are scarce.
Artillery strikes have limited effect on a tank unless hit it directly. Many people have seen videos where Ukrainian artillery precisely hits tanks, but they don’t see hundreds of unsuccessful or missed hits (survivorship bias)
- It’s great if you have precision-guided munitions, but with the frontline that stretches thousands of kilometers and involves thousands of tanks, the limited number of such munitions plays against you.
I agree that some tank doctrines are obsolete, but not a tank itself. It remains a “Swiss-army-knife” solution for many situations due to its adaptability. Any slightly modernized tank from the 80-90s can expand Ukraine’s both defensive and offensive capabilities.
It’s understandable why the general public is amused by the presence of the Russian T-62, nevertheless, its 115mm gun continues to cause destruction and kill people. AT ammo supplies are depleting, but old Russian tanks are still coming.
I think it’s time for the West to work on providing Ukraine🇺🇦 with even more guided munitions, AT means, as well as even older tanks, crew training, and logistics support, as tanks are still a major force in this war.
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Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”
The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
Thread:
2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.
Analysis: New Data Suggests Russia Is Sustaining Mi-8 Output Despite Wartime Losses
According to non-public Russian procurement documents obtained and analyzed by the Frontelligence Insight team, current Mi-8 production appears sufficient to offset wartime losses. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the Soviet era, more than 12,000 Mi-8 helicopters of all types have been produced. It’s a versatile military transport platform that can move troops, cargo, serve as a flying hospital or EW asset, and conduct attack missions with unguided rockets and 100–500 kg bombs.
3/ Correspondence between Aviafarm and ZOMZ the Defense Ministry and ZOMZ show a request for 40 IS-264A thermometers: 20 for Kazan and 20 for Ulan-Ude, where Mi-8s are produced.
Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out