🧵As numerous experts argue whether the era of tanks has ended, tanks continue to play a crucial role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The dismissal of tank relevance leads to flawed conclusions that Ukraine doesn’t need tanks, which only worsens the situation.
I want to emphasize that these concepts might be irrelevant in other wars or doctrines, such as the US doctrine, which is centered around air supremacy, but the current focus is Ukraine. My analysis is based on the experience of troops on the receiving end, as well as tank crews.
Poor combined arms readiness of the Russian army, cooperation and communication issues, unsatisfactory logistics, inadequate training, and incorrect strategic and tactical use of tanks led to an opinion that tanks are no longer needed
While it’s true that at the beginning of the invasion Russia tried to use swift tank blitzkrieg and moved tank units into cities under impression that there would be little to no resistance, the situation dramatically changed since then.
The enemy has been learning from us and copied the UAV+MBT combination. The problem is that they have much more tanks, and they adapted to minimize exposure to modern AT weapons. Let’s take a closer look:
- Russia uses small quadcopters to perform reconnaissance: find and identify targets or anti-tank threats. Due to the relatively small cost of small copters, many tank units got commercial drones from volunteers and donations
- Instead of engaging in direct fire, the tank takes a covert position, avoiding the direct fire from anti-tank weaponry and staying outside of AT range or vision. This was ineffective in the past but changed completely with fire-adjustment drones.
- Some observers might question the accuracy of such a fire; however, experience tells us that with fire adjustment from the drone, tanks can accurately hit targets even 4-6 km away. Example of a methodical use:
- A tank remains an effective tool in urban warfare. When enemy infantry faced fortified positions in Mariupol multistoried buildings, covered by infantry fire, the enemy used tanks to demolish the building floor by floor
- Mines remain a major problem for tanks, but Russians use mine-clearing line charges, mine flails, artillery barrage, or a combination of both. Some German mines are quite resistant to that, but they are scarce.
Artillery strikes have limited effect on a tank unless hit it directly. Many people have seen videos where Ukrainian artillery precisely hits tanks, but they don’t see hundreds of unsuccessful or missed hits (survivorship bias)
- It’s great if you have precision-guided munitions, but with the frontline that stretches thousands of kilometers and involves thousands of tanks, the limited number of such munitions plays against you.
I agree that some tank doctrines are obsolete, but not a tank itself. It remains a “Swiss-army-knife” solution for many situations due to its adaptability. Any slightly modernized tank from the 80-90s can expand Ukraine’s both defensive and offensive capabilities.
It’s understandable why the general public is amused by the presence of the Russian T-62, nevertheless, its 115mm gun continues to cause destruction and kill people. AT ammo supplies are depleting, but old Russian tanks are still coming.
I think it’s time for the West to work on providing Ukraine🇺🇦 with even more guided munitions, AT means, as well as even older tanks, crew training, and logistics support, as tanks are still a major force in this war.
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SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.