The difficulty of stopping the grey market electronic component trade to Russia doesn't mean it should not be tried.
It can and should be.
The issue is how difficult, costly, and unreliable sanctions can make the supply chain for Russian high tech weapons.
2/n
Production lines need parts at a rate that can support production.
Simply making it so that the full build of materials needed for a finished drone or missile are highly irregular in showing will have the same sort of effect as strategic bombing.
This is an interesting development on a number of levels. As in, TRLG 230 has the same "legs" (range) as a GMLRS-ER.
So Ukraine now has multiple sources of guided rocket deep strike capability. This means political pressure by any one supplier to negotiate 'land for peace'
This is really good advertising for Turkish high tech weapons for nations on the West's export control lists.
Another possibility is we are seeing a cover story for use of the Luchs 300 mm Vilkha-M.
2/4
Whether we are looking at a Turkish TRLG 230, a US GMLRS-ER or a indigenous Ukrainian Vilkha-M.
A missile with the reach shown in the @DefMon3 map means all of Russia's truck, train and Sea of Azov port logistics north of Crimea in Southern Ukraine are under AFU's thumb.
3/4
On Nov 19th I did a thread on the Przewdow missile strike making the case it wasn't a Ukrainian missile and I mentioned a radar & electronic warfare angle I didn't address.
The thing about being one of the few people who have researched General MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters is you learn all the old tricks with mechanically rotating antenna radars like that on the 1977 vintage E-3 Sentry AWACS APY-1.
The missile attack on Przewodow has become a Rorschach test for how strong the West’s de-escalation faction’s "directed cognition" is in dealing with Reality in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The “It was a Ukrainian missile” narrative doesn't match reality. This🧵will explain
1/
...why.
**Directed cognition, in rough layman terms, means making a quick & incorrect analysis from limited data and only picking more data to support that analysis.
The way to cure a directed cognition conclusion is to audit all the available data.
To do this I’m going to walk you through 5V55K missile design, fuzing, weapon effects, and some Ukrainian evidence. I'm going to leave radar & electronic warfare for another thread.
Below are infographics of the 5V55K & a data table. 3/
The irony of Biden Administration National Security Advisor Sullivan's 'de-escalation' phobia about not letting Ukraine receive the 55 NATO Mig-29's has come home to roost.
Sullivan's role in preventing adequate PSU fighter air defense may well lead to a NATO escalation from 1/6