Missiles of Ukraine I - Sapsan
OTRK (Operational-Tactical Missile System) "Sapsan" [peregrine in ๐บ๐ฆ] is a prospective single-stage, solid-fuel, short-range ballistic missile system. It has been under development in various forms since the mid-90s under a variety of names. 1/46
For clarity, Sapsan currently refers to the domestic variant, while "Hrim-2" ["thunder" in ๐บ๐ฆ] refers to the reduced range (MCTR compliant) export version. Itโs also been referred to as "Grom" ["thunder" in ๐ท๐บ] or "Grim," a corruption of Hrim. 2/46
There is a profound asymmetry between ๐ท๐บโs ability to strike targets in ๐บ๐ฆ and ๐บ๐ฆโs ability to strike targets in occupied ๐บ๐ฆ territory and ๐ท๐บ. This asymmetry is a grave threat to both ๐บ๐ฆโs war effort and its people that must be urgently addressed. 3/46
There are substantial critical ๐ท๐บ military assets deep in occupied-๐บ๐ฆ territory, particularly Crimea, that are largely inaccessible to ๐บ๐ฆ strikes. It is imperative that ๐บ๐ฆ gain the capability to reliably strike these targets. 4/46
Equally, there are numerous enormously valuable strategic assets within ๐ท๐บ (and ๐ง๐พ) itself. These include airbases housing strategic bombers, AEW&C, and C2 aircraft; military factories; port facilities; C2 nodes; rail and road bridges along logistical arteries; etc. 5/46
Each of these represents a grave threat and they must be eliminated by any means available. If ๐บ๐ฆโs allies are unable or unwilling to provide the relevant munitions, then we must aid the development, productionโฆ 6/46
โฆ, and deployment of capable domestic ๐บ๐ฆ systems and munitions. Sapsan is one of these munitions and it is arguably the most capable and significant ๐บ๐ฆ system that ๐บ๐ฆโs allies can support the fielding of. 7/46
Design:
Sapsan is broadly analogous in its intended role to the ๐ท๐บ Iskander-M/K as well as the ๐บ๐ธ ATACMS and PrSM. It was originally conceived as a multi-role launch platform for both SRBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles. 8/46
The published maximum range of Sapsan is 500 km (280-300 km for Hrim-2) with a 480 kg unitary or cluster munition warhead, likely derived from Tochka-U. The est. damage radius of the unitary warhead is ~55 m or a 10,000 - 30,000 sq. m area for the dispersal of submunitions. 9/46
According to the designers, the 500 km max range is a political restriction as ๐บ๐ฆ had been abiding by the INF though not technically a party to the treaty. It should be possible to increase the maximum range to 1,500 km, making it a medium-range ballistic missile. 10/46
Such a dramatic increase in range is achievable by using a lighter warhead combined with reductions in structural mass and improvements to motor performance. It is also possible that a small second-stage or kick-stage motor could be added as well (this is my speculation). 11/46
Guidance is via GNSS/INS (global navigation satellite system/inertial navigation system), likely using both GPS/GLONASS. This is supplemented by a choice of four active seeker heads: electro-optical contrast (EO), infrared (IR), active radar (3 mm), or combined EO/radar. 12/46
These seeker heads work by observing the terrain beneath the missile in their respective wavelengths and comparing it to a pre-loaded terrain map to estimate position. Combined with GNSS, this is used to correct the inherent INS drift/error that accumulates in flight. 13/46
Sapsan can follow ballistic and quasi-ballistic trajectories as well as maneuver during flight to extend its range and evade ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. Maneuvering is performed using both aerodynamic control surfaces and a series of attitude control thrusters. 14/46
Much like ATACMS and PrSM, Sapsanโs terminal flight profile is thought to include a near-vertical dive toward its target to maximize both terminal velocity and precision. Terminal velocity is likely in excess of Mach 4 and probably in the range of Mach 5-6. 15/46
It is also notable that relatively modern and sophisticated manufacturing techniques were used in its construction. The use of additive manufacturing (3D printing) and powder metallurgy for metal components and a composite (e.g. carbon fiber) motor casing were referenced. 16/46
Capabilities:
If operational, Sapsan would provide a potent standoff capability to ๐บ๐ฆ. A 280+ km range would enable deep strikes anywhere within occupied ๐บ๐ฆ (including Crimea), not to mention deep within ๐ท๐บ itself, particularly if the range is enhanced to >500 km. 17/46
The option of a cluster munition warhead offers enhanced capabilities against dispersed targets that the latest versions of ATACMS, having only a unitary warhead, lack. This is especially valuable when targeting installations such as airbases where targets may be dispersed. 18/46
Sapsan being ๐บ๐ฆ designed and manufactured mitigates potential restrictions that might be attached to the use of foreign-provided systems like ATACMS. This would give ๐บ๐ฆ a much freer hand to strike critical targets in ๐ท๐บ such as airbases, military factories, or C2 nodes. 19/46
๐ท๐บ IAMDS (integrated air & missile def. system) would be severely challenged by Sapsan. As a ๐ท๐บ miblogger notes, itโs unlikely that S-300/400s near the target could intercept Sapsan in terminal phase as it would descend in the funnel-esque radar dead zone above S-300/400. 20/46
In this dead zone, command-guided, semi-active radar homing (SARH), and track-via-missile (TVM) interceptors are ineffective if they rely on organic ground-based radars for off-board target illumination. This includes the standard 5V55 and 48N6 interceptors for S-300/400. 21/46
Providing illumination using airborne or remote radar inorganic to the launching system could potentially solve this issue, but itโs unclear if ๐ท๐บ IAMDS has achieved the necessary level of integration or operator skill to perform this kind of interception. 22/46
A recent report from @RUSI_org on VKS (๐ท๐บ Air Force) operations has revealed notable deficiencies in the integration of ๐ท๐บ A-50U/M AEW&Cs aircraft and Il-20M relay/C2 aircraft that has degraded their ability to pass useful fire control data to relevant S-300/400 systems. 23/46
๐ท๐บโs dilemma is further worsened by Sapsanโs estimated 25-70+ km apogee. A mid-course intercept at the upper end of those altitudes is likely outside S-300/400โs engagement envelope for most available interceptors. 24/46
Sapsanโs extreme maneuverability due to its attitude control thrusters, estimated on the order of 20-25g overloads (equiv. to a rapid 90-degree turn). This likely significantly exceeds the maneuvering capabilities of 5V55 and 48N6 series interceptors. 25/46
The proposed solution is the use of 9M96 series of ARH (active radar homing) interceptors from an S-350 system (though S-300/400 also support 9M96). It is cited as ๐ท๐บโs only interceptor maneuverable enough to intercept a ballistic target maneuvering with 20-25g overloads. 26/46
The 9M96โs ARH combined with its INS and mid-course update capability would potentially enable interceptions in the radar dead-zone. The availability of 9M96 is unclear. It has yet to be publicly observed deployed in/near theater outside of a lone S-350 system in Taganrog. 27/46
Equally, I will speculate that ๐ท๐บ IAMDS would likely be unable to reliably intercept Sapsan given S-300/300V/400โs observed inability to intercept GMLRS and the failure to intercept the ballistic missiles (likely ATACMS or Sapsan) that were used to strike the Saky air base. 28/46
It is also notable that during the Nargorno-Karabakh War in 2020, ๐ฆ๐ฒ S-300s totally failed to engage, let alone intercept, any of the ๐ฎ๐ฑ-made LORA tactical BMs deployed by ๐ฆ๐ฟ. Like Sapsan, LORA is capable of maneuvering and following quasi-ballistic trajectories. 29/46
The major unknown among Sapsanโs capabilities is its precision beyond vague statements of โmeters.โ Vilkha-M, a ๐บ๐ฆ precision-guided MRL (multiple rocket launcher) round with GNSS/INS, has a quoted CEP (circular error probable) of <30 m at 120 km or <10 m at 70 km. 30/46
While quite poor compared to analogous ๐บ๐ธ systems, Sapsanโs CEP is likely superior to Vilkha-M as Sapsan has active seekers that Vilkha-M lacks, in addition to GNSS/INS. It is also possible that Sapsan may have a higher quality GNSS/INS package given its intended role. 31/46
Readiness-
All these technical details come back to the fundamental question, does Sapsan exist? Is it operational? The short answer: It is uncertain but possible. When the program was restarted in 2021 after being paused since 2019, development was reportedly 80% complete. 32/46
Prior to 2021, the solid rocket motor had successfully undergone hot fire testing and at least 12 motors had been manufactured. Development and testing of the active seeker heads had also reportedly been completed as had warhead testing. 33/46
At least two TELs had been manufactured, one for Sapsan and one for Hrim-2. Itโs important to note that Sapsan and Hrim-2 differ in diameter, ~900 mm and ~600 mm respectively. It is unclear if a Hrim-2 TEL can support a 900 mm Sapsan missile or just a 600 mm Hrim-2. 34/46
Now we come to export customers. According to ๐บ๐ฆ sources there were two prospective export customers for Sapsan. The first is ๐ธ๐ฆ. It has been widely reported that ๐ธ๐ฆ heavily financed the development of Hrim-2/Sapsan, contributing $70-200 mln. 35/46
It is known that in 2019 a prototype Hrim-2 system, including โmotors, warheads, and spare partsโ was exported to ๐ธ๐ฆ for testing. It is unclear if the system was complete or included fully functional missiles or the prototype Hrim-2 TEL. 36/46
There were unconfirmed reports published a few months ago that ๐ธ๐ฆ had returned the Hrim-2 system to ๐บ๐ฆ as part of an agreement brokered by ๐บ๐ธ. However, details regarding any such agreement are scarce and it remains completely unknown if such a transfer occurred. 37/46
Following the resumption of the program in 2021, a number of changes were announced including a change in TEL to one based on a ๐จ๐ฟ Tatra chassis which was to become a multi-functional chassis supporting a number of other weapon systems. 38/46
It is unclear how much, if any, funding was actually allocated for the program in 2021. According to @TarasChmut, significant funding wasnโt actually allocated until 2022, with a specific focus on completing the 280 km Hrim-2 variant. 39/46
It was also reported that following the programโs resumption, the ๐บ๐ธ apparently expressed interest in procuring the system (the other prospective customer). Iโll speculate that the ๐บ๐ธ wanted to either evaluate it or procure some of the underlying technology. 40/46
The big news was a report from @BBC_ua published in Sep. concerning an espionage case involving KB โPivdenne,โ which is involved in development. It indicated that development of Sapsan had been completed by late June 2022 and serial production was being initiated. 41/46
It is unclear if this referred to the development of Sapsan specifically or Hrim-2 (or both). Likewise, it is equally unclear if serial production referred to Sapsan or Hrim-2. From an engineering standpoint, a less ambitious 280 km variant would be easier to complete. 42/46
However, a ๐ท๐บ cruise missile strike on July 2 against a facility in Pavlohrad, likely the solid propellant production plant, reportedly disrupted these efforts. This was followed by a ๐ท๐บ strike against the primary Pivdenmash manufacturing plant in Dnipro on July 16. 43/46
Pivdenmash is one of ๐บ๐ฆโs primary rocket and missile manufacturers and was heavily involved in Sapsanโs creation. Itโs unclear what the long-term impacts of such strikes on development would be. Per the @KyivPost, itโs widely believed that most of Pivdenmashโsโฆ 44/46
โฆmissile production lines are located in underground facilities hardened against nuclear strikes. A legacy of the Soviet Unionโs civil defense paranoia. This is somewhat speculative since official details were state secrets of the USSR and continued as state secrets of ๐บ๐ฆ. 45/46
There has not been any additional reporting on the programโs status since September. I will consider appending a sequel to this thread in the event there is additional reporting on the status of the program in the future. 46/46
A massive thanks and shoutout to @DEFENSEEXPRESS for their fantastic coverage of Sapsan and many other ๐บ๐ฆ weapon systems. This thread would not have been possible without their reporting. Stay tuned for Part II of this series covering ๐บ๐ฆโs Neptun AShM in the coming weeks.
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@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Hi Lesya, as you may know I was a volunteer on Walter Report, later Mriya Report, from May 2022 to January 2023.
I have Mriya Report internal communications that detail continuous coordination between MR and the MA board from the creation of MR in July 2022 through January 2023.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Given the turnover in the MA since then, Iโm inclined to assume you may be unaware of that prior history.
The assertion there was no coordination between MA and MR is, from my perspective, demonstrably false. Iโm happy to provide excerpted communications to that effect.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid โJoeโ refers to Joseph โYehudaโ Friedberg and โBโ is Alexander Bakus, then MAโs Director of Treasury.
MR forked off from WR on July 17. Alex was intimately involved in the planning of this split and coordinated it with MA alongside Yehuda.
A brief round up of what we do actually know thus far about Iran's ballistic missile raid against Israel, named "Operation True Promise 2" by the IRGC.
Starting with the missiles, Iran employed 180-200 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), including Ghadr, Emad, and Kheibarshekan or Fattah-1.
A derivative of the Shahab-3, Ghadr is a liquid-fueled MRBM that ordinarily carries a single separable reentry vehicle (RV). These specfic missiles have been upgraded with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs).
Ghadr is one of the primary missiles Iran employed against Israel in April during "Operation True Promise."
A further development of Ghadr, Emad is a liquid-fueled MRBM that carries a single separable MaRV. Alongside Ghadr, is one of the primary missiles previously employed against Israel in April.
Although defense articles designated as Significant Military Equipment were exported to China without authorization, that SME does not appear to be classified.
The unauthorized hand-carry of defense articles, specifically technical data, to Russia, Iran, and Lebanon by RTX employees on personal travel with company-issued electronic devices likely only concerns unclassified defense articles.
Neither an Antenna Mast Group nor Communications Relay Group and Electric Power Unit are visible.
The CRG acting as the RLG's Launcher Control Station plus AMG and EPU are emplaced at a different site. RL1 enables the CRG/LCS to communicate with LS up to 10 km away via VHF.
2|6
Remote launchers optimize PATRIOT's defended area against tactical ballistic missiles but create dead zones for airbreathing threats.
Remoting launchers in this instance is unusual as the RLG does not have Dnipro within its defended area for TBMs with PAC-3 or PAC-3 MSE.
3|6
I won't detail the complete program history of S-300P/F/V as @ChungTzuW has already written excellent threads about them which I strongly recommend reading for context.
In short, all three systems emerged from a joint VKS/VMF/SV procurement program.
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VKS/VMF requirements were focused on ABTs (air-breathing threats) while SV requirements were focused on TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles). This led to a divergence into S-300P/F and S-300V using radically different missiles and radars.
3|23
GLSDB has a range of >150 km while SDB has a range of ~110 km from a ~12 km release altitude and ~270 m/s release airspeed.
Position error due to accumulated inertial measurement unit drift is quadratically proportional to time of flight and range by extension.
2|5
Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
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