RUSI has a new report out today on lessons from the first phase of the Ukraine war The authors include a Ukrainian lieutenant-general & @Jack_Watling. The paper is full of rich data & implications for other armed forces. I wrote up some highlights here: economist.com/europe/2022/11…
The full paper can be found here. "this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022." rusi.org/explore-our-re…
The paper includes the most detailed and accurate account to date of the first phase of the war. "Many Russian soldiers arrived in towns [in the north] without their weapons loaded. They were – for the most part – not anticipating heavy fighting" static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
The contrast between north & south shows that the Russian invasion was not foreordained to fail. "The destruction of Mariupol...demonstrates the difference that could have been made elsewhere if Russian forces were properly prepared for heavy fighting." static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
One key lesson. "There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth." One answer is hardened protection. Another is deception. But ultimately the best way to survive is to move fast & keep moving. economist.com/europe/2022/11…
Deception works. Ukraine photographed damage to airfields and printed the resulting pattern on to big sheets. "This led ... amusingly to the Russians debating whether Ukrainian fighter aircraft were operating from subterranean shelters" static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
Drones vital for intelligence, but eye-watering attrition. 90% of drones Ukraine deployed Feb-July were destroyed. Average life expectancy of fixed-wing drone was six flights; that of a quadcopter a paltry three. How long would European fleets survive? economist.com/europe/2022/11…
Electronic warfare played (and is playing) a big role. But "fratricide is a systemic issue between Russian systems," notes the RUSI report. One example is Khibiny EW pod on Russian aircraft. static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
HIMARS genuinely marked a turning point: "The introduction of HIMARS and M270 firing GMLRS into the UAF therefore can be seen as the point where the Russian offensive on Donbas ended and the war entered a new phase". But authors are cagey on details. static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
At peak in Donbas Russia using "more ammunition in two days than entire British military has in stock". At Ukr rates of use UK stocks would "potentially last a week." UK lacks firepower to deliver kind of blunting effect that UAF achieved north of Kyiv" static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
"The oft-cited refrain of @DefenceHQ that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation...were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland." static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
RUSI: "The historical approach of the [ARRC] and 3 UK Division of erecting tented cities – command posts with a large physical footprint – is non-viable in wartime on the modern battlefield. These sites will be identified and struck."
On which topic, see: economist.com/technology-qua…
Russian missiles not duds. "For the most part, the Russian missile systems are reliable and accurate...Russians routinely adapted flight routes for every mission and such missiles were observed to make up to 80 changes of course on their way to a target." static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
Russia "can fabricate around 100 Kalibr missiles per year, for example, and this may come at the expense of other munitions because many Russian munitions have common key modules that act as bottlenecks in the production of multiple systems" static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
Survival depends on "defeating precision". Three main ways to do it: stop a launcher from determining its own position, preventing enemy from locating you, or interfering with "mechanism for precision strike" (e.g. jamming its navigation signals with EW) static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
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.@olliecarroll & I write on lessons from the cyber conflict in Ukraine. Tho’ it’s been intense, many say Russia has underperformed. That’s partly due to Ukraine’s superb defence. Others argue that offensive cyber power has also been misunderstood. economist.com/science-and-te…
The early view was that cyber had played a minimal role in the war. Officials pushed back strongly against that. In September NCSC head said Ukraine was "most sustained and intensive cyber campaign on record". Two NATO officials published below in April. foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…
Others argued the nature of the Russian cyber campaign had evolved over time, with a shift to simpler and lower-cost operations to enable a higher tempo of wartime attacks. This is what @gabby_roncone & John Wolfram of Mandiant told me. economist.com/science-and-te…
Ru "cyber campaign appears to have consisted of a small number of carefully planned offensive cyber ops...in the early phases of the war...& has since reverted to unsophisticated (yet prolific & sometimes intense) denial-of-service operations and phishing" carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/eva…
"Cyber defense at scale relies on the involvement of the largest commercial technology and cybersecurity companies. This is because of both the deep dependence on the services of a small number of providers and [reliance] on automated protection" carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/eva…
|"the most indispensable commercial partners for cyber defense are American. Even European governments, let alone those who view Washington less favorably, might be uncomfortable relying on the decisions taken in a handful of boardrooms in America" carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/eva…
"Belgium and the UK have become embroiled in a row after the Belgian government blocked the export of technology that is critical for maintaining the British nuclear deterrent, despite both countries being Nato allies." thetimes.co.uk/article/belgiu…
"Two weeks ago, the federal Belgian government refused authorisation for a specialised isostatic press needed to maintain Britain’s nuclear arsenal because the greens, which make up a fragile ruling coalition, vetoed the export." thetimes.co.uk/article/belgiu…
A sentence to be savoured. "Military sources said Britain’s nuclear deterrent would remain fully operational without the Belgian-made equipment." thetimes.co.uk/article/belgiu…
Excellent two-part conversation (subscriber-only) between Michael Kofman, Justin Bronk & Jack Watling on the Russia Contingency podcast. A lot of the discussion is essentially myth-busting about the war. A few highlights below. warontherocks.com/episode/therus… warontherocks.com/episode/therus…
1/ Russian air/missile power was effective. That, plus electronic warfare, worked to "disable & suppress the Ukrainian air defence system very effectively in the first couple of days" says Bronk. Air force punched hole in defences to allow VDV to seize airfields, notes Watling.
The problem was when ground forces didn't advance fast enough, Russia struggled with "dynamic" targeting (e.g. new targets). Russia had, and still has, plenty of HUMINT on targets but "their ability to get that to their air force in a timely manner is non existent" says Watling.
Jim Hockenhull's RUSI presentation on OSINT: "open source has also proved to be a force multiplier....what's happened is that so many people have become sensors. In fact, that kind of citizen involvement every phone has become a sensor." rusi.org/events/members…
Some important IHL/Law of Armed Conflict implications from this? "crowdsourcing, using standardised chat bots, has allowed those Ukrainian citizens to report Russian units and locations. And that civilian sensor of network has been both a force multiplier" rusi.org/events/members…
"what's happening with [OSINT] is we still don't have the [jigsaw] lid...but what we have is an almost infinite number of jigsaw pieces. Part of our challenge is that you could make an almost infinite number of pictures as a consequence of these pieces" rusi.org/events/members…
Yet more spy arrests in Sweden. They follow Sweden's arrest of two other suspected Russian spies earlier this month, Norway's arrest of a suspected GRU illegal in October, the Netherlands' arrest of another in June (now jailed in Brazil) & Poland's arrest of yet another in March.
I'm also curious as to what happened to these folks picked up in Albania, after they attacked guards at a weapons factory in August. theguardian.com/world/2022/aug…