Third-quarter G.D.P. growth was revised up modestly, to +2.9% (annualized) from +2.6% in the initial estimate. The details look a bit stronger too: Final sales to private domestic purchasers (a measure of underling demand) now +0.5% annualized, vs. +0.1% in the initial estimate.
On the other hand, Gross Domestic Income (an alternate measure of economic output) rose just 0.3% annualized in Q3. (This is the first estimate for Q3 G.D.I.)
The weakness in GDI in Q3 is notable because for much of this year, economists were pointing to GDI as evidence that the economy was stronger than GDP suggested. But revisions changed that story quite a bit, and now GDI has been weaker than GDP for two straight quarters.
Over the longer term, GDI still shows a higher overall level of economic output than GDP. But the two measures tell a pretty similar story about the past year: Inflation-adjusted growth has ground nearly to a halt over the past four quarters.
On the other hand, headline G.D.P. has been pushed around by volatile trade and inventory components. Domestic demand (shown here in dark blue) has remained positive throughout this year. And today's revisions make it look a bit better than the initial release.
Consumer spending, meanwhile, has remained solidly positive, and much steadier than headline GDP. (And the Q3 figure was revised up.)
As @JordynJournals & @melbournecoal reported over the weekend, consumers have defied expectations by continuing to spend. nytimes.com/2022/11/27/bus…
It's important to keep this all in perspective, however. The economic rebound (whether measured by GDP, GDI, consumer spending...) has been very rapid by historical standards. GDP returned to its prepandemic trend by the end of last year, and even now is only modestly below it.
Lastly, a reminder that *nominal* (non-inflation-adjusted) output is WAY above trend. It's just that a lot of that demand is getting burned off in the form of inflation.
And with that, I leave you until 10 a.m., when we get #JOLTS.
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So this was an interesting finding from @NateSilver538, but one I found odd because @BLS_gov publishes CPI for regions (and for some metro areas) but not for states. So I dug into it a bit, and there's less here than meets the eye.
Nate's data is coming from this tracker from the @JECRepublicans. They don't have a state-level inflation estimate either, though. They just use BLS's estimate of regional inflation and apply it to an estimate of household spending when Biden took office. jec.senate.gov/public/index.c…
You can see this if you hover over their map (or download their data). States in the same region all have the same cumulative rates of inflation. But they differ in the amount of inflation experienced in dollar terms because some states have higher avg household incomes.
I hate that @ellawinthrop is leaving us, but I'm so glad I got to work with her on her last piece for @nytimesbusiness. She's the best, most collaborative, most creative visual journalist I've ever worked with. A thread with a few of my favorite Ben-and-Ella collabs:
Good news on inflation! U.S. consumer prices FELL 0.1 percent in June, and were up just 3 percent from a year earlier. "Core" prices, stripping out volatile food and fuel, were up 0.1 percent from May and 3.3 percent from last June. Data: …Live coverage: bls.gov/news.release/c… nytimes.com/live/2024/07/1…
This is the second straight month where there has been effectively no inflation on a month-to-month basis. Prices were flat in May, and down in June.
If you take a longer view here: At 3% year-over-year, inflation is no longer outside historical norms (though it is still higher than immediately prepandemic). And over the past three months, rents have risen at an annual rate of ***just 1.1%.***
Job openings ticked up in May (but only because April was revised down). Layoffs edged up. Quits basically flat. All consistent with a gradually slowing, but not collapsing, job market. #JOLTS
Full data: bls.gov/news.release/j…
There were 8.1 million job openings on the last day of May. That's up from 7.9 million in April, revised down from the 8.1m originally reported.
Larger story here is that openings are clearly falling quickly, even if they're still high in absolute terms. #JOLTS
There were 1.2 job openings for every unemployed worker in May. That's more or less where things stood immediately before the pandemic (when the labor market was widely viewed as strong but not overheated).
The U.S. economy slowed in the final three months of the year, but only because the Q3 number was so strong -- the 3.3% growth rate in Q4 was well above expectations and certainly offered no hints of a brewing recession. (Belated charts thread)
This is not a case where the volatile components of G.D.P. made a weak quarter look strong, as sometimes happens. Measures of underlying demand were also very strong.
For all the predictions of a recession, G.D.P. growth actually *accelerated* in 2023, and topped the prepandemic average growth rate as well.
Job openings, quits and layoffs all edged down slightly in November. Consistent with a gradually cooling labor market, but definitely no sign things are falling off a cliff. #JOLTS
Data: bls.gov/news.release/j…
There were 8.8 million job openings on the last day of November. That's down a touch from October, but only because October was revised up. Big picture: Openings are trending down (and quite quickly, at that), but are still high by historical standards. #JOLTS
The number of job openings per unemployed worker actually ticked up in November (because unemployment fell), but ignore the noise. The labor market is becoming more balanced, though the ratio is (again) high relative to the prepandemic period.