.@olliecarroll & I write on lessons from the cyber conflict in Ukraine. Tho’ it’s been intense, many say Russia has underperformed. That’s partly due to Ukraine’s superb defence. Others argue that offensive cyber power has also been misunderstood. economist.com/science-and-te…
The early view was that cyber had played a minimal role in the war. Officials pushed back strongly against that. In September NCSC head said Ukraine was "most sustained and intensive cyber campaign on record". Two NATO officials published below in April. foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…
Others argued the nature of the Russian cyber campaign had evolved over time, with a shift to simpler and lower-cost operations to enable a higher tempo of wartime attacks. This is what @gabby_roncone & John Wolfram of Mandiant told me. economist.com/science-and-te…
Many argued that Russia's cyber campaign looked misleadingly feeble because Ukraine's defence was so strong. In August the head of GCHQ called it "arguably seen the most effective defensive cyber activity in history." economist.com/by-invitation/…
In June, Microsoft wrote about "a new form of collective defense. This war pits Russia, a major cyber-power, not just against an alliance of countries. The cyber defense of Ukraine relies critically on a coalition of countries, companies, and NGOs." blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/…
This Carnegie piece summarised the intensity of international co-operation around Ukrainian cyber defence. "diverse partners are rallying to shared values and upending previous assumptions that the cyber attacker will always get through."
Clearly, extensive (and in some cases secret) foreign assistance was a crucial part of this defensive effort. For instance @US_CYBERCOM had a sizeable in Ukraine from December, identifying Russian operations on Ukrainian networks. UK & others also involved
Many have drawn broader implications from this. In September Lindy Cameron, CEO of UK's defensive cyber-security agency @NCSC, argued the key lesson was not that cyber is defence "dominant", but "in cyber security, the defender has significant agency"
Others emphasise Russian failings—many similar to those seen in Ru conventional military forces. This is Marcus Willett, GCHQ's first director cyber. "The war has exposed some key weaknesses in Russian cyber capabilities compared with, especially, the US"
.@gavinbwilde pointed out Russia has far less experience of integrating cyber into military ops than the US. @ILDannyMoore described "significant operational failings in almost every single [known] attack that they have ever carried out in cyberspace" economist.com/science-and-te…
On top of all that, there's the view that cyber power has been misunderstood. Some argue we under-estimate how hard & costly big destructive attacks are (@LenMaschmeyer: direct.mit.edu/isec/article/4…) or degree to which cyber is an intelligence contest (tnsr.org/roundtable/pol…)
.@ciaranmartinoxf points out Stuxnet may have distorted expectations. "In truth, argues Mr Martin, Stuxnet was the “Moon landing” of offensive cyber, an exquisite one-off that required superpower resources to execute rather than...a staple of cyberwars" economist.com/science-and-te…
As Thomas Rid wrote in March: "Cyberwar has been playing a trick on us for decades..It keeps arriving for the first time, again & again, & simultaneously slipping away into the future." Cyber is: "digitally upgraded intel. operations at the edge of war" nytimes.com/2022/03/18/opi…
Final thought: the war is ongoing, the cyber campaigns on both sides are evolving and there is a great deal we don't know or can't see. The lessons are contested & preliminary. I hope the piece gives a flavour of the debate & the views on different sides. economist.com/science-and-te…
We write in the piece: "judging a cyber-campaign by the volume of malware is like rating infantry by the number of bullets fired". @DanWBlack of NATO offers a contrary view: Russian campaign as a "cumulative strategy" to create "critical mass of pressure"
Another excellent survey of Ukr cyber ops, by @JonKBateman. "Russian cyber “fires” (disruptive or destructive attacks) may have contributed modestly to Moscow’s initial invasion, but since then they have inflicted negligible damage on Ukrainian targets" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"Intelligence collection—not fires—has likely been the main focus of Russia’s wartime cyber operations in Ukraine, yet this too has yielded little military benefit." carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"To meaningfully influence a war of this scale, cyber ops. must be conducted at a tempo that Russia apparently could sustain for only weeks at most. Moscow worsened its capacity problem by choosing to maintain...global cyber activity v non-Ukr targets" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"Militaries that plan for major war should ask whether they can realistically meet the high bar of producing and sustaining cyber fires at meaningful levels. Meeting this bar may require huge standing cyber forces" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"The rapid regeneration of cyber capabilities is another key hurdle. Given limited wartime cyber capacity, militaries may need to experiment with wave tactics: short bursts of intense cyber fires followed by periods of stand-down and regeneration." carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"China’s cyber forces are probably larger than Russia’s, but they have carried out far fewer cyber fires. Would they execute an even bigger and more effective cyber salvo at the outset of a Taiwan invasion, or bungle the opener due to inexperience?" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
Constraints on Russian cyber performance in Ukraine: small size of Russian cyber forces, slow to regenerate "cyber capability" once used, resilient Ukrainian defences carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
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The Economist's briefing this week. "ICE and Border Patrol have come to resemble militias that answer to the president and operate with seeming impunity. The killings in Minneapolis reveal how quickly this evolution has occurred" economist.com/briefing/2026/…
"The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, passed in July, included a whopping $170bn for immigration enforcement—more than most countries spend on their armed forces. ICE has more than doubled in size over the past year, hiring 12,000 new deportation officers." economist.com/briefing/2026/…
'Several ICE recruitment posts on social media include dog-whistles such as “Which way, American man?” (an allusion to a white supremacist book) and “Destroy the flood” (a slogan from a video game about invasive parasitic aliens).' economist.com/briefing/2026/…
"Retired Army Lt. Gen. @GenFlynn, who was once President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, was hired as a consultant for the Bosnian Serb republic eight years after he admitted to secretly working to benefit the Turkish government." washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/…
Essentially, corruption is being legalised (for some). Flynn 'joins Rod Blagojevich, the former Democratic governor of Illinois who went to prison on corruption charges, as the second person pardoned by Trump to work on behalf of the Bosnian Serb republic' washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/…
"The Trump administration also wiped away Biden-era sanctions levied in 2023 against Dodik’s children and several business entities that officials said he used to siphon public funds “and enrich himself and his family at the expense of [his] citizens and functional governance in the country.”...
So far this term, Trump has pardoned his most prominent allies involved in the effort to overturn the 2020 election results, the founder of an online drug market, former TV stars found guilty of fraud and tax evasion, and other people who have paid large sums of money to hire people who they believe have the president’s ear."
1/ The UK Parliament's intelligence & security committee (ISC) has published its first full annual report in two years, covering the administration and finance of the UK intelligence community. A few highlights below. isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/upl…
2/ As in previous reports, the committee notes that more & more departments are doing security & intel work compared to the past, and that the ISC doesn't have sight of these. "The impact of these matters has become more serious since then," it says. isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/upl…
3/ ISC: "China’s state intelligence apparatus – almost certainly the largest in the world – targets the UK and its interests prolifically and aggressively, presenting a challenge for our Agencies to cover" isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/upl…
1/ The first of two speeches by UK military / intelligence leaders today. The later one by Rich Knighton, the new chief of defence staff. This one by Blaise Metreweli, the chief of MI6. "We are now operating in a space between peace and war." gov.uk/government/spe…
2/ Metreweli says speech is not a "global threat tour". Says China "a central part of the global transformation taking place this century" and "essential that we, as MI6, continue to inform the govt's understanding of China’s rise and the implications for UK national security."
3/ Metreweli says "Russia is testing us in the grey zone with tactics that are just below the threshold of war" and includes "Drones buzzing airports and bases." About as close to an official attribution as you're going to get. gov.uk/government/spe…
Trump's national security strategy is out and some of the Europe sections are shocking. "...the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed
gives cause for great optimism." whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
Trump national security strategy: Make Europe White Again.
"Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades ...certain NATO members will become majority non-European"
"the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure"
As far as I can see, this nat sec strategy is far harsher on Europe than on Russia. There is no mention of a threat from Russia or of deterrence, only that "re-establishing strategic stability" is a priority. Europe is cast as a major threat to freedom.
The proposal is nothing short of a very bad joke. I mean, read this:
"$100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine;
-- The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture."
The fact that this absurd and unworkable clause is in there is itself a suggestion that the proposal is the basis for further negotiation and not a "take it or leave it"