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Shashank Joshi Profile picture
@shashj
Nov 30, 2022 • 23 tweets • 11 min read • Read on X
.⁦@olliecarroll⁩ & I write on lessons from the cyber conflict in Ukraine. Tho’ it’s been intense, many say Russia has underperformed. That’s partly due to Ukraine’s superb defence. Others argue that offensive cyber power has also been misunderstood. economist.com/science-and-te…
The early view was that cyber had played a minimal role in the war. Officials pushed back strongly against that. In September NCSC head said Ukraine was "most sustained and intensive cyber campaign on record". Two NATO officials published below in April.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…
Others argued the nature of the Russian cyber campaign had evolved over time, with a shift to simpler and lower-cost operations to enable a higher tempo of wartime attacks. This is what @gabby_roncone & John Wolfram of Mandiant told me. economist.com/science-and-te… Image
Many argued that Russia's cyber campaign looked misleadingly feeble because Ukraine's defence was so strong. In August the head of GCHQ called it "arguably seen the most effective defensive cyber activity in history." economist.com/by-invitation/…
In June, Microsoft wrote about "a new form of collective defense. This war pits Russia, a major cyber-power, not just against an alliance of countries. The cyber defense of Ukraine relies critically on a coalition of countries, companies, and NGOs." blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/…
This Carnegie piece summarised the intensity of international co-operation around Ukrainian cyber defence. "diverse partners are rallying to shared values and upending previous assumptions that the cyber attacker will always get through."
Clearly, extensive (and in some cases secret) foreign assistance was a crucial part of this defensive effort. For instance @US_CYBERCOM had a sizeable in Ukraine from December, identifying Russian operations on Ukrainian networks. UK & others also involved
Many have drawn broader implications from this. In September Lindy Cameron, CEO of UK's defensive cyber-security agency @NCSC, argued the key lesson was not that cyber is defence "dominant", but "in cyber security, the defender has significant agency"
Others emphasise Russian failings—many similar to those seen in Ru conventional military forces. This is Marcus Willett, GCHQ's first director cyber. "The war has exposed some key weaknesses in Russian cyber capabilities compared with, especially, the US"
Image
.@gavinbwilde pointed out Russia has far less experience of integrating cyber into military ops than the US. @ILDannyMoore described "significant operational failings in almost every single [known] attack that they have ever carried out in cyberspace" economist.com/science-and-te…
On top of all that, there's the view that cyber power has been misunderstood. Some argue we under-estimate how hard & costly big destructive attacks are (@LenMaschmeyer: direct.mit.edu/isec/article/4…) or degree to which cyber is an intelligence contest (tnsr.org/roundtable/pol…)
.@ciaranmartinoxf points out Stuxnet may have distorted expectations. "In truth, argues Mr Martin, Stuxnet was the “Moon landing” of offensive cyber, an exquisite one-off that required superpower resources to execute rather than...a staple of cyberwars" economist.com/science-and-te…
As Thomas Rid wrote in March: "Cyberwar has been playing a trick on us for decades..It keeps arriving for the first time, again & again, & simultaneously slipping away into the future." Cyber is: "digitally upgraded intel. operations at the edge of war" nytimes.com/2022/03/18/opi…
Final thought: the war is ongoing, the cyber campaigns on both sides are evolving and there is a great deal we don't know or can't see. The lessons are contested & preliminary. I hope the piece gives a flavour of the debate & the views on different sides. economist.com/science-and-te…
I also wrote a short survey of some of the ideas in the piece for @TheEconomist's weekly science newsletter. Sign up here: economist.com/newsletters/si…
We write in the piece: "judging a cyber-campaign by the volume of malware is like rating infantry by the number of bullets fired". @DanWBlack of NATO offers a contrary view: Russian campaign as a "cumulative strategy" to create "critical mass of pressure"
Another excellent survey of Ukr cyber ops, by @JonKBateman. "Russian cyber “fires” (disruptive or destructive attacks) may have contributed modestly to Moscow’s initial invasion, but since then they have inflicted negligible damage on Ukrainian targets" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"Intelligence collection—not fires—has likely been the main focus of Russia’s wartime cyber operations in Ukraine, yet this too has yielded little military benefit." carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"To meaningfully influence a war of this scale, cyber ops. must be conducted at a tempo that Russia apparently could sustain for only weeks at most. Moscow worsened its capacity problem by choosing to maintain...global cyber activity v non-Ukr targets" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"Militaries that plan for major war should ask whether they can realistically meet the high bar of producing and sustaining cyber fires at meaningful levels. Meeting this bar may require huge standing cyber forces" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"The rapid regeneration of cyber capabilities is another key hurdle. Given limited wartime cyber capacity, militaries may need to experiment with wave tactics: short bursts of intense cyber fires followed by periods of stand-down and regeneration." carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
"China’s cyber forces are probably larger than Russia’s, but they have carried out far fewer cyber fires. Would they execute an even bigger and more effective cyber salvo at the outset of a Taiwan invasion, or bungle the opener due to inexperience?" carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
Constraints on Russian cyber performance in Ukraine: small size of Russian cyber forces, slow to regenerate "cyber capability" once used, resilient Ukrainian defences
carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus… Image

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More from @shashj

Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jun 24
Important. "The US military strikes on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities last weekend did not destroy the core components of the country’s nuclear program and likely only set it back by months, according to an early US [DIA] intelligence assessment" edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Wow. 'Two of the people familiar w/ the assessment said Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium was not destroyed. One of the people said the centrifuges are largely “intact.” “...the (DIA) assessment is that the US set them back maybe a few months, tops”...' edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
And a caveat. "It is still early for the US to have a comprehensive picture of the impact of the strikes, and none of the sources described how the DIA assessment compares to the view of other agencies in the intelligence community." edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Read 4 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jun 22
Pentagon briefing: “I know that battle damage is of great interest. Final battle damage will take some time, but initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.”
Pentagon briefing: “In total, US forces employed approximately 75 precision guided weapons during this operation. This included, as the President stated last night, 14 30,000 pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance penetrators, marking the first ever operational use of this weapon.”
Pentagon briefing: “our initial assessment… is that all of our precision munitions struck where we wanted them to strike and had the desired effect, which means especially in Fordo, which was the primary target here, we believe we achieved destruction of capabilities there”
Read 10 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jun 20
1. Useful details here. “While some American officials find the Israeli estimate credible, others emphasized that the U.S. intelligence assessment remained unchanged” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
2. “American spy agencies believe that it could take several months, and up to a year, for Iran to make a weapon.” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
3. “new [White House] assessments echoed material provided by Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, which believes that Iran can achieve a nuclear weapon in 15 days.”

But: “None of the new assessments on the timeline to get a bomb are based on newly collected intelligence”
Read 5 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jun 12
'To reach even [Natanz] all the weapons available to the Israeli Air Force, and all except the 30,000 lbs GBU-57/B and the 5,000 lbs GBU 72/B available to the United States, would likely require several impacts into the same crater to ‘burrow’ down...' rusi.org/explore-our-re…
"For the FFEP [Fordow] and new facility at Natanz at an estimated 80-100 meters, possibly with layers of reinforced concrete, even the GBU-57/B [carried by B2/B21] would likely require multiple impacts at the same aiming point to have a good chance of penetrating the facility."
"Strikes with lesser penetrating weapons could still collapse entry and exit tunnels...However, unless a longer-term campaign were mounted with regular follow-up strikes, efforts to dig down...to re-establish access and supplies would likely begin almost immediately."
Read 16 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jun 3
🧵A few other random observations from the Strategic Defence Review that caught my eye.
"much more rapid progress is needed in [carrier strike] evolution into ‘hybrid’ carrier airwings, whereby crewed combat aircraft (F-35B) are complemented by autonomous collaborative platforms in the air, and expendable, single-use drones" Image
Pretty interesting, but v non-committal.

"Exploring possible development from a Type 45 destroyer to a minimally crewed or autonomous air dominance system that could integrate directed energy weapons" Image
Read 47 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jun 1
1/ Very important signal that UK might return to air-launched tactical nuclear forces by buying F-35A and participating in US nuclear sharing arrangements. There had been indications that UK was preparing to be able to host B61 tactical nuclear weapons. thetimes.com/uk/defence/art…
2/ UK participation in nuclear sharing would have limited impact in itself, since weapons remain under US custody & control, and several other European countries already host B61s & practice delivering them. This doesn’t mitigate against withdrawal of US nuclear umbrella. But …
3/ Having the Royal Air Force prepare for & be capable of handling, carrying, delivering & planning non-strategic nuclear use could make it easier in the long term to develop a (vastly more expensive & currently unviable) sovereign air-launched tactical nuclear leg, like France.
Read 6 tweets

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