Wow: the October personal saving rate was the second lowest ever recorded (data goes back to 1959).
The two-month moving average was actually the lowest ever recorded and the three-month moving average was the third lowest.
The low and fall saving rate is supporting a huge divergence between stagnant real incomes and steadily rising consumption.
Relative to CBO's pre-pandemic forecast* real per capita:
Disposable personal income: -5%
Personal consumption expenditures: +2.5%
*CBO does not forecast these exact variables but has ones that are close (e.g., personal income instead of disposable personal income). I think my versions of their forecast are reasonably robust--you can see the levels and approximate CBO forecasts here.
The personal saving rate is typically about 7.5%.
During the pandemic it was above 10% for the 15 straights months--with the entire period accumulating $2.2T in excess savings.
It has been below average for 13 straight months, $800b in excess dissavings.
You can also think about this as the lagged impact of fiscal policy and pandemic-reduced consumption. The initial fiscal multipliers were relatively low as people saved money. But fiscal policy has long and variable lags and it is supporting consumption (and inflation) now.
This story is likely disproportionately about higher income households (but we can't be sure because BEA does not produce real-time distributional data).
One hint is that real compensation per capita, which matters more for middle-class households, is only slightly below trend.
Overall this is consistent with the excess saving story (the household budget constraint being expanded) & the pent up demand story (the marginal utility of spending being expanded as the pandemic eased).
Also of fiscal policy mattering--could debate if for better or worse.
Will we have a Wile E Coyote moment when consumers realize there is nothing below them and consumption plummets? Could happen--although these data plus more direct indicators of household balance sheets and financial distress suggest that moment could be 6-12 months away.
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Several thoughts on that piece by @nealemahoney & @BharatRamamurti in @nytopinion.
1. They claim price controls are good politically. I'm very open to this being true, I'm under no illusion that what I think is good policy is particularly well correlated with good politics. But I am genuinely interested in more evidence beyond the brief observations they make.
2. They claim that even if you think price controls are a bad idea they can help you pass supply-increasing legislation that is on balance good. Once again, I'm open to this. And in government I've often done 3rd, 7th or 12th best policies because of constraints.
It has now, for better or worse, been effectively abolished.
The last three legislated increases in the minimum wage were bipartisan:
1989: President Bush (41) and a Democratic Congress
1996: President Clinton and a Republican Congress
2007: President Bush (43) and a Democratic Congress
Prices are up about 50% since it was increased to $7.25/hr in 2009.
As a result the inflation-adjusted minimum wage is about the lowest it has ever been. The productivity-adjusted min wage is the lowest it has ever been.
Only 1% of workers nationwide are paid at or below that.
The most helpful visualization of the persistent and, to some degree, resurgence of core inflation is this. Four straight months of strong core goods inflation largely due to tariffs. Plus services inflation remains reasonably strong.
A big upward revision for GDP, was a 3.8% annual rate (up from 3.0% in the advance estimate). For H1 GDP up at a 1.6% annual rate.
The biggest change was consumption which was 2.5% annual rate (up from 1.4% in the advance). Business fixed investment strong, residential weak.
Here is quarterly consumer spending. It looked like it was really slowing but with this upward revision and the July and August indications it's looking much more healthy.
Business fixed investment has been strong. It is unclear how much of this is pulling forward of capital equipment imports to get ahead of tariffs and how much is sustainable. (Note disaggregating structures have been falling while equipment is rising, reducing a disconnect.)
The problem recently has been in both goods and services. Core goods inflation has typically been about zero but in the run-up to this year had deflation. Now tariff-driven inflation.
And at the same time core services inflation has picked up.