Wow: the October personal saving rate was the second lowest ever recorded (data goes back to 1959).
The two-month moving average was actually the lowest ever recorded and the three-month moving average was the third lowest.
The low and fall saving rate is supporting a huge divergence between stagnant real incomes and steadily rising consumption.
Relative to CBO's pre-pandemic forecast* real per capita:
Disposable personal income: -5%
Personal consumption expenditures: +2.5%
*CBO does not forecast these exact variables but has ones that are close (e.g., personal income instead of disposable personal income). I think my versions of their forecast are reasonably robust--you can see the levels and approximate CBO forecasts here.
The personal saving rate is typically about 7.5%.
During the pandemic it was above 10% for the 15 straights months--with the entire period accumulating $2.2T in excess savings.
It has been below average for 13 straight months, $800b in excess dissavings.
You can also think about this as the lagged impact of fiscal policy and pandemic-reduced consumption. The initial fiscal multipliers were relatively low as people saved money. But fiscal policy has long and variable lags and it is supporting consumption (and inflation) now.
This story is likely disproportionately about higher income households (but we can't be sure because BEA does not produce real-time distributional data).
One hint is that real compensation per capita, which matters more for middle-class households, is only slightly below trend.
Overall this is consistent with the excess saving story (the household budget constraint being expanded) & the pent up demand story (the marginal utility of spending being expanded as the pandemic eased).
Also of fiscal policy mattering--could debate if for better or worse.
Will we have a Wile E Coyote moment when consumers realize there is nothing below them and consumption plummets? Could happen--although these data plus more direct indicators of household balance sheets and financial distress suggest that moment could be 6-12 months away.
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The problem recently has been in both goods and services. Core goods inflation has typically been about zero but in the run-up to this year had deflation. Now tariff-driven inflation.
And at the same time core services inflation has picked up.
A market slowdown in the pace of job gains, with 22K added in August, bringing the three month average to 29K.
On a percentage basis have not seen job growth this slow outside of recessionary periods in more than sixty years.
The unemployment rate rose from 4.2% to 4.3% (unrounded was a smaller increase).
Wage growth was strong and average hours steady.
All of these are consistent with a marked slowdown in labor supply (due to immigration policy) combined with a continued slight softness in labor demand (as evidenced by the unemployment rate which has been steadily rising at about 0.03 percentage point per month for 2-1/2 years.
But two reasons to be less worried than headline: (1) transitory tariffs & (2) some of this is imputed from rising stock market.
Here are the full set of numbers I'll talk about.
Particularly notable is how much lower market core has been than overall core at every horizon. Note regular core includes imputed items, notably portfolio management fees where the price goes up when the stock market goes up.
Market core is both better predicted by slack and a better predictor of future inflation. It has moved sideways this year. But given that tariffs are (hopefully temporarily) pushing inflation up that suggests that underlying inflation is going down.
The jobs slowdown is here with 73K jobs in July & large downward revisions to May & June bringing the average to 35K/month.
Not quite as bad as you might think because steady-state job growth is much lower in a low net immigration world but unemployment still gradually rising.
A small portion of the weaker jobs numbers in recent months are Federal cuts.
But the bigger issues is the slowdown in private job creation.
My latest @nytopinion attempts to answer the question, "The Tariffs Kicked In. The Sky Didn’t Fall. Were the Economists Wrong?"
Part of my argument is the economy actually has slowed & inflation has picked up, as you would expect.
Plus Trump called off some tariffs and lags.
But there are two broader lessons here:
1. U.S. economy is mostly domestic services. Trade matters but it doesn't matter as much as some of the hype might make you think. (And I confess, I do suffer from TDS, tariff derangement syndrome.)
2. Much of macro is small on a percentage basis. But small things really matter a lot.
0.5% off one year's growth rate and $1,000 per household per year forever are the same. But the former sounds small and the later makes it clear it is a large unforced error.