And in particular the fact of how Russian troops don't value fuel trucks anywhere near the operational & strategic value they represent for the Russian Army.
That's why the truck in that photo clip is important. It's a 1967 Zil-131 family fuel truck.
The photos of the truck type in question below come from a UK sales website.
No Soviet truck outside a Mayday Parade ever looked that "used car salesman shine" good.
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That Zil fuel truck is of the same age cohort as the T-62 tanks showing up in Ukraine.
Russia is reaching back to late 1960's to recondition 55 year old vehicles for fuel truck replacements. 7/
A couple of things fall out from that "Flaming datum."
1st, changes in Russian senior commanders haven't and can't make Russian soldiers care about the logistics of its own army.
The Russian Army's social system of theft & corruption will not be fixed in this war nor for
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...will it be for decades afterwards.
The US Army took 20 years to reform itself after the corruption of the Vietnam war in a society far friendlier to the hard truth.
That's not Russia's society of the 2020's.
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2nd, the Russians are hurting far worse with fuel truck logistics than they are with replacement tanks, per this report.
Soviet Military Rear Services in East Germany
A Research Paper
SOV 84-100061X
LA 84-100121X
February 1984 cia.gov/readingroom/do…
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The following is a quote is from that 1984 CIA logistical report-
"The logistic buildup lagged nearly a decade behind the buildup of combat forces and weapon systems, creating for a time the impression that the Soviets did not plan to maintain a substantial logistic
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...capability in peacetime. That impression has been erased by the steady expansion of logistics over the past decade. For example:
- Since 1977, the capacity of ammunition depots has nearly doubled.
- Since the early 1970s, equipment pre-positioned for mobile medical and
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... maintenance units has doubled.
- Since 1978, the introduction of Kamaz trucks has increased the lift capacity of active nondivisional motor transport units by about 60
percent [PASSAGE REDACTED]"
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The CIA report later expands further on the details of the deployment KAMAZ truck type in East Germany based Soviet Army.
Which is why that reconditioned 1967 Zil fuel truck is bloody important.
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The CIA said in 1984 that the Russian truck fleet modernization was a decade behind its tanks, AFV's and self propelled artillery.
And it marked the 1978 introduction of the KAMAZ in East Germany as when that build up in logistical vehicles kicked off.
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If Russia is reconditioning 1967 Zil fuel trucks in 2022 for use in Ukraine.
It means that most if not all those post 1978 Soviet era fuel trucks have been used up either in combat or by operational attrition.
Pulling a 1967 fuel truck into 2022 combat means Russia is in a world of deep logistical hurt because that late 1960's era had far, far fewer fuel trucks built per armored/mechanized unit.
The firepower of the Russian Army is in its vehicles.
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Vehicles have to move for Russian firepower to do the same.
That ability to move is now in doubt.
It is clear the Ukrainian military has noticed this Russian fuel distribution problem and is acting to make it worse.
The difficulty of stopping the grey market electronic component trade to Russia doesn't mean it should not be tried.
It can and should be.
The issue is how difficult, costly, and unreliable sanctions can make the supply chain for Russian high tech weapons.
2/n
Production lines need parts at a rate that can support production.
Simply making it so that the full build of materials needed for a finished drone or missile are highly irregular in showing will have the same sort of effect as strategic bombing.
This is an interesting development on a number of levels. As in, TRLG 230 has the same "legs" (range) as a GMLRS-ER.
So Ukraine now has multiple sources of guided rocket deep strike capability. This means political pressure by any one supplier to negotiate 'land for peace'
This is really good advertising for Turkish high tech weapons for nations on the West's export control lists.
Another possibility is we are seeing a cover story for use of the Luchs 300 mm Vilkha-M.
2/4
Whether we are looking at a Turkish TRLG 230, a US GMLRS-ER or a indigenous Ukrainian Vilkha-M.
A missile with the reach shown in the @DefMon3 map means all of Russia's truck, train and Sea of Azov port logistics north of Crimea in Southern Ukraine are under AFU's thumb.
3/4
On Nov 19th I did a thread on the Przewdow missile strike making the case it wasn't a Ukrainian missile and I mentioned a radar & electronic warfare angle I didn't address.
The thing about being one of the few people who have researched General MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters is you learn all the old tricks with mechanically rotating antenna radars like that on the 1977 vintage E-3 Sentry AWACS APY-1.
The missile attack on Przewodow has become a Rorschach test for how strong the West’s de-escalation faction’s "directed cognition" is in dealing with Reality in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The “It was a Ukrainian missile” narrative doesn't match reality. This🧵will explain
1/
...why.
**Directed cognition, in rough layman terms, means making a quick & incorrect analysis from limited data and only picking more data to support that analysis.
The way to cure a directed cognition conclusion is to audit all the available data.
To do this I’m going to walk you through 5V55K missile design, fuzing, weapon effects, and some Ukrainian evidence. I'm going to leave radar & electronic warfare for another thread.
Below are infographics of the 5V55K & a data table. 3/
The irony of Biden Administration National Security Advisor Sullivan's 'de-escalation' phobia about not letting Ukraine receive the 55 NATO Mig-29's has come home to roost.
Sullivan's role in preventing adequate PSU fighter air defense may well lead to a NATO escalation from 1/6