The Kh-22 [AS-4 Kitchen] is a supersonic air-launched cruise missile originally developed as an anti-shipping missile. First entering service in 1962, it is the oldest standoff munition in ๐ท๐บ inventory. Production is estimated to have ceased around 1988. 2/13
The Kh-22 is carried exclusively by ๐ท๐บ Tu-22M3 [Backfire-C] strategic bombers. The Tu-22M3 can carry up to 3 Kh-22s, though it is common for them to carry one or two at a time. 3/13
The most interesting and relevant technical aspect of the Kh-22 is its propulsion system. Unlike other cruise missiles that typically use jet engines, the Kh-22 uses an actual liquid-propellant rocket engine. 4/13
The Kh-22 is powered by a single R-201-300 engine developed by the Isayev Design Bureau (OKB-2). The R-201-300 uses TG-02 (also known as Tonka or Tonka-250) as the fuel and AK-27I, a formulation of inhibited red-fuming nitric acid (IRFNA), as the oxidizer. 5/13
TG-02 is a ~50/50 mixture of triethylamine and various isomers of xylidine. AK27I consists of ~73% nitric acid, ~27% dinitrogen tetroxide (NTO), and an iodine-based inhibitor. The inhibitor is present to prevent the nitric acid from rapidly corroding the oxidizer tanks. 6/13
The combination of TG-02 and AK27I is hypergolic, meaning they ignite immediately upon contact with each other in the absence of an ignition source. While this simplifies engine design by not requiring a separate ignition system, it complicates propellant handling. 7/13
The Kh-22's propellants, combined with the age of the missiles, themselves likely goes a long way to explain these in-flight failures. The newest units are almost 35 years old. The R-201-300 is a maze of pumps and propellant lines that have valves, seals, etc. 8/13
A single eroded seal could lead to a propellant leak that would easily cause an explosive engine failure, esp. since the propellants are hypergolic. For example, the Cygnus Orb-3 mission failed when one of Antares' 35-year-old NK-33 engines exploded shortly after launch. 9/13
Deviations in propellant composition due to improper storage could likewise cause a violent engine failure. For example, the nitric acid in IRFNA decomposes over time to nitrogen dioxide, water, and oxygen with exposure to light or elevated temperatures. 10/13
Despite the presence of an inhibitor, IRFNA will still slowly corrode its storage tank. Over time, this will leech material from the tank walls and contaminate the propellant. Either of these effects could produce a significant deviation in propellant composition. 11/13
These deviations could easily produce temperatures or pressures that exceed design parameters or potentially cause unexpected combustion instabilities leading to violent vibrations capable of tearing the engine and missile apart. 12/13
These are just a few examples of the innumerable failure modes that are possible when working with aged (and likely improperly stored/maintained) liquid rocket engines and propellants (that are also hypergolic). 13/13
โข โข โข
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Hi Lesya, as you may know I was a volunteer on Walter Report, later Mriya Report, from May 2022 to January 2023.
I have Mriya Report internal communications that detail continuous coordination between MR and the MA board from the creation of MR in July 2022 through January 2023.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid Given the turnover in the MA since then, Iโm inclined to assume you may be unaware of that prior history.
The assertion there was no coordination between MA and MR is, from my perspective, demonstrably false. Iโm happy to provide excerpted communications to that effect.
@Lesya_G @JSetka @P_Kallioniemi @MriyaReport @MriyaAid โJoeโ refers to Joseph โYehudaโ Friedberg and โBโ is Alexander Bakus, then MAโs Director of Treasury.
MR forked off from WR on July 17. Alex was intimately involved in the planning of this split and coordinated it with MA alongside Yehuda.
A brief round up of what we do actually know thus far about Iran's ballistic missile raid against Israel, named "Operation True Promise 2" by the IRGC.
Starting with the missiles, Iran employed 180-200 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), including Ghadr, Emad, and Kheibarshekan or Fattah-1.
A derivative of the Shahab-3, Ghadr is a liquid-fueled MRBM that ordinarily carries a single separable reentry vehicle (RV). These specfic missiles have been upgraded with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs).
Ghadr is one of the primary missiles Iran employed against Israel in April during "Operation True Promise."
A further development of Ghadr, Emad is a liquid-fueled MRBM that carries a single separable MaRV. Alongside Ghadr, is one of the primary missiles previously employed against Israel in April.
Although defense articles designated as Significant Military Equipment were exported to China without authorization, that SME does not appear to be classified.
The unauthorized hand-carry of defense articles, specifically technical data, to Russia, Iran, and Lebanon by RTX employees on personal travel with company-issued electronic devices likely only concerns unclassified defense articles.
Neither an Antenna Mast Group nor Communications Relay Group and Electric Power Unit are visible.
The CRG acting as the RLG's Launcher Control Station plus AMG and EPU are emplaced at a different site. RL1 enables the CRG/LCS to communicate with LS up to 10 km away via VHF.
2|6
Remote launchers optimize PATRIOT's defended area against tactical ballistic missiles but create dead zones for airbreathing threats.
Remoting launchers in this instance is unusual as the RLG does not have Dnipro within its defended area for TBMs with PAC-3 or PAC-3 MSE.
3|6
I won't detail the complete program history of S-300P/F/V as @ChungTzuW has already written excellent threads about them which I strongly recommend reading for context.
In short, all three systems emerged from a joint VKS/VMF/SV procurement program.
2|23
VKS/VMF requirements were focused on ABTs (air-breathing threats) while SV requirements were focused on TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles). This led to a divergence into S-300P/F and S-300V using radically different missiles and radars.
3|23
GLSDB has a range of >150 km while SDB has a range of ~110 km from a ~12 km release altitude and ~270 m/s release airspeed.
Position error due to accumulated inertial measurement unit drift is quadratically proportional to time of flight and range by extension.
2|5
Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
3|5